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ABSTRACT 
Debate about European labour market flexibility enhancing reforms and lack thereof has 
a tendency to be dominated by economics arguments. This thesis advances the debate by 
going beyond the economics arguments to ask the political science question: what 
explains the political ability (or inability) to enact flexibility enhancing reforms in 
European countries from the early 1980s to the global recession of 2008? Answering the 
question, this thesis argues that the ability to enact reforms is best explained by a 
combination of traditional political-economy pressures for reforms and political-
electoral motivations of party leaders in government. 
 
The argument is supported by a longitudinal analysis of European and country specific 
reforms using mixed-methods – i.e. quantitative and qualitative research –and 
employment protection legislation (EPL) as a proxy for reforms, the latter being 
warranted because of EPLs political salience as a reform target prior to 2008. First, a 
quantitative cross-country reform-hazard analysis arrives at significant economic and 
political explanations for reforms, which include a country’s social model, 
unemployment rate and economic growth. Then, a qualitative analysis of the trajectory 
of EPL and functionally linked labour market reforms combines the quantitative results 
with a broader political understanding of reforms for Germany, the UK and Denmark as 
country cases where reforms were enacted, and France as a case where only limited or 
contradictory EPL reforms were put in place during the period covered by this thesis.  
 
The thesis adds robustness to the literature showing most pre-2008 global recession 
reforms were at the margin, targeting non-regular employment parts of European labour 
markets. However, overall, the thesis provides a political understanding of the European 
reform trajectory, suggesting that economic arguments rarely on their own stand up as 
determinants of reforms. The implications for future research are that the enactment of 
flexibility enhancing reforms should be treated more explicitly as the outcomes of 
political decisions and less as reactive steps to economic predictions or political 
economy pressures for reforms, even if the latter continues to play a role in bringing 
reforms onto the political agenda.  
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Research question and theoretical background   
Why, politically, have European politicians been able to reform European labour 
markets towards more flexibility in the thirty years leading up to the global recession 
that started in 2008? Answering that question by understanding the determinants of 
reforms - i.e. what explains the political ability to enact reforms – is important to 
political science because of the political salience and scale of reforms undertaken by 
European politicians from the early 1980s to 2008, who steadily implemented a range of 
liberalizing or flexibility enhancing labour market reforms. Across the 15 most 
integrated EU member states1, ‘almost two reforms per year and country’ were 
implemented from 1980 to 2007 – primarily liberalizing reforms in the areas of 
employment protection, unemployment benefits and active labour market policies 
(Boeri, 2011:1185).   
 
While many of those reforms were on their own marginal – defined as creating or 
widening the gap ‘between a reformed and an unreformed segment of the labour market’ 
– they were cumulatively part of an overall liberalization of European countries (Boeri, 
2011:1174; Baccaro and Howell, 2011). From a political science perspective, this thesis 
posits that understanding the political ability to reform is as important as understanding 
the economic need for reforms or the empirical (often disputable) outcomes of such 
reforms – an area of study that has spurred a large and growing literature, e.g. on labour 
market dualization and the impact of reforms on unemployment (Palier and Thelen, 
2010; Howell et. al., 2010; Baccaro and Rei, 2007).  
 
Indeed, focusing on the ability to reform – defined as political coalitions aligning to 
enact flexibility enhancing labour market reforms – is warranted precisely because of the 
unrelenting economics argument in favour of reforms during the thirty years to 2008.  
During that period, for example, the prevailing economics view was that increasing 
                                                 
1 For the list of EU15 countries, please refer to Table 3 in Chapter 2.  
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flexibility, e.g. lowering employment protection –  would be beneficial to European 
economies by driving down the rising unemployment and decreasing levels of growth 
they were experiencing (OECD, 1987; Siebert, 1997).  Therefore, even if never entirely 
separate, this thesis focuses on the ability rather than the need for reforms.  
 
The research question posed is: using the politically salient variable of employment 
protection (EPL) as a proxy – while also including other functionally linked labour 
market reform areas where relevant – what explains the political enactment of flexibility 
enhancing reforms in European countries in the 30 years to 2008’s great recession?  
 
In answering the question, the thesis aligns with the emerging literature focused on 
‘analysis of the political coalitions on which economic institutions rest’ (Thelen, 
2012:139). First, the political-electoral perspective hypothesises that variables such as 
the political electoral impact of enacting reforms is the most likely determinant of 
whether European labour market flexibility enhancing reforms are enacted or not. This 
hypothesis is supported by looking at election or leadership prospects for politicians 
attempting to implement reforms, changes to party systems and other politically driven 
changes within a country’s political system. Conditions that would in turn help 
determine if and how political coalitions can enact reforms.  
 
The literature on labour market flexibility reforms recognises such an explicitly political 
argument. Liberalizing reforms may deliver (economic) benefits over the long term, but 
may also be eschewed by politicians who are limited by four- or five- year terms of 
office at the end of which they wish to be, or for their party to be, re-elected. They are 
too well aware that the ‘pains of reform usually precede the gains, making it even harder 
to push through the needed reforms’ (Bean, 1998:355; Saint-Paul, 2000). Similarly, a 
review by European Central Bank economists of the literature dealing with the challenge 
of agreeing to and implementing structural reforms showed that European politicians 
‘discount the future at a higher rate than is socially desirable, owing to the political 
uncertainty surrounding their eventual re-election’ (Leiner-Killinger, et. al., 2007:12). 
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From a politicians’ perspective, as aptly expressed by Jean-Claude Juncker, former 
Prime Minister of Luxembourg and current President of the European Commission the 
dilemma of implementing or failing to implement European labour market flexibility 
reforms in the period prior to 2008, when viewed from a political standpoint, can be 
summed up as one in which ‘we all know what to do, we just don’t know how to get re-
elected after we’ve done it’ (Economist, 2007). In this sense, the more formal political 
reasons for a lack of reforms were likely unfavourable short-term electoral prospects for 
politicians. Or, stated inversely to Juncker’s statement, the hypothesis that a political 
leader may put forward an electoral approach that privileges a country’s interests at the 
cost of re-election. Hence, researchers and political practitioners alike converge around 
the idea that labour market flexibility reforms or lack thereof are best explained by 
understanding how they affect politicians attempting to implement reforms. 
 
A second way to explain political coalitions for reforms, hypothesises that political 
economic conditions, or in certain cases economics-based variables, may present the 
most likely determinants of the ability to reform labour markets e.g. a desire to reduce 
unemployment or increase growth through employment protection reforms. Or at the 
very least that political economy variables need to be controlled for when considering 
the politics of labour market reform enactments. In other words, can labour market 
flexibility reforms, or lack thereof, be best explained by a political focus on solving 
problems of government, e.g. high levels of unemployment, or maintaining institutional 
continuity and thereby potentially, a country’s social model comparative advantage as 
the main driver of political coalitions forming to enact reforms? 
 
While labour markets are only a subset of the political economy institutions on which 
European countries could or would depend to address challenges like unemployment, the 
hypothesis that both wider political economy and specific economic variables are the 
most likely determinants of labour market flexibility enhancing reforms can also be 
grounded in the existing literature. For example, enacted reforms have been theoretically 
linked to ‘pressures to deliver policies that are congruent with production regimes’, e.g. 
coordinated and uncoordinated market economies, or reforms of the same (Wood, 
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2001:248; Soskice, 1990). Further, as shown by Hassel, most European governments 
have experienced political economy ‘pressures for reform’ emanating from ‘labour 
market and social policy inefficiencies that burdened governments’, e.g. stagnant 
economic growth or persistent high unemployment levels (Hassel, 2007:254).  
 
In addition to those domestic pressures for reforms, the pressures wrought by European 
and global economic integration should also be considered. So far, the literature on 
Europeanization has focused mainly on the impact of European economic and political 
integration on continuity and change in the politics and policy outcomes of EU Member 
States, including labour market reforms (Exadactylos and Radaelli, 2012; Graziano and 
Vink, 2006; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). Yet the EU only has limited jurisdictional 
capacity in the area of labour market policy – no supranational authority exists at the EU 
level in that domain. Hence, the impact of Europeanization or globalization on labour 
market flexibility reforms must necessarily be indirect. That holds even for European 
Union soft law like the Lisbon Agenda and the “Europe 2020” initiative that followed 
the Lisbon Agenda (Schmidt, 2006; Borras and Jacobssen, 2004; Mosher and Trubek 
2003; De la Porte, 2002). 
 
Of course, the argument could, and indeed has been made that labour market flexibility 
is not important regardless of political and economic considerations or pressures for 
reforms, including European integration and globalization. Simply put: ‘why deregulate 
labour markets’ at all when ‘no serious…politician believes that flexible labour markets 
resolve everything’? (Anderson and Regini, 2000:2). However, from a longitudinal 
perspective it is politically salient that, in particular, employment protection reforms 
were increasingly common during the period covered by this thesis. Indeed, Andersen 
and Regini who asked their question about labour market deregulation in 2000, admitted 
that flexibility had become necessary or would increasingly become so as part of the 
ability of European economies to ‘adjust quickly to change’ in a globalizing world 
economy (Regini, 2000:15).  
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In fact, the literature now broadly recognises that the political challenge in regulating the 
risks of European political economies has become not one of whether or not to reform, 
rather one of ‘[a]dapting unemployment protection to labour market change’ as a ‘major 
social and economic challenge to European welfare states’ (Clasen and Clegg, 2012:1). 
To the extent that a ‘liberalization of the world’s economies’, including for the European 
labour markets of the countries covered in this thesis, to varying degrees has already 
occurred (Hall and Thelen, 2009:8; Baccaro and Howell, 2011; Boeri, 2011). What is 
missing, however, is a clear picture of the determinants or explanations of the political 
decisions to enact those reforms – marginal or otherwise.  
 
Explaining labour market reforms is important for two reasons. First, because rather than 
circumscribing the answer to a single hypothesis, it is likely to be the combination of 
economic challenges to governments and political-electoral (dis)advantages to reforming 
political parties and their leaders, changes to party systems or other politically driven 
changes within the political system of a country that offers the more precise 
understanding of conditions for European labour market flexibility enhancing reforms. 
Second, as the thesis will show, through a better understanding of the trajectory of 
reforms obtained via a longitudinal analysis of enacted reforms, the specific conditions 
for reforms can be made more explicit for the benefit of focusing policy makers wishing 
to meet the reform challenge of European labour market flexibility. Overall, the 
argument presented based on the trajectory of reforms is that the reform challenge was 
and ultimately remained a political challenge during the time period covered by the 
thesis. 
 
Understanding the reform trajectory is important, because regardless of political 
economy pressures for reforms, there are certainly cases where, for example, even high 
increases in unemployment did not forestall significant labour market reforms, i.e. 
France (Milner, 2012; Malo et. al., 2000). Therefore, the specification of a combined 
political and economic understanding of European reform trajectories for labour market 
flexibility is important as neither on its own are likely to offer a satisfactory answer. In 
other words, the thesis argues that the traditional approach of focusing only on economic 
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pressures or political-electoral arguments for or against labour market reforms will leave 
the reader short of understanding what determined the ability for reforms to go forward.  
 
To recap, answering the posed research question is achieved using employment 
protection legislation (EPL) and functionally related reform enactment events as a proxy 
for the dependent variable of labour market flexibility reforms across European countries 
from the early 1980s, in some cases earlier if theoretically warranted, to the Great 
Recession in 2008. The reasoning behind the selection of changes to EPL as the main 
proxy for European labour market flexibility reform events is explained in the next 
Section 1.2. The section also analyses the availability of data to conduct a longitudinal 
analysis of reform events to answer the research question and test the posed hypotheses. 
Section 1.3 then provides an overview of actual observed variation on the dependent 
variable of EPL. Finally, details of the thesis research design and methods are set out in 
Section 1.4. Overall, the research design will allow for testing the two hypothesis 
outlined above using both quantitative and qualitative methods with the aim of 
answering the posed research question.   
1.2 Employment protection and labour market reforms  
The long-standing argument for European hiring and firing flexibility reforms is largely 
anchored in the OECDs highly influential 1994 ‘Jobs Study’ (OECD, 1994). The study 
built on and referenced what Boeri and van Ours argue was a ‘large body of academic 
papers and policy reports…[that] examined the effects of labour market institutions on 
economic performance before the Great Recession’ (Boeri and van Ours, 2013:1). Its 
basic purpose was to try to explain the large discrepancy in labour market success 
between the highly flexible labour market of the United States of America (USA) and 
the less flexible European one(s).  
 
The overall finding of the study was that Europe exhibited significant institutional 
‘rigidities’, derived from much higher levels of EPL – also a standard measure of labour 
market flexibility used by the OECD (OECD, 1994). While of course there were other 
existing political rigidities like the strength of organized labour and institutional 
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constraints in some countries, the EPL focus was perhaps surprising perhaps but more so 
as it departed somewhat from the usual focus within political economy and economics 
research on the interaction effects of EPL, unemployment benefits, active labour market 
policies, and the total tax wedge on low wages that are usually components of labour 
market institutions and structural reforms of the same (cf. Boeri and Van Ours, 2013:23).  
 
Yet the OECD Jobs Study did not stand alone. A range of economics and policy related 
literature emerging from the “Eurosclerosis” of the 1980s, to at least the 2008 Great 
Recession, focused on EPL as the main culprit of the purported European labour market 
malaise and as the economic and political challenge of European labour market 
flexibility reforms (Siebert, 1997; Tanzi and Schuknecht, 1996). Also evident in the 
Agenda for a Growing Europe, called The Sapir Report2 for its lead author Andre Sapir, 
and in subsequent peer reviewed articles covering the work of the Report, EPL was 
emphasised over levels of unemployment benefits covering a typology of four European 
social models, namely Continental, Anglo-Saxon, Mediterranean, and Nordic social 
models (Sapir, 2006).  
 
Not only did the OECD Job Study set the tone for the political salience of EPL for the 
period covered in this thesis, Sapir’s work also demonstrates the utility of understanding 
labour market reforms in terms of EPL (over other functionally linked areas) as his 
analysis showed how ‘protecting jobs with employment legislation is definitely 
detrimental to employment, whereas protecting workers with unemployment insurance is 
potentially useful for employment’ (Sapir, 2006:379). To illustrate, by extension, Sapir’s 
social model typology showed that while liberal Anglo-Saxon regimes were 
economically efficient through low EPL, they lacked a robust element of equity; that 
conservative Continental and Mediterranean regimes tended to be both inefficient (high 
EPL) and (increasingly) unequal; while the Nordic European regimes showed the ability 
to achieve both efficiency (low EPL) in global markets and a high degree of relative 
equity (Sapir, 2006). 
                                                 
2 A report on the economy of the European Union edited by a panel of experts under the direction of 
André Sapir and published in July 2003 (Sapir, 2003). 
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That matters because at a political level, labour market flexibility understood through the 
EPL variable showed that there would not necessarily be an implicit conflict with the 
equity-focused assumption of the overall European social model (Sapir, 2006). Put 
differently, for using the EPL variable as a dependent variable, calls for reforms of EPL 
needed not necessarily be considered neo-liberal in intent and therefore potentially 
ideologically biased. That is because, as shown by the Nordic social model, EPL driven 
labour market flexibility and equity can, in principle and as evident in the Nordic 
countries, co-exist.  
 
Hence with respect to social models as an analytical variable for understanding labour 
market flexibility reforms, because they explicitly deal with the advantages or 
disadvantages of flexible labour market, Sapir’s typology is useful to help frame a 
European-focused analysis of the determinants of European labour market flexibility 
reforms and will be used throughout the thesis. Further, in a wider political economy 
context, Sapir’s typology provides a structural reform perspective focused explicitly 
around labour markets that does not contradict the otherwise more prevalent varieties of 
capitalism and/or worlds of welfare capitalism social model typologies (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001; Esping Andersen, 1996).  
 
The liberal, conservative, and social democratic models defined by Esping-Andersen 
were developed around how a welfare state regime could limit the overall market 
‘commoditisation’ of labour (Esping-Andersen, 1990:144). For this reason, labour 
market institutions and reforms of the same – like wage-setting, legal job protection, and 
so forth, in this tradition were studied using a power-resource approach for the extent to 
which they offered social protection, omitting a direct link to EPL (Regini and Esping-
Anderson, 2000; Esping-Andersen, 1990:144). 
 
Similarly, Hall and Soskice’s ‘variety of capitalism’ argues that countries had developed 
social models in accordance with their institutional, Ricardian comparative competitive 
advantages (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Soskice, 1990). Using Germany and the USA as 
core case countries, the varieties of capitalism approach argues that political economies 
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derived comparative competitive advantage mainly from their ability to establish and 
sustain specific labour market skills levels, e.g. low in the USA and high in Germany, 
through which a sustainable competitive advantage was created and perpetuated – rather 
than levels of EPL as in the case of Sapir’s typology (Iversen, 2005; Sapir, 2003; Hall 
and Soskice, 2001). Therefore, those social model constructs, i.e. varieties of capitalism 
and worlds of welfare capitalism theories are only drawn on where theoretically relevant 
with the analysis of EPL instead making reference to Sapir’s social model typology as 
described above.  
 
Returning to employment protection and labour market reforms, it is important at the 
outset of the thesis to recognise that even if Sapir’s typology is contingent on a positive 
EPL reduction effect on European political economies, economics-research evidence has 
since emerged to challenge the mainstream EPL reform-benefits view prevalent before 
the Great Recession. Specifically, a host of studies have shown that EPL-driven 
structural reforms do not always empirically yield the intended economic results of, say, 
lower unemployment that was assumed in, for example, the above mentioned OECD Job 
Study report (Baccaro and Rei, 2007; Howell et. al., 2007). 
 
Even so, the way in which importance has been ascribed by politicians and economists 
alike to EPL shows a continued underlining of its special location in the politics of 
European political economies – certainly within the time frame covered by this thesis. 
For example, the relevant economics literature on labour market reforms holds that ‘the 
strict employment protection legislation in Europe…[was] the smoking gun responsible 
for the asymmetric responses to the global shock of the 2008-9 [Great Recession]’ 
(Boeri and van Ours, 2013:2). Equally, the labour market literature within ‘political 
economy puts heavy emphasis on employment legislation’ to understand country-level 
‘trajectories of liberalization’ and how governments can ‘influence the operation of 
labour markets’ (Thelen, 2012:112).  
 
Overall then, while perhaps economics and political economy literature on the 
significance of EPL as a structural reform variable for the period covered here may be 
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somewhat simplistic, within a policy context it serves to highlight that for politicians one 
of the absolute key labour market rigidities focused on in Europe, from the early 1980s 
to at least the Great Recession, related to EPL. Hence, for the purposes of this thesis and 
in recognition of the need for a parsimonious analysis in the face of otherwise highly 
complex European labour markets, EPL can function as a useful proxy for analysing the 
ability of European politicians to enact labour market flexibility reforms at least up to 
the Great Recession. That is, EPL is a critical and important indicator of labour market 
policy (dis)continuities not least through its perceived economic impact in the pre-Great 
Recession period, but mainly also for its high political salience. 
  
Beyond economics, the politics of increased labour market flexibility through lowering 
of EPL also link up to political leadership strategies and coalitions that may or may not 
support reforms in the short and long term (Thelen, 2012). In that context, the literature 
on structural or liberalizing reforms is much larger than can be covered in this thesis. 
However, to further define and put the focus on EPL in perspective, liberalizing or 
flexibility enhancing labour market reforms usually involve one of two main strands. 
The first strand covers de-regulation or the ‘elimination or relaxation of institutional 
barriers’ and the second covers more extensive systemic ‘transformation in the role 
played by formally unchanged institutions’ as they take on ‘different functions and 
generate different outcomes’ within political economies (Baccaro and Howell, 
2011:527).  
 
Situated within the first strand, a reduction in employment protection is one avenue of 
liberalizing reforms that can be directly traced by looking at its defining ‘removal of 
legal or contractual restrictions at the workplace level, in the broader market, and in 
society’ by analysing changes in European countries’ EPL (Baccaro and Howell, 
2011:527). The caveat is that, ultimately, the explanatory power of the analysis in this 
thesis will also be restricted by the narrower focus on de-regulation rather than more 
broad systemic transformations. Importantly, however, EPL is as mentioned above 
readily available and a widely used variable in reform related research (Boeri and van 
Ours, 2013; Thelen, 2012:112). Critically, it covers the majority of the time period 
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relevant to the thesis research question, being available from the OECD from 1985 
onwards (OECD, 2010). 
 
That said, a number of additional data sources can help provide important, additional 
qualitative insights into the content and exact political nature of European labour market 
reforms. Pointing to the generally increased importance ascribed to labour market 
reforms across Europe, the European Commission has developed the LABREF database, 
which covers reforms in 20 EU member states from 2000 to 2013 (Turrini et. al., 2014). 
Likewise, the private Rodolfo de Benedetti Foundation (FRDB) makes available a 
qualitative country-by-country overview of all structural and non-structural labour 
market reforms in European countries covering the years from 1980 to 2007, including 
one specifically for EPL (FRDB, 2015; Boeri, 2011).  
 
However, LABREF only ‘collects information on measures adopted by EU Member 
States’ compared to EPL covering all of the OECD (Turrini et. al., 2014). LABREF is 
therefore less useful than the OECDs EPL in terms of a longitudinal study and as an 
indicator of the area where politicians presumably focused their efforts in the period 
leading up to the Great Recession: a comparison focused on differences between a 
sclerotic EU and the presumably more dynamic USA, as well as the rest of the OECD. 
Differently, the FRDB database focuses on qualitative tracing of all legislated reforms in 
the 15 most integrated EU member states. Therefore, that does allow a complementary 
qualitative review of trends discerned through the use of the quantitative OECD-EPL 
variable, especially at a country level (Boeri, 2011).  
 
Overall, while both the LABREF and the FRDB databases are important repository of 
information on labour reforms, the OECD’s EPL indicator remains the single most 
straightforward quantitative, if imperfect, longitudinal proxy-indicator for the thesis 
dependent variable of labour market flexibility reform events in Europe up to the Great 
Recession. Not least when what is sought is a measure for cross-country comparison of 
trends in labour market flexibility reforms with an emphasis on testing the politics 
oriented research hypotheses of this thesis, as outlined above. For those reasons the 
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FRDB data is used in lieu of LABREF’s to provide qualitative information to the thesis’ 
analysis of labour market flexibility reform events over and beyond the data available on 
EPL from the OECD, which is used for the thesis’ quantitative analysis. 
 
Finally, the definition of the OECD’s EPL measure is straightforward and unambiguous 
i.e. EPL is defined as employment protection derived by labour market participants 
through legislation, judicial rulings, collective bargaining deals and national practices 
(OECD, 2014a). As such, technically EPL is a longitudinal data series presented by the 
OECD, covering ‘the procedures and costs involved in dismissing individuals or groups 
of workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers’ (Venn, 2009; OECD, 2007).         
 
In sum, for the purposes of this thesis, EPL is used for its political salience and 
longitudinal, comparative availability. Yet it is not used in isolation, drawing mainly on 
FRDB data where available to provide qualitative information on each reform event at 
country level. Also, critically, related reforms in the areas of unemployment benefits, 
active labour market policies, and the total tax wedge on low wages that are usually part 
and parcel of labour market institutions and structural reforms of the same will be taken 
into account to complement the analysis and enrich our understanding of what 
constitutes the “perfect storm” when it comes to labour market reforms. 
 
Critically, EPL links the argument that ‘relying on strict unemployment laws at a time of 
rapid change when old jobs and practices are no longer warranted, (…) discourages 
adaptation to change and preserves the status quo’ to the analysis of this thesis by 
emphasizing that the overall and longitudinal timing of events is not trivial (Sapir, 
2006:381). That this is so should not be surprising as reforms will always form part of an 
on-going political process. In other words, a longitudinal perspective also becomes 
critical to assess the politics of EPL reform decisions. To arrive at a longitudinal 
perspective with respect to EPL reform, the subsequent Section looks at the observable 
variation on the thesis dependent variable of EPL. 
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1.3 Variation on the dependent variable: marginal reforms   
As we have seen so far, to study politically salient determinants of labour market 
flexibility reforms, the most important distinction to be made is that although inter-
related, the political decision or ability to enact reforms is distinct from the impact of 
such reforms on economic outcomes. In the latter case, the economics-based socio-
economic impact of labour market flexibility reforms is primarily an empirical question, 
whilst the enactment of such reforms – the topic of this thesis, remain an analytically 
separate question concerning the trajectory of political decisions to reform or not. 
 
Now moving to an initial analysis of observed variation on the dependent variable of the 
thesis, reforms, it might a priori be considered cavalier to claim that a reform trend of 
any sort is to be expected across all European countries. However, the idea that 
European countries can be analytically assessed as a block with respect to regulation and 
de-regulation is quite practical and arguably of intrinsic analytical value. For example, in 
a recent assessment of EU member states, Hix argued that rather than different across the 
board, say along social model lines, the ‘basic socio-economic policies of the EU 
Member States are really quite similar compared to the rest of the world’ (Hix, 2008:21).  
 
The premise therefore, as corroborated by the economics literature on European labour 
market flexibility reforms, is that European labour markets have been reformed towards 
more flexibility, at least at the margin (Boeri, 2011). To illustrate, consider the trend in 
EPL reforms in Table 1 showing the variation on the proxy dependent variable of the 
thesis, EPL. For ease of reference given the focus of this thesis, in Table 1 EPL reforms 
are further differentiated by European social models using Sapir’s typology; with the 
time period covered being from 1985 to 2008.  
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Table 1: Employment Protection Legislation EU15 by Social Models 
  
EU15 by 
Social Model 
EPL 1985 
Employment Protection 
Legislation 
EPL 2008 
Employment Protection 
Legislation 
Change 
1985-2008 
Overall Regular  Temporary Overall Regular  Temporary Overall Regular  Temporary 
Continental 11 10 13 9 10 9 -2 0 -4 
Nordic 11 10 11 7 9 5 -4 -1 -6 
Mediterranea
n 
15 13 17 10 10 11 -5 -3 -7 
Anglo-Saxon 2 3 1 2 3 1 0 0 1 
EU15 Total 39 36 42 29 32 26 -10 -4 -16 
Data Source: Estimates of the employment protection indicators from 1985-2008 available from the OECD’s employment protection 
website (www.oecd.org/employment/protection). Extracted in 2010 and rounded to zero decimal places – see full details in Table 2, 
Chapter 2. All tabulations and calculations completed as part of research for this thesis. Social Model categories as developed by 
Sapir (Sapir, 2006). For the list of EU15 countries, please refer to Table 3 in Chapter 2. 
 
Table 1 indicates that for the group of 15 most integrated European Union member states 
between 1985-2008, there was a reform trajectory showing a change towards labour 
market flexibility of about 25% for the overall EPL measure: the summary overall EPL 
score for EU15 countries decreased from 39 in 1985 to 29 in 2008. However, the two-
tiered nature of the reforms showing a gap ‘emerging between a reformed and an 
unreformed segment of the labour market’ can also be discerned from Table 1: the 
difference for temporary EPL was a large -16 versus that of regular EPL, which was 
more subdued at only -4 in difference between 1985 and 2008 (Boeri, 2011:1185). 
 
Further, in analysing EPL reforms from an economics perspective, Boeri and Garibaldi 
argued that the observed two-tier reforms led to a so-called ‘honeymoon effect’ (Boeri 
and Garibaldi, 2007). The effect appears when temporary contract flexibility increases 
and ‘firms exploit’ this new hiring flexibility; yet, since regular employment conditions 
have not changed, ultimately all workers are replaced by workers with temporary 
contracts and ‘employment returns to its level before the reform’ (Boeri and Garibaldi, 
2011:1204). While arising strictly from an economics perspective, the honeymoon effect 
type of argument – driven off observed policies that are similar with respect to the 
enactment of marginal labour market reforms, has also spurred a politics-focused 
literature for understanding one of the possible outcomes of marginal reforms around 
what has been termed labour market ‘dualization’ (Palier and Thelen, 2010).  
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Dualization is defined as marginal labour market reforms leading to a two-way 
segmentation of the labour market. Insiders – those who are able to politically hold out 
against or lessen the impact of labour market liberalising reforms, and outsiders – those 
who suffer the brunt of flexibility enhancing labour market reforms are segmented when 
dualization occurs (Rueda, 2007). Insiders work within unreformed regular employment 
terms and non-regular or temporary employment terms – those that are at the margin, are 
created or further liberalized for labour market outsiders. The result is a dualized labour 
market or a posited European ‘age’ of dualized labour markets (Davidsson and 
Emmenegger, 2012; Palier and Thelen, 2010).  
 
To illustrate, if translated into social model terminology, dualization means that an 
increasing number of outsiders experience a higher level of commodification and 
presumably also a more competitive labour market. However, for the purpose of this 
thesis the outcome aspect of dualization as a result of marginal reforms is not the main 
interest. What the dualization literature adds to the analysis here is related to the political 
aspects of reforming coalitions opting for two-tier labour market regimes. As such, 
dualization may be analytically useful for understanding political reform choices and 
where present – in the same vein to that of social model belonging, can qualitatively 
point to analytically useful information with respect to labour market reforms that both 
occurred or might not have occurred, i.e. the observance of persistently unreformed 
labour market segments (Boeri, 2011:1175). 
 
Linking to existing answers for how policy or reforms enactment coalitions might form, 
Saint-Paul has seminally used the median voter theorem to argue that politically 
significant labour market reforms would most likely arrive in two parts; in effect 
supporting both the idea of an economic honeymoon effect and a political preference for 
the reform outcome associated with labour market dualization (Saint-Paul, 2000). 
According to Saint-Paul’s theory, first politicians need to buy the ‘support of incumbent 
employees by granting that the new arrangements…will only apply to new contracts’ 
(Saint-Paul, 2000:227). Reforms would therefore not affect the status quo for voters 
under regular employment arrangements – insiders or regular contract holders most 
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likely also being the median voter majority, the votes of which are necessary for political 
parties aiming to win the power to form a government. Then, as a second step, with the 
increased flexibility in place, over time this could lead to further systemic change 
through labour market reforms for other (regular) parts of the labour market (Saint-Paul, 
2000).  
 
Dualization is perhaps then a political expression of the first step in Saint-Paul’s labour 
market flexibility reform theory. Yet one area where dualization varies is in terms of the 
argument that what is causing dualization – and hence by implication also labour market 
flexibility reforms, is the changing nature of existing political economy ‘linkages’ 
between industrial relations, labour market policy and welfare state reforms (Palier and 
Thelen, 2012:121). Those are valid arguments, but this thesis attempts a slightly 
different approach to explaining labour market flexibility reforms by distinguishing 
mainly between political and economic explanatory variables and their combined effect 
over time, where discernible, to help determine what best explains the ability of 
politicians to enact flexibility enhancing reforms. 
 
Having looked at this thesis’ research question, hypotheses and described the dependent 
variable of labour market flexibility reforms in the context of the existing literature, the 
rest of this Chapter examines the design and methods applied to answer the thesis 
question so that both political and economic or wider political economy explanatory 
variables can then be further developed in the subsequent Chapters.  
 
1.4 Design and methods   
1.4.1 Mixed-methods and case selection   
Labour markets are complex institutions and therefore, for ease of analysis and because 
of its political salience as discussed above, this thesis relies largely on the widely used 
OECD EPL measure of reform events as a proxy for the dependent variable of European 
labour market flexibility change and continuity. EPL is available for EU and non-EU 
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members of the OECD and measures longitudinally traceable reform events, events in 
the direction of more flexibility being the main variable of interest.  
 
In politically explaining EPL change events, the determinants of labour market de-
regulation need to capture both political and economic variables. As such, empirically, 
explanatory political variables like the impact of political leadership or shifting 
coalitions that enact reforms over time are difficult to capture quantitatively, with some 
exceptions like the ideological leaning of the party in government. Conversely, 
economic explanatory variables like unemployment, economic growth and so forth are 
more easily captured quantitatively. Further, a cross-country quantitative approach is 
well suited to capturing economic and some political economy variables, like social 
models, while a country-by-country set of qualitative case studies are better suited to 
examining political explanatory variables. 
 
Therefore, the thesis applies a mixed-methods research design covering both quantitative 
and qualitative research methods: using a mixed-methods approach allows the thesis to 
systematically explore both economic or wider political economy and political 
determinants of European labour market flexibility reforms, as follows; (1) 
Quantitatively through a cross-country quantitative reform-hazard statistical model, and 
(2) qualitatively through country-by-country tracing of reform events, and the political 
coalitions supporting them. 
 
Additionally, a key reason for using a mixed-methods research design is Gualmini and 
Hopkin’s finding that, when surveying two decades of political economy literature to 
discern patterns of ‘distinctive institutions of welfare capitalism’, the research 
methodology itself had often led to unintended bias (Gualmini and Hopkin, 2012:65). In 
their analysis, quantitative or statistical analysis tended to show findings supporting 
similarities in the direction of change with respect to how countries had reformed on the 
back of domestic, European or globalization pressures. Inversely, a continuation of 
differences between countries was often associated with ‘detailed qualitative empirical 
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analysis of single [country] cases’ showing the ‘persistence of national differences, 
stressing a lack of significant change over time’ (Gualmini and Hopkin, 2012:65).  
 
In practice, mixed-methods require incorporation of quantitative statistical modelling 
and qualitative cross-national case-studies (cf. Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010). That said, 
political scientists often call for mixed methods in comparative analysis yet fail to 
develop appropriate ‘guides for carrying out such work’ (Lieberman, 2005:435). Derived 
from Lieberman, a standard guide for using mixed-methods in political science would be 
for the quantitative analysis to help explain both variation in the dependent variable of 
labour market flexibility reforms and help specify the selection of countries for 
subsequent qualitative case studies. The reason being that ‘a unified approach which 
joins intensive case-study analysis with statistical analysis’ supports the ability of 
arriving at ‘more focused case studies and comparisons’ (Lieberman, 2005:435). 
 
This thesis follows this guide with respect to understanding variation on the dependent 
variable of EPL more fully. As such, country-case studies will be used in Chapters 3 to 6 
as a follow-on to a statistical investigation of reform events in Chapter 2, allowing for 
examination of ‘within-case processes and/or variation’ derived from the quantitative 
analysis (Lieberman, 2005:440). However, the selected cases also need to ‘theory test’ 
the posed hypotheses and therefore case selection cannot wholly be relied on from the 
quantitative analysis (George and Bennett, 2005:75).  
 
For answering the research question that means the cases also need to follow the criteria: 
(1) help test the specified research hypotheses or hypothesis and (2) provide a better 
understanding of the determinants of the observed variation on the dependent variable of 
EPL reform events. As such, the qualitative case studies are intended to allow for a 
better understanding of the change and continuity process or, somewhat more 
ambitiously, the identification of causal pathways between political factors and EPL 
reforms.  
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The implication of these two criteria for case selection is that the quantitative analysis 
cannot be fully relied on to select cases because they also need to be theoretically valid 
with respect to testing the thesis research question. Thankfully, the available literature on 
European country level labour market reforms support a case selection of countries 
where reforms, marginal or otherwise, have not appeared to take hold regardless of 
pressures to reform from an economic perspective. In the case of France, a priori limited 
reforms to employment protection (limited variation on the dependent variable) is 
evident from the existing literature while nonetheless France also experienced 
persistently high economic pressures for reform through having consistently high levels 
of unemployment and sluggish growth across the time period covered by the thesis 
(Marx, 2012; Malo, 2000). Therefore, France is used as a case study of a European 
country within the 15 most integrated EU member states that have not overall reformed 
its labour markets despite political economy pressures to do so, at Chapter 6.   
 
Similarly, the theoretical background analysis in this Chapter showed that in terms of the 
politics of how labour market reforms might a priori be a neo-liberal proposition that 
might be unpalatable for some political parties, the case of the Nordic social model 
challenged such a view because they showed that low EPL could be coupled with an 
outcome that generated lower comparative levels of inequality (Sapir, 2006). 
Specifically, as an example of a Nordic social model country, Denmark is a suitable case 
study, one that satisfies the selection criteria because it follows the so-called flexicurity 
labour market model quite closely. While further discussed in Chapter 5, flexicurity is 
the underlying labour market approach that sets the Nordic countries apart in Sapir’s 
typology; an approach which supports high levels of labour market flexibility (the 
“flexi” part) by compensating workers with high levels of socio-economic support in the 
form of high replacement rates and high investments in active labour market policies 
(the “curity” part) (Madsen, 2006).  
 
This matters to testing the posed research hypotheses because with flexicurity in place, 
the political aspects of liberalization through labour market reforms in Denmark would a 
priori be expected to be politically less salient – which is in fact confirmed by the 
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analysis in Chapter 5. Instead, it would be expected that economic or at least a 
combination of political and economic variables would be more important to explaining 
any variation on the dependent variable of EPL reform events. Importantly, Denmark – 
while having had historically high levels of labour market flexibility, also satisfies the 
selection criteria of exhibiting variation on the dependent variable. Specifically, as will 
be shown in Chapter 5, Denmark in the period covered by the thesis experienced 
significant marginal reforms of temporary EPL not traditionally a part of the Danish 
labour market (Goul Andersen, 2011).    
 
Finally, the two main strands of social models in Europe within Sapir’s typology for 
continental and liberal countries to a large extent match the varieties of capitalism 
typologies of coordinated market economies, for which Germany is the classic case, and 
liberal market economies, for which in Europe, the UK is the classic case, respectively. 
Hence, selecting the cases of Germany and the UK, at Chapters 3 and 4, means that the 
extensive literature of those two models can be drawn on for the thesis analysis. 
Importantly, in terms of the theoretical criteria both Germany and the UK have a well 
documented history of completing labour market reforms in a liberalizing direction. 
 
In the case of the UK, Margaret Thatcher completed significant labour market flexibility 
enhancing reforms during the period covered by the thesis (Wood, 2001). Similarly, in 
the case of Germany the so-called Hartz reforms mean that Germany can also be used as 
a case which exhibits variation on the dependent variable of EPL (Neugart, 2005). Both 
countries, however, would not a priori be expected to have particular institutional 
features that would make either political economy or political variables more or less 
salient with respect to determining enacted reforms. Hence, they are both appropriate 
cases for the thesis research question.  
 
Having selected the country-cases, the following sections specify the quantitative and 
qualitative methods that will be applied in Chapter 2 (quantitative analysis) and Chapters 
3 (German case), 4 (UK case), 5 (Danish case), and 6 (French case).  
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1.4.2 Quantitative analysis of reforms: event-history analysis   
For the quantitative analysis of reforms, a statistical event history analysis (EHA) is used 
in Chapter 2. The main reason for the selection of EHA is that it has emerged as a 
valuable tool for researchers interested in comparative political change, which focuses 
on a longitudinal political process like the implementation of labour market flexibility 
reforms (Barriga, 2004). For example, relevant to labour market reforms, by definition a 
product of political coalitions, Barriga applied EHA to a study of political reforms 
because as a methodology it is explicitly ‘capable of modelling common political 
phenomena’ (Barriga, 2004:80). As such, ‘[g]iven its strength in the study of political 
change, event history should be an important option for researchers studying political 
change’ (Barriga, 2004:80). 
 
Further, EHA has in recent years developed into a convenient tool for longitudinal 
identification of the underlying dynamics of observed policy changes – like changes in 
EPL (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004; Jones and Branton, 2005; Berry and Berry, 
1990). One such development is the ability of advanced EHA models to explicitly 
attempt to resolve the ‘snapshot’ problem of more commonly used pooled cross-
sectional regression analysis (Blossfeld, Golsch, and Rohwer, 2003). The snapshot 
problem with cross-sectional analysis is that the analytical value of the cross-sectional 
statistics underlying – for example, most social model typologies, are ‘not determined by 
hypothesis about the dynamics of the substantive [underlying] process itself’ (Blossfeld 
et. al. 2003:5).  
 
However, it is also important to dispel a common misunderstanding about event history 
models in classic political science research: previously the notion of time-dependency or 
the basic ‘timing’ of an event was the primary focus of EHA application, i.e. the specific 
timing of a ministerial resignation (King et. al. 1990; Bennett, 1996). In part, the specific 
event-timing focus of early political science was due to the use of parametric event 
history models (Box-Steffensmeier, 2004:21). However, today, as shown by Box-
Steffensmeier and as will be applied in the quantitative analysis in Chapter 2, the most 
appropriate EHA model for political scientists is the Cox proportional hazard model.  
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The Cox model is useful to political scientists, the topic of this thesis included, because 
it allows analyses of ‘the relationship between some outcome (the dependent variable) 
and covariates of theoretical interest’ over time, rather than the simpler, classic, time 
dependency application (Box-Steffensmeier, 2004:47). Importantly, that also means that 
EHA now, compared with time-series analysis that works with an average effect, can 
produce a hazard rate of reform that takes into account the overall trajectory of reforms. 
 
Therefore, EHA drives a better understanding of the political trajectory of reform events, 
rather than average effects, and this is becoming clearer as the use of the methodology 
has increased in recent years. For example, similar to the approach informing this thesis, 
Martin and Steiner used EHA to analyse globalization driven liberalization by measuring 
changes in globalization as ‘a dichotomous measure of major liberalization events 
constructed from the KOF restriction index’ (the KOF index being a standard index of 
globalization that is also used in Chapter 2) (Martin and Steiner, 2013:15; Dreher, 2006). 
 
In a very similar form, for the purposes of this thesis, labour market flexibility increases 
measured through changes in EPL (events) represent a dichotomous measure of 
politically enacted reforms. Therefore, using EHA rather than standard time series 
statistical analysis is appropriate for answering the research question from a quantitative 
perspective, in the sense that EHA is ‘an appropriate estimation technique where 
[reform] events are the outcome of interest’ (Martin and Steiner, 2013:15).  
 
To summarize, for the quantitative part of the mixed-methods application, EHA overall 
and specifically with the calibration in recent years of the multiple-event Cox models, no 
longer needs to be compressed into time-series averages, snapshots in time, or discrete 
events (Jones and Branton, 2005; Guy Peters, 1998:187). Therefore, EHA is applied in 
Chapter 2 to test the duration of the time a unit, i.e. an existing level of EPL, remains in 
a particular political state, i.e. reformed or not towards more flexibility. Doing so allows 
the reform testing process to be repeated, mimicking the political process of 
continuously forming coalitions that may or may not form to reform a country’s labour 
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markets towards more flexibility. Further details of the EHA statistical model 
specification is outlined in Chapter 2. 
 
1.4.3 Qualitative analysis of reforms: case-study method  
For the qualitative part of the mixed-methods approach, the case studies are structured in 
such a way as to help ‘describe politically important events systematically’ (King et. al., 
1994:43). At the same time, the purpose of the case studies is to explore what reforms 
have resulted from longitudinally changing political coalitions willing (or not) to 
liberalize and/or de-regulate labour markets (Thelen, 2012). As such, qualitatively 
researched reform events risk being spuriously analysed unless they are accompanied by 
a ‘good description’ across country case studies (King et. al., 1994:45). To avoid this 
result, the qualitative case-study methodology for Chapters 3-6 incorporates ‘a procedure 
of systematic data compilation’ focusing on providing information on political 
dynamics, which are not covered by the quantitative Chapter 2 (George and McKeown, 
1985:43). 
 
Specifically, the procedure used in this thesis builds on a systematic and repeatable 
approach to data collection and presentation of each of the four case studies. Each case 
study has an introduction that historically traces the trajectory of EPL reform events, the 
events that generate a change in the OECD EPL indicator to be specific. Each case 
reconstructs and explains those reform events and any clear attempts at reforms that 
failed, as well as reforms to functionally-linked areas like unemployment benefits that 
may contribute to a better overall understanding of reform determinants with the aim of 
politically explaining European labour market reforms.  
 
Further, overall, each thesis Chapter is intended to address and answer a specific part of 
the thesis research question (Dunleavy, 2003), avoiding the often seen pitfall of mixed-
methods with regards to maintaining ‘integrity of the single study, compared to 
inadvertently permitting the study to decompose into two or more parallel [quantitative 
and qualitative] studies’ (Yin, 2006:41). To ensure that this thesis remains a single study, 
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but also more than the sum of its parts, both the qualitative and quantitative studies are 
structured around a longitudinal approach to understanding developments in labour 
market flexibility reforms.  
 
Finally, over and beyond the political salience of EPL up to the Great Recession, another 
reason for time bounding the thesis is the availability of data. For the qualitative country 
case studies, secondary literature on European political economy developments is 
limited to after the Second World War – with detailed reform analysis possible from the 
1970s onwards. For the quantitative analysis, the existence of longitudinal data sets is a 
limiting factor. However, in addition to the data sources already mentioned, good quality 
data is available for cross-country analysis from reliable sources like the OECD, World 
Bank, etc. from the mid-1980s onwards. With respect to time limits, the specified 
theoretically relevant time limit of the 2008 Great Recession avoids having to interpret 
any significantly (skewing) impact of the Great Recession, the impact of the Great 
Recession itself not being within the scope of this thesis.  
 
Having outlined the research question and its theoretical background, established the key 
tenets of the dependent variable and variation on the same up to the Great Recession, the 
following Chapters will discuss and provide evidence for the argument that the reform 
challenge is ultimately a political challenge. As a preview, the main finding of the thesis 
is that factoring in political variables like electoral-political incentives and/or intra-party 
leadership dynamics are key determinants of reforms, without which reforms are 
unlikely to observed. As such, the thesis does not provide evidence to reject the 
hypothesis that labour market flexibility reforms are best explained by a political focus 
on solving economic problems like low growth and high unemployment. Rather, the 
thesis underlines that the political conditions for reforms need to be present together with 
economic problems for politicians to have the ability to enact reforms successfully.  
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2. Explaining European labour market flexibility reforms  
Following the mixed-methods approach outlined in Chapter 1, this Chapter 
quantitatively operationalizes the thesis research question by using EPL as a proxy for 
labour market reform events to do an initial review of what determines labour market 
flexibility enhancing reforms in European countries, or lack thereof, in the period from 
the early 1980s to the Great Recession in 2008. As also discussed in Chapter 1, EPL is 
considered an appropriate measure for labour market reform trends available for 
sufficient years to make a longitudinal analysis possible. Further, EPL allows for a 
disaggregated analysis of overall, regular and temporary employment protection 
measures to give an indication of flexibility across different segments of the labour 
market.  
 
In practical terms, explaining European labour market flexibility reforms is 
operationalized by deploying an event history analysis (EHA) to determine the nature of 
the trend towards marginal labour market flexibility enhancing reforms across core EU 
member states that was briefly outlined in Chapter 1. With the methodological choice of 
an event history analysis (EHA) discussed in Chapter 1, suffice to mention here that 
similar to the EU, EHA is a common method used to model State-level policy responses 
to politically significant events at the Federal level in the United States of America 
(Jones and Branton, 2005; Berry and Berry 1990). 
 
For example, covering European integration, EHA has been used to research changes in 
specific policy areas, e.g. tracking European legislation implementation by EU member 
states and EU voting patterns (Schulz, 2000; Golub, 1999). Here EHA is used primarily 
for its estimation technique that, in difference from say time series statistical analysis, 
can be used to focus explicitly on explaining policy discontinuities or labour market 
reform events, as the dependent variable, and the hazard rate or political risk of reforms 
happening or not, and what explains them (Martin and Steiner, 2013:15). 
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The Chapter begins with a descriptive overview of labour market flexibility trends in the 
EU and OECD from 1985 to 2008; doing so helps better gauge, at the outset, the level of 
observable reforms towards more flexible European labour markets. A level which as 
generally argued in the economics literature has been at the margin (Boeri, 2011). The 
second part of the Chapter illustrates and tests the distinctiveness of labour market 
flexibility reforms for EU member states against an OECD control group and across 
European social models.  
 
Third, the Chapter specifies a multiple event history analysis to model the hazard rate or 
probability of labour market flexibility reforms for identified explanatory political 
economy variables at three distinct analytical levels: domestic, European, and global. 
The main function of the Chapter is to look at institutional continuity and change with 
respect to the enactment of reforms, including what variables are significant for 
explaining reforms so that they can be narrowed down and focused on in more detail in 
the following qualitative case-study Chapters. 
 
2.1 European labour market flexibility reforms 1985-2008 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the OECDs ‘Employment Protection Legislation’ (EPL) 
index represents a sufficiently long running data series covering ‘the procedures and 
costs involved in dismissing individuals or groups of workers and the procedures 
involved in hiring workers’ to be of meaningful use as a longitudinal measure of labour 
market flexibility reforms across EU member states (OECD, 2014a; Venn, 2009; OECD, 
2007). Specifically, EPL is defined using an analysis of legislation, judicial rulings, 
collective bargaining deals and national practices (Venn, 2009:13)3.  
 
                                                 
3 Other indices exist in the literature, e.g. Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice’s composite index of employment 
protection includes collective dismissals and company based protection, yet would not justify identification of discrete 
events for EHA (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice, 2001). More recently the European Commission has created the 
LABREF database and the private Fondazione Rodolfo de Benedetti has created a qualitative index of labour market 
reforms in the EU from 1980 to 2007 (Boeri, 2011). The reason for primarily using the OECDs EPL measure is 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
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Qualitatively, the importance of employment protection derives from the notion by 
economists up until at least the Great Recession, that high or ‘strict EPL inhibits labo[u]r 
market flexibility by reducing firms’ ability to adjust the workforce during changing 
economic conditions’ (Zhou, 2006:9; Siebert, 1997). At the same time, observed 
marginal EPL reforms also drive a better understanding of what the OECD labels the 
‘incidence of non-regular employment’, in the sense that EPL provides a distinction 
between regular and non-regular employment types (OECD, 2014a:141). 
 
As argued in Chapter 1, that incidence clearly mattered to policy makers in terms of why 
or why not they should or would support reforming coalitions, again at least up until the 
Great Recession. Further, the precise impact of flexibility enhancing changes to various 
areas of the labour market, including EPL, is a continuing debate within political 
economy (cf. Howell et.al, 2007). Yet, for the purposes of this thesis – as outlined in 
Chapter 1, reforms towards more flexibility are considered the result of political 
decisions to reform labour markets – what explains the political ability to take the 
decision to reform being the topic of this thesis.  
 
Technically, OECD defines EPL as a summary indicator ‘made up of three sub-
indicators quantifying different aspects of employment protection’: the strictness of 
regulation for regular contracts, temporary contracts and collective dismissals measured 
on a scale from zero (high flexibility) to six (low flexibility) (Venn, 2009:6)4. Changes 
in both directions for overall EPL and the corresponding trend for 25 OECD countries 
from 1985 to 2008 are shown in Table 2 using data extracted from the OECD website 
and then computed for the purposes of this and subsequent Chapters5.  
 
Table 2 divides countries into core EU states (labelled EU15) and non-EU member states 
(labelled Rest of OECD), even if by 2008 some of the Rest of OECD labelled countries 
                                                 
4 Collective dismissals are attributed 40 per cent of the weight assigned to regular and temporary contracts (OECD, 
2007).  
5 The OECD regularly updates the EPL data series and when doing so backdates changes. The data used in this thesis 
is from the 2010 release of data covering EPL up to 2008 or in a few cases, 2009. The statistical analysis in this 
Chapter was replicated with both the releases of OECD data for EPL up to 2004 and 2008 with similar results. 
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had joined the EU. Countries that have recently joined the OECD, for example Chile, 
have not been included for lack of longitudinal data. It is also worth noting that for some 
Eastern European countries data is only available for the post-communist era, usually 
from 1990 or 1993 onwards. Overall, the usable range of years varies from 15 to 23 
years: enough years to conduct a valid longitudinal analysis of reforms using EPL as a 
proxy for labour market flexibility, and those changes in EPL as a measure of European 
labour market flexibility reforms.  
 
Table 2 describes both upwards (less flexible) and downwards (more flexible) EPL 
events. For the purposes of this Chapter, a change in EPL in either direction is labelled a 
labour market flexibility reform event given that a political reform process will have 
taken place to make such a change in the OECD’s EPL measure occur. From Table 2, if 
first considering upwards EPL moves or reform events towards less flexibility, then it is 
clear that very few countries decided to make their labour markets less flexible in this 
way. Further, when they did so, the overall effect or change in the overall level of EPL 
was limited. For this reason, in subsequent sections the Chapter does not use the 
upwards reform events in the statistical event history analysis that follows – these 
upwards events (less flexible) are statistically “censored” (omitted) and instead the 
reform events towards more flexibility, that is downwards numerical events in EPL, are 
used to explore European labour market flexibility reform trends. 
 
To verify the limited importance of omitting or censoring upwards (less flexible) moves 
in EPL, the only EU15 countries listed in Table 2 that have not increased flexibility 
(lowered EPL) are France, the UK and Ireland. For the OECD group similar exceptions 
are found in Hungary, Poland and New Zealand. This can be seen in Table 2 as a 
positive number in the column labelled “change”, which shows the difference between 
EPL in 1985 and 2008.   
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Table 2: Employment Protection Legislation Continuity and Change 1985-2008 
  
Country by Social 
Model 
No. of Down-
wards Events 
EPL 1985 
Employment Protection Legislation 
EPL 2008 
Employment Protection Legislation 
Change 
1985-2008 Overall Regular 
Temp
orary 
Overall Regular 
Temp
orary 
Overall Regular  
Temp
orary 
EU15                     
Continental 7 11.32 9.69 12.94 9.27 9.55 9.01 -2.05 -0.14 -3.93 
Austria 1 2.21 2.92 1.50 1.93 2.37 1.50 -0.28 -0.55 0.00 
Belgium 1 3.15 1.68 4.63 2.18 1.73 2.63 -0.97 0.05 -2.00 
France 2 2.79 2.51 3.06 3.04 2.45 3.63 0.25 -0.06 0.57 
Germany 3 3.17 2.58 3.75 2.12 3.00 1.25 -1.05 0.42 -2.50 
Luxembourg 0 na na na 3.25 2.75 3.75 na na na 
Mediterranean  16 15.14 13.03 17.26 10.48 10.19 10.76 -4.66 -2.84 -6.5 
Greece 2 3.56 2.38 4.75 2.73 2.33 3.13 -0.83 -0.05 -1.62 
Italy 5 3.57 1.77 5.38 1.89 1.77 2.00 -1.68 0.00 -3.38 
Portugal 6 4.19 5.00 3.38 2.88 3.63 2.13 -1.31 -1.37 -1.25 
Spain 3 3.82 3.88 3.75 2.98 2.46 3.50 -0.84 -1.42 -0.25 
Nordic  11 10.95 10.45 11.47 7.28 9.38 5.2 -3.67 -1.07 -6.27 
Denmark 1 2.40 1.68 3.13 1.50 1.63 1.38 -0.90 -0.05 -1.75 
Finland 4 2.33 2.79 1.88 1.96 2.17 1.75 -0.37 -0.62 -0.13 
Netherlands 3 2.73 3.08 2.38 1.95 2.72 1.19 -0.78 -0.36 -1.19 
Sweden 3 3.49 2.90 4.08 1.87 2.86 0.88 -1.62 -0.04 -3.20 
Anglo-Saxon 0 1.53 2.55 0.5 1.86 2.72 1.01 0.33 0.17 0.51 
Ireland 0 0.93 1.60 0.25 1.11 1.60 0.63 0.18 0.00 0.38 
United Kingdom 0 0.60 0.95 0.25 0.75 1.12 0.38 0.15 0.17 0.13 
Total, excluding 
Luxembourg 
34 38.94 35.72 42.17 28.89 31.84 25.98 -10.05 -3.88 -16.19 
Rest of OECD            
Australia 1 0.94 1.00 0.88 1.15 1.42 0.88 0.21 0.42 0.00 
Canada 0 0.75 1.25 0.25 0.75 1.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Czech Rep.* 1 1.90 3.31 0.50 1.96 3.05 0.88 0.06 -0.26 0.38 
Hungary* 0 1.27 1.92 0.63 1.65 1.92 1.38 0.38 0.00 0.75 
Iceland 0 na na na 1.18 1.73 0.63 na na na 
Japan 2 1.84 1.87 1.81 1.43 1.87 1.00 -0.41 0.00 -0.81 
Korea* 2 2.74 3.23 2.25 1.90 2.37 1.44 -0.84 -0.86 -0.81 
Mexico* 0 3.13 2.25 4.00 3.13 2.25 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
New Zealand* 1 0.86 1.35 0.38 1.40 1.56 1.25 0.54 0.21 0.87 
Norway 2 2.90 2.25 3.54 2.69 2.25 3.13 -0.21 0.00 -0.41 
Poland* 1 1.40 2.06 0.75 1.90 2.06 1.75 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Slovak Republic* 1 1.80 2.47 1.13 1.44 2.50 0.38 -0.36 0.03 -0.75 
Switzerland 0 1.14 1.16 1.13 1.14 1.16 1.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Turkey* 1 3.76 2.64 4.88 3.72 2.56 4.88 -0.04 -0.08 0.00 
USA 0 0.21 0.17 0.25 0.21 0.17 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total, excluding 
Iceland 
12 24.64 26.93 22.38 25.65 26.39 22.60 -0.17 -0.54 0.22 
 
Data Source: Estimates of the employment protection indicators from 1985-2008 available from the OECD’s employment protection 
website (www.oecd.org/employment/protection). Extracted 2010. All tabulations and calculations completed as part of research for 
this thesis. *Data only available from 1993 or later years onwards.  
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Moving to look at higher flexibility (downwards EPL reform events), it is evident from 
Table 2 that there is a strong directional trend towards labour flexibility reforms in EU15 
countries, as expressed by EPL: the EU15 group of countries moved from an average of 
overall EPL of 2.8 to 2.1 between 1985 and 20086. For regular EPL the trend is less 
marked with a move in the same period from 2.6 to 2.3. A large part, but not all, of the 
overall variation is derived from reforms of temporary EPL, which went from an average 
of 3.0 to 1.9 during the same period. The reforms correspond to a 25 per cent increase in 
overall labour market flexibility for the entire period and 11 and 38 per cent for regular 
and temporary EPL, respectively. 
 
Politically, regular employment protection covers mainly existing labour market insiders 
and has therefore potentially remained fairly steady, yet flexibility has increased. 
However, the outsiders, who take up work or employment through temporary 
employment contracts, have experienced a significant liberalization. The result appears 
to provide strong descriptive statistical support for the general dualization of labour 
markets theory. That is so because outsiders were adversely impacted.  
 
However, more important is the fact that the general trends in labour market flexibility 
reforms were driven by liberalization at the margin: temporary EPL events or reforms 
are at the margin of the labour market, across the board. For example, for a country like 
Denmark dualization is not the result of the observed relaxation of temporary EPL. 
Rather, the result of such marginal reforms is the almost complete liberalization of 
labour market flexibility when using EPL as the proxy unit of measure for labour market 
flexibility reforms. At the other end, Germany – the classic case of dualization (Palier 
and Thelen, 2010), comes closer to fulfilling the dualization thesis through reforms at the 
margin, as regular EPL remained high and even slightly increased between 1985 and 
2008.  
 
To compare, when looking beyond the European political economy, the Rest of OECD 
group of countries showed overall labour market reform stability: EPL overall averaged 
                                                 
6 Three countries had higher EPL in 2003 than the 1985 EU15 average of 2.8: France, Portugal and Spain.  
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1.8 in 1985 and remained at that level in 2008 with only a limited number of change 
reform events relative to the EU15 group of countries, representing a small 4 per cent 
per cent decrease in labour market flexibility over the time period. From Table 2, clearly 
the variance or increase in labour market flexibility is not very marked for the “Rest of 
OECD” group countries as a whole, although the trend towards either higher or lower 
flexibility is more mixed (observable as a positive or negatively denominated difference 
in Table 2). A good indicator of the difference in relative reform movement is the 
standard deviation of the difference in scores for EU15 OECD members (.67), which is 
over double that of non-EU15 OECD members (.33). 
 
While EU15 countries started from a higher EPL base than the Rest of OECD countries, 
a sustained directional trend towards the OECD average was borne out by 9 of 15 
countries completing more than one reform event during the measured time period, and 
7 of those completing more than 2 reform events. Again, only the UK and Ireland did 
not have any downwards events and only Ireland, the UK and France experienced a 
marginal increase in their overall levels of EPL, from 0.60 to 0.75 for the UK, 0.93 to 
1.11 for Ireland and 2.79 to 3.04 (in 2009) for France.  
 
For France, the flexibility enhancing events that did take place happened, atypically for 
EU15 countries, for regular EPL and was insufficient (a difference of -0.06) to cancel 
out the reduction in flexibility put in place for temporary EPL (difference of 0.57). 
France has been used as an example of dualization (Palier and Thelen, 2010), yet the 
quantitative evidence presented here suggest France as a case more likely of limited or 
possible contradictory overall reforms (Marx, 2012). A result, which questions why 
politically France took so different a course to other EU15 countries and that will 
therefore need to be reviewed in the case study for France in Chapter 6.  
 
Further, an equality of means test shows that the difference between EPL in 1985 and 
2008 is statistically significant for the EU15 group of countries7. It could therefore be 
                                                 
7 Comparing EU15 EPL means and standard deviations, both are smaller in 1985 than 2008 and the difference is 
significant at the 5% confidence level (t=3.14 with 13df). Similarly, for the OECD group of countries, but the 
difference between the two time periods is not significant (t=0.38 with 13df).  
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argued that the EU is moving towards the Rest of OECD levels of flexibility rather than 
the EU remaining on a specific European path of inflexible labour markets. These results 
seem to, at least in part, work against much of the classic political economy literature 
which tends to argue that resilience of labour market regimes is the expected outcome 
(Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2000), even if 
Thelen has recently challenged this view in support of liberalization-led labour market 
flexibility reforms, rather than a continuation of varieties or divergence, and Baccaro and 
Howell has taken this further by arguing that liberalization is a general trend across EU 
countries (Thelen, 2009, 2012; Baccaro and Howell, 2011). Yet it remains an empirical 
and out of scope question for this thesis what the exact economic or socio-economic 
impact has been, not least because the starting points for liberalization vary. However, 
importantly, the descriptive statistics presented in this Chapter do add robustness to the 
argument that the marginal, mainly temporary EPL reforms have been a key driver of 
overall labour market liberalization. 
 
2.2 Event history analysis (EHA) of European labour market 
flexibility reforms 
So far, the descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 indicate that EU15 countries had a 
strong propensity to engage in liberalizing labour market reforms. Yet it should also be 
recognised that, underlying the reform hazards or “probability of increased flexibility” of 
overall EPL in Europe, lies a higher but not exclusive, easing of restrictions for 
temporary rather than regular employment protection. However, to go beyond the 
descriptive results in Table 2, an event history analysis (EHA) is a convenient tool for 
longitudinal identification of the underlying political economy dynamics of observed 
policy changes expressed – in this case for EPL reform events (Martin and Steiner, 2013; 
Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004)8. 
                                                 
8 Political science applications of event history analysis have tended to focus on the notion of time-dependency (cf. 
Bennett, 1996; Alt and King, 1994; King, 1990). Today, Cox proportional hazard models can be used to analyse 
relationships over time beyond time dependency (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004:47) as multiple-event Cox 
models no longer forces researchers to compress complex political processes into discrete events (cf. Jones and 
Branton, 2005; Guy-Peters, 1998:187).  
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The event history analysis below will be carried out in two steps. First, by comparing 
EU15 Member States to the Rest of the OECD and, in line with the theoretical argument 
of the thesis, analysing institutional continuity by investigating if domestic institutions 
refract labour market reforms by comparing EU15 Member State reforms by social 
model indicating institutional continuity. Second, in Section 2.3 a multiple-event history 
analysis is used to test political economy explanatory variables at domestic, European 
and global levels. To effectively test whether EPL reforms in EU15 member states 
observed and listed in Table 2 are significantly different from those of the Rest of OECD 
countries, an estimate of the hazard or probability of increased flexibility is the most 
convenient EHA test.  
 
To explain the methodology, in event history analysis, the hazard rate is the risk that a 
politically decided upon EPL reform event will take place during any one calendar year; 
yearly because the time interval of the data points for EPL provided by the OECD are 
also on a yearly time scale. In other words, EHA is a statistical analysis that transforms 
the identification of the underlying dynamics of policy change, the EPL reform events, 
by turning the descriptive data in Table 2 into a probabilistic estimation of how well or 
how poorly labour market flexibility reforms in the EU have progressed over time.  
 
The standard EHA method to obtain the probability of a longitudinal difference between 
EU15 and Rest of OECD flexibility enhancing EPL reform events is the Kaplan-Meier 
non-parametric estimator of the survivor function; here calculated for downwards EPL 
events only to investigate the identified trend towards more flexible labour markets in 
the EU (upwards EPL events are censored, see above) (Kaplan and Meier, 1958). For the 
data in Table 2, the Kaplan-Meier estimator of the survivor function – survival here 
meaning not reforming labour markets as expressed through a change in EPL for any 
given year, is the probability that a country will not revise its EPL policy downwards 
(reform towards more flexible labour markets) between 1987 and the last year for which 
data is available (see discussion of research time limits set for this thesis in Chapter 1).  
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Calculated for the first change event towards increased labour market flexibility since 
the setting apace of the Single Market in 1987 – a key event of interest to capture any 
effect of European integration, the resulting comparative EU15 and OECD Kaplan-
Meier survivor functions are shown in Figure 1. The term survivor in this context is 
defined as the time a country ‘survives’ until a reform is completed: in the analysis here 
until flexibility enhancing changes in EPL (downwards) are observed. As per Figure 1, a 
labour market flexibility reform event may be repeated across several years as would be 
expected from a politically determined policy reform process.  
 
Figure 1: Survivor Functions for EU15 and ‘Rest of OECD’ – EPL First Events  
 
Data Source: Estimates of the employment protection indicators from 1985-2008 available from the OECD’s employment protection 
website (www.oecd.org/employment/protection). All tabulations and calculations completed as part of research for this thesis using 
Stata statistical software. X-axis: years from 1987 to 2009. Y-axis: expression in probability that the observed groups of countries 
‘survive’ without reforms.   
 
The survivor functions in Figure 1 represent the first EPL downward change events 
across all countries for which data was presented in Table 2, above. Immediately 
obvious is the distinction between EU15 and non-EU15 OECD countries, somewhat 
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expected from the descriptive statistics in Table 2. EU15 countries start reforms in 1990, 
two years prior to the formal introduction of the EU Single Market in 1992. From Figure 
1, OECD countries do not start putting their flexibility at risk or increasing their 
flexibility through labour market EPL reforms until 1996, perhaps in connection with 
rising global economic integration. Albeit OECD reforms start from a lower absolute 
level of EPL, some countries in this group do have quite inflexible labour markets; 
completed reforms may indicate globalisation starting to impact those countries in the 
mid-1990s. 
 
A log-rank test comparing the statistical equality of the two groups’ survivor functions 
show a significant difference and rejection of the hypothesis that they are equal9. This is 
an important result because the log-rank test is not just a point in time test. Rather, it is a 
test of differences in the overall survivor functions for each group. In other words, the 
log-rank test result becomes, by definition, longitudinally representative of distinctive 
continuity and change for the two groups of countries. In this case, the two survivor 
functions represent a significant trend towards labour market flexibility reforms over 
time that is different between the two groups, EU15 and Rest of OECD. The 
interpretation is that for the research question of this thesis, change and continuity in 
labour market flexibility reforms in the EU15 group of countries are analytically distinct 
from the Rest of the OECD. 
 
Further, the data in Figure 1 can be used to calculate a survivor function across Sapir’s 
standard four-way typology of European social models, which combines both worlds of 
welfare and varieties of capitalism typologies with levels of EPL as a key differentiator 
(Sapir, 2006)10. Doing so, the survivor functions for each social model for the EU15 
countries are as shown in Figure 2. By inspection, Figure 2 confirms the directional 
trend of change from Figure 1, above, towards more flexibility through labour market 
flexibility reforms. Also, as would be expected from the descriptive statistics of Table 2 
                                                 
9 The log-rank test is significant with Chi2=4.06 (P<0.05). 
10 Typologies used by Sapir for the EU15 are: Anglo-Saxon (UK, Ireland), Continental (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg), Mediterranean (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain), and Nordic (Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, 
Sweden) (Sapir, 2006:375). 
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and the previously discussed economics literature, because upwards change events are 
censored/omitted, in Figure 2 the trend is flat or simply put, there is no hazard of change 
for the UK and Ireland that compose the Anglo-Saxon social model countries in the 
EU15 group shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Survivor Functions for EU15 Social Models – EPL First Events 
 
Data Source: Estimates of the employment protection indicators from 1985-2008 available from the OECD’s employment protection 
website (www.oecd.org/employment/protection). All tabulations and calculations completed as part of research for this thesis using 
Stata statistical software. X-axis: years from 1987 to 2009. Y-axis: expression in probability that the observed groups of countries 
‘survive’ without reforms.   
 
Then, what separates the remaining ‘Continental’, Nordic’, and ‘Mediterranean’ social 
models are the timings rather than the eventual intensity of the reform hazard rate. 
Again, a log-rank test confirms that the survivor functions are significantly different – 
important, given the expected and actual flat slope of the Anglo-Saxon social model 
survivor function11. From a mixed-methods perspective, the log-rank test indicates that 
                                                 
11 The log-rank test is significant with Chi2=26.68 (P<0.05).  
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different social models – through their domestic political coalitions, have refracted 
pressures to reform labour markets differently in a manner consistent with their 
prevailing social model or political economy variety. Hence, from a European social 
model perspective the plot in Figure 3 indicates a European trend in labour market 
flexibility towards the rest of the world taking hold just before the introduction of the 
Single Market. 
2.3 Multiple EHA: analysing reforms as a political process 
The repeated nature of labour market flexibility reforms evident from Table 2, above, 
(event column) indicates – as would be expected, that reforms represent an on-going 
political reform process: a significant number of countries engage in multiple reforms, 
here measured as multiple downwards EPL events (increased flexibility) – principally 
for the overall and temporary measures of EPL. At the same time the Kaplan-Meier 
estimators in section 2.2 of this Chapter suggested that labour market reforms varied 
between Europe and the rest of the OECD, but also across domestic institutions through 
the social model to which a EU15 member state belonged.  
 
Therefore, the need arises for the formulation of an event history analysis capable of 
modelling not just first events, as was possible with the Kaplan-Meier estimators, but 
also multiple events. Technically, that would mean calculating the probability of survival 
times before a country reforms without assuming that any country ever leaves the risk 
set of reforms – from Table 2, that labour market reform events might happen repeatedly 
any year after a theoretically meaningful start date, assuming of course that data is 
available (Jones and Branton, 2005:20). 
 
Within the scope of this thesis, the start date of the analysis is the year 1987 on the basis 
that 1987 was the year in which the European Single Market (SEM) was set apace. So 
for the multiple event history analysis that will be presented below, the analysis 
considers that from 1987 onwards EU level reform pressures stemming from the SEM 
would be discernible from the available data. However, more than taking into account 
the first reform event, the first reform event and all subsequent events being taken into 
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account in calculating the probability of labour market flexibility reforms, a multiple-
event history analysis is also a quantitative way to reflect the continuous set of political 
coalitions behind those reforms, including explanatory variables for those reforms. 
 
When policy adoption – labour market reforms through EPL events, is defined as a 
continuous political process of coalitions passing labour market flexibility reforms, then 
the appropriate EHA model also needs to account for the time or ‘gap time’ between 
such reform events (Jones and Branton, 2005:21). Technically, a gap time event history 
analysis adjusts the risk set of the analysed countries to account for the repeatability of 
observed EPL reform events. Therefore, for EPL multi-event modelling purposes, events 
need to be treated as conditional on past events – like most political reform decisions 
would be, and measured time at risk for each country to reform must be predicated on 
the time elapsed since the occurrence of (any) previous EPL reform events.  
 
Drawing the theoretical elements of analysing a multiple event or political process 
together with the policy reform tracing purpose of this Chapter and Chapter 1, the most 
appropriate multiple event history analysis model is the Cox proportional hazard event 
history ‘gap’ model (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004; Jones and Branton, 2005). 
Following Hosmer et. al., the gap model can be defined as: 
 
hs (t, x, ßs) = h0s(t-ts-1)e
xßs
                                              (1) 
 
Where, beyond the standard Cox proportional hazard model, ts-1 represents the time of 
the previous events, i.e. the ‘gap’ time (see Hosmer et. al., 2008:290). Further, the 
proposed model stratifies events by the first event, i.e. the first post 1987 event is 
considered substantively different from subsequent events as doing so preserves the 
ordering of events (Jones and Branton, 2005; Cleves, 1999). By the same token, it is not 
possible to assume that the recurrence time between events is independent for each 
country in the analysis – from a political perspective that is straightforward: political 
coalitions change and previous reforms have or may have a substantive impact on 
subsequent reforms. Technically, therefore, robust standard errors adjusted for clustering 
  49 
by country are used to control for the independence of events over time for each country 
(Cleves, 1999; Lin and Wei, 1989).  
 
Further, the gap model when stratified by first event takes into account the sequential 
political process or enactment of reforms: first, the risk of a second reform event does 
not come before the first event has already happened and, second, the model controls for 
independence of events for the same country. In other words, the Cox proportional 
hazard event history gap model specified for the analytical purposes of this thesis takes 
into account the necessary adjustments to the model when analysing a continuous policy 
reform process like labour market flexibility enhancing reforms as expressed via 
downwards changes to EPL. 
 
As a caveat, drawing on the seminal work by Berry and Berry on the use of EHA for 
policy adoption and reform tracing processes in the United States, the specified gap 
model is still open to the problem of potentially lacking independence of events between 
countries (Berry and Berry, 1990). Traditionally, a variable measuring the influence of 
one reforming or policy-adopting country on its closest geographical ‘neighbour’ has 
been used to control for this eventuality (cf. Brace et. al., 2001; Berry and Berry, 1990). 
Considering the analytical scope of this Chapter as well as the obvious geographical 
issues, defining a ‘neighbour’ control variable across OECD countries is inadequate. 
Instead, a control variable is used to distinguish between the ‘status’ of countries as 
either belonging to the EU15 or non-EU15 OECD groups of ‘neighbourhoods’, as it 
were. Further, the ‘status’ variable also helps distinguish between models for EU15 
countries (models 1 and 2) and model 3 (all of OECD) in the results Table 3, below.  
 
Building on the theoretical discussion in Chapter 1, a quantitative analysis is provided 
below of what potentially explains labour market flexibility reforms from an explicitly 
longitudinal perspective using the specified multiple-event history model. 
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2.4 Domestic, European and global levels of analysis 
In the existing political economy literature, part of which was referenced in Chapter 1, 
there are case-specific and cross-sectional statistical explanations for change and 
continuity in labour market flexibility. Tapping into that literature, the grouping of 
potential explanatory variables can be done at three distinct analytical levels: domestic, 
European, and global. For each level, the literature provides at least some theoretical 
impetus or empirical evidence for selecting explanatory variables and each level lends 
itself to operationalization using event history analysis. In short, this section assesses the 
likelihood that a country will increase labour market flexibility, analysed through EPL 
reforms or events, given domestic political institutional constraints, European 
integration, and globalisation and the variables for doing so are described below.  
 
2.4.1 Domestic institutional constraints 
Considering the discussion of labour market flexibility reforms towards liberalized or 
even dualized labour markets, the relationship between domestic institutions and the 
probability of policy reforms is important. Further, the same relationship has 
traditionally been at the core of analytical approaches emphasizing the resilience of 
social model typologies, the potential challenges faced by domestic economies from 
European integration, the continuation of varieties of capitalism, etc. (cf. Thelen, 2009, 
2012; Palier and Thelen, 2010; Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2000; Scharpf, 1996). As 
such, the underlying question to be tested is the extent to which domestic political 
economy and institutions constrain or refract pressures for labour market flexibility 
reforms. 
 
First, from socio-economic or economic ‘pressures on government’ (Hassel, 2007:254) 
to historical institutionalist path dependence, domestic institutional constraints would be 
expected to be significant in determining labour market policy discontinuities (cf. Thelen 
and van Wijnbergen, 2003). From a varieties of capitalism perspective, continuity of 
domestic political institutions were also instrumental in determining the relative 
economic competitiveness of countries (Iversen, 2005; Streeck and Thelen, 2005; 
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Thelen, 2004; Mares, 2006, 2003; Hall and Soskice, 2001). A straightforward indicator 
for domestic level political-institutional constraints is Henisz’ political constraints 
(Polcon) index, which will be used to test for the effect of domestic political and 
institutional constraints on the probability of labour market flexibility reforms (Henisz, 
2000).  
 
The Polcon index is derived from a spatial model of domestic political interactions and 
incorporates the number of ‘independent political institutions with veto power in a given 
polity’ (Henisz, 2000:3). In other words, variables like the type of government in power, 
the electoral system, and so forth, are incorporated into the index to map the alignment 
and heterogeneity of the political actors that inhabit domestic institutions. For 
convenient interpretation of estimated hazard rates, i.e. the risk that a reform-event will 
take place during a yearly time interval, the Polcon index has been converted to 
percentages.  
 
Second, the multiple event history analysis considers the impact of economic growth and 
analyses how, as might well be expected, the level of unemployment in a country 
impacts the willingness or ability of politicians to form coalitions to complete labour 
market flexibility reforms – especially reforms involving EPL (Siebert, 1997). To model 
economic competitiveness and the relationship between labour market reforms and 
unemployment levels, the World Bank’s standard measures of percentage GDP growth 
and a country’s unemployment rate will be used (World Bank, 2010).  
 
Third, from a political coalitional perspective, the enactment of labour market flexibility 
reforms could well a priori be considered a result of the ideological leaning of the 
government in power. Therefore, the left, right or centre position of the main party in 
government is used as an explanatory variable in the specified event history analysis. 
Specifically, the Database of Political Institutions (DPI, 2010) is used to measure the 
ideological leaning of governments as an explanatory variable of observed EPL labour 
market flexibility reforms in the Cox model below. 
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2.4.2 Europeanization and globalisation 
Overall, Europeanization research has focused on understanding the impact of European 
integration on continuity and change in the politics and policy outcomes of EU member 
states (Exadactylos and Radaelli, 2012; Graziano and Vink, 2006; Featherstone and 
Radaelli, 2003). Historically, convincing evidence of the direction of any causal link was 
‘missing’ (Goetz, 2000:211), yet the initial and now decade old Europeanised politics 
argument by Hix and Goetz persists in the notion that ‘the impact of European level 
decisions on the choices available in national political systems is now too evident to 
ignore’ remains, at least to be tested empirically (Hix and Goetz, 2001:2).  
 
However, as the EU only has limited jurisdictional powers in the area of labour market 
policy, the theoretical impact must necessarily be indirect. This is also true for the soft 
law driven Lisbon Agenda (Schmidt, 2006; Borras and Jacobssen, 2004; Mosher and 
Trubek 2003; De la Porte, 2002) and the “Europe 2020” initiative that followed the 
Lisbon Agenda. At the same time, as shown by van Vliet, the European Commission’s 
European Employment Strategy (ESS) has played a significant role in shifting Member 
States’ labour market reform focus from passive to active reform measures (van Vliet, 
2011); even if Fleckenstein reaches the conclusion that the ‘EES did not possess the 
capacity to Europeanise German labour market policy to any significant extent’ in a 
country specific application (Fleckenstein, 2006:283). 
 
Therefore, following the survivor function results presented in this Chapter, (see Figure 
2 and 3), it may be more appropriate to consider the extent to which European 
integration can be thought of as an extension of globalisation. Establishing such an 
extension would need to define both globalisation and European integration as a 
continued development of economic integration and political interdependence. The 
European Commission’s Internal Market Index (IMI) (Tarantola et. al., 2004) covers EU 
member state compliance with the Single Market and shows a clear and significant 
correlation with the KOF Globalisation Index (Dreher, 2006). This is especially true for 
the relationship between IMI and the economic globalisation sub-component of the KOF 
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Globalisation Index, making the assumption of European integration as an extension of 
globalisation a plausible one12.  
 
This leaves the following imperfect avenues for empirically establishing the event 
history hazard rates or probability of labour market flexibility reforms, as explained by 
Europeanization and Globalisation. To measure globalisation, the KOF Globalisation 
Index is used as it covers economic, social, and political dimensions of globalization. 
The KOF index is supplemented by the World Bank’s ‘openness’ index, a standard 
economic measure of countries’ trade readiness (World Bank, 2010; Keefer and 
Stasavage, 2003; Romer, 1993). Further, European integration, as a catalyst for domestic 
policy change, is directly tested using indicator variables for the coincidence of events 
(EPL reductions) and the introduction of the Single Market (1993), Monetary Union 
(2002) and the Lisbon Agenda (2000). 
 
2.4.3 Social model belonging and control variables  
Given the results of the Kaplan-Meier Estimators discussed above as well as the 
theoretical arguments presented in Chapter 1, belonging to one of the four Sapir social 
model categories is carried over into the multiple-event history analysis for EU15 
countries as both a control and potential explanatory variable for labour market 
flexibility reforms. However, for parsimony in the use of data the estimated hazard ratios 
are not broken down for each Cox models 1, 2, and 3 as this was already done using the 
Kaplan-Meier Estimators.  
  
However, to test if EU15 countries are distinctive from the OECD country group, apart 
from helping control for the above mentioned “neighbourhood” effect, the status of 
countries is controlled for using an indicator variable (Status=OECD), meaning non-EU 
OECD, to allow two models (Model 1 and Model 2, below) to be developed covering 
EU15 countries only and then one for all of OECD (Model 3, below). Also, the existing 
                                                 
12 It is not possible to use IMI on its own as measurements are only available for EU15 countries. A simple regression 
analysis of the IMI and KOF indices yield a coefficient .026 with P<.001 and a .73 correlation between IMI and 
economic globalisation measured by KOF.  
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level of wealth of each country is controlled for using a standard log transformed 
measure of real GDP per capita from the World Bank. Finally, lagged variables are used 
in the analysis to ensure control for the statistical own effect of each country. 
 
2.5 Multiple event history estimation and results 
The explanatory variables for the directional trend in labour market flexibility witnessed 
by EU15 member states since 1987 is modelled using three multiple Cox proportional 
hazard gap models as specified above, where the hazard rate is the limit of the 
probability of an event happening – that is, the probability of a labour market flexibility 
reform increasing event (a downwards move in EPL). Table 3 shows the results for 
explanatory variables at each level of analysis: domestic institutions, Europeanization, 
and globalisation. 
 
Model 1 includes all the above-specified explanatory variables and reflects a careful 
model selection process. Model 2 is identical to Model 1 except that the events used for 
the dependent variable is not downwards events in Overall EPL but in Temporary EPL. 
Model 3 is identical to Model 1 but does not control for the belonging of countries to the 
EU15 group (Country Status). By excluding the status control, Model 3 becomes a 
model of all OECD countries as a homogenous group. As discussed above, all three 
models are stratified by first event, i.e. multiple events are accounted for and the first 
(post 1987) event is held as substantively different from any subsequent events. 
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Table 3: Multiple Event History Analysis: Cox Model Hazard Ratios 
Multiple Event Model/ 
Explanatory Variables
3
 
M1: EU15 Status M2: EU Status EPL Temp M3: OECD as One 
Hazard 
Rate 
Robust 
St. 
Errors 
Hazard 
Rate 
Robust St. 
Errors 
Hazard 
Rate 
Robust 
St. 
Errors 
Domestic
1
 
Political Constraints  1.10* 0.03 1.08* 0.03 1.10* 0.39 
GDP Growth 0.83* 0.07 0.80 0.10 0.79* 0.73 
Unemployment 1.17* 0.06 1.16* 0.08 1.21* 0.56 
Government 0.95 0.28 1.22 0.34 1.09 0.30 
Social Model 1.57* 0.34 1.33 0.39 1.70* 0.37 
EU and Globalization
1
 
EU Initiatives
2
 na na na na na na 
Openness 0.99* 0.00 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.00 
Globalization  0.91 0.04 0.97 0.03 0.95 0.03 
Controls       
Country Status (EU15) 0.13 0.15 0.60 0.58 na na 
Country Lag 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 
Log GDP 1.15 0.68 2.14 1.29 1.84 0.80 
 n=435  n=511  n=435  
1: (*) indicates significant at 5% level. 
2: Not significant / removed to maintain model parsimony. 
3: Stratified by first spell Cox-regression models using the Breslow method for ties and robust standard errors. 
Data Source: Estimates of the employment protection indicators from 1985-2008 available from the OECD, World Bank, ETH-KOF 
and Witold Henisz POLCON websites. All tabulations and calculations completed as part of research for this thesis using Stata 
statistical software.  
 
Table 3 shows the exponentiated Cox regression coefficients, which is equal to the 
hazard ratio of increased labour market flexibility (expressed by EPL events as defined 
above), not the beta coefficients usually shown in results tables of cross-sectional 
statistical analysis. That is because the interpretation of a hazard rate is highly 
convenient and straightforward: the exponentiated coefficients can be interpreted as the 
ratio of the hazard’s occurrence given a one-unit change in the explanatory variables, all 
other things remaining equal or ceteris paribus. In other words, the hazard rates express 
an increase or decrease in the risk of an event, in the case of the analysis here, the risk or 
likelihood of a labour market reform of EPL taking place towards more flexibility given 
an infinitesimal time interval. 
 
Model 1 shows that an EU15 country with sticky political institutions, as measured by 
the POLCON political constraints measure referenced above, has a higher risk or hazard 
of being in the process of reforming its labour markets: even if the process may be 
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relatively slow, a high level of domestic institutional constraints increases the hazard of 
increased labour market flexibility by about 10 per cent. Somewhat counter-intuitive, 
this result may indicate that the pressure on policy makers to complete flexibility 
reforms has increased over time to an extent where even countries with more “sticky 
institutions” (with many veto points) have politically overcome that stickiness to begin a 
labour market flexibility reform process. A practical example would be Germany, that 
while famous for its joint-decision making traps (Scharpf, 1996), have completed a 
relatively high number of EPL labour market reforms. 
 
So, while increased flexibility may be a clear economic strategy, contrary to general 
perceptions it is politically being carried out by policy makers in Europe in countries 
where political constraints would otherwise be expected to prevent or retard reforms. A 
caveat is due with respect to political expediency: the reform process is slow and is 
clearly driven, if not exclusively then to a large extent, by temporary EPL. This is 
confirmed by the hazard being significant and almost identical at 8 per cent in Model 2.  
 
This finding would appear to support the general hypothesis of a dualization of labour 
markets in Europe, also adds robustness to the economics literature that has established a 
trend of marginal reforms in Europe for the covered period (Boeri, 2011). Specifically, 
for the research question of this thesis what can be deduced from Model 1 and 2 is that 
sticky institutions are not, from a domestic political perspective, retarding reforms as 
long as those reforms are at the margin, namely temporary employment protection 
reforms. 
 
Hence, the results shown raise the spectre of policy makers actually following the road 
of reform, at least when the reform trend is measured using both Overall and Temporary 
EPL as the dependent variable. The reform trend is statistically significant when taking 
into account domestic political constraints – and, somewhat unsurprising given its 
traditional significance in the literature and as shown by each social model using a 
Kaplan-Meier Estimator above, belonging to a specific social model is also a statistically 
significant determinant of labour market flexibility reforms. As such, the social model 
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explanatory variable increases the hazard of increased labour market flexibility by about 
60 per cent. A result which would seem to lend support to the research hypothesis that 
institutional continuity is to expected, even if there are economic pressures for 
governments to reform labour markets towards more flexibility,  
 
Combining the results of sticky institutions with social model significance would 
qualitatively indicate that a further relationship exists between countries that adopt 
reforms at the margin, in some cases leading to dualization, and the stickiness of their 
institutions. From a quantitative statistical perspective, the multiple-event history 
analysis confirms and adds further robustness to the findings of the Kaplan-Meier non-
parametric estimator of the survivor function (see Figure 2), which used a log-rank test 
to show that the event or reform trajectory was statistically different for each European 
social model. As such, during the analysed period, overall, reforms have been refracted 
by domestic political institutions towards a marginal reform trajectory that it appears in 
part is informed by the stickiness of domestic political institutions.  
 
In terms of economic challenges having the effect of furthering the forming of reform 
coalitions, the event history analysis shows that GDP growth decreases the hazard of 
increased labour market flexibility by about 17 per cent, but is only significant for 
overall (Model 1) and the OECD as whole (Model 3), not temporary EPL (Model 2). 
This is unsurprising in so far as economic growth is the key challenge for EU countries 
not already at the more flexible end of the scale (Hassel, 2007; 2011). However, it does 
intuitively align with the argument that growth is important but perhaps less important 
than other factors, like for example unemployment, when politicians consider reforming 
labour markets as a response to Hassel’s identified “problem of government” driver of 
reforms. A driver that in this thesis is represented by the hypothesis that such economic 
pressures for reforms are the most likely determinants of reforms – a hypothesis that 
cannot so far be rejected on the basis of the EHA results presented here.   
 
However, it follows that unemployment rate increases the hazard of increased labour 
market flexibility between 16 to 21 per cent across models, which is unsurprising from 
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an economics and political economy perspective – a standard political response to 
unemployment would potentially be to increase labour market flexibility. Perhaps more 
surprising, globalisation is not significant and openness to trade has a very marginal 
hazard rate and is only significant for Model 1. As such, the distinction between a direct 
and indirect Europeanization and Globalisation effect is less important than popularly 
argued and seemingly feared by electorates across Europe (Giles, 2007). 
 
This is underlined by the lack of any significant observed effect of the tested for EU 
initiatives, at least from a timing perspective. That said, the combination of GDP Growth 
and Unemployment, but not Europeanization or globalization being statistically 
significant explanatory variables in the analysed Models is somewhat counterintuitive 
given the often-presumed correlation between GDP growth and globalisation and the 
impact of Europeanization (not tested here).  
 
In sum, the continued relevance of domestic institutions and tracing political coalitions 
that have emerged to “defeat institutional stickiness” would appear to be important. Not 
least if the topic of interest is to better understand the ability of politicians to enact de-
regulatory labour market flexibility reforms like those discussed in this Chapter and 
which Baccaro and Howell more generally argue has become prevalent as part of a 
liberalization trend across Europe (Baccaro and Howell, 2011). A trend that Boeri has 
shown, and to which this Chapter adds robustness, in the area of labour market reforms 
being a case where marginal reforms have contributed to overall political economy 
liberalization for EU15 countries (Boeri, 2011).  
 
Further, together with instances of reforms induced by classic economic challenges for 
governments, like unemployment and GDP growth, the domestic level of analysis 
appears more important than either European or global levels of analysis. For this 
reason, the European and global levels of analysis will only be used when a specific case 
warrants it in the country-case studies that follow in Chapters 3 to 6.  
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2.6 Conclusion  
As the quantitative or large-N analysis of the thesis’ mixed-methods approach, this 
Chapter has added robustness to the contention that most labour market flexibility 
enhancing reforms were at the margin – driven by temporary EPL reforms. First, 
descriptive statistics showed an observable trend towards increased labour market 
flexibility and helped gauge the extent to which European labour market flexibility 
reforms had progressed since the EU Single Market project was set apace. The results 
showed that from 1985 to 2008 only three EU15 group countries decreased their labour 
market flexibility, namely the UK, Ireland and France.  
 
Opposite, for increases in flexibility there was a strong directional trend towards labour 
market flexibility reforms across EU15 countries. In total, reforms corresponded to a 26 
per cent increase in overall EPL labour market flexibility for the 1985 to 2008 period 
and 11 and 38 per cent for regular and temporary EPL, respectively. In contrast, the Rest 
of OECD group of countries showed overall stability. In addition, most EU15 countries 
completed several reforms – observed as multiple downwards EPL events and hence part 
of an on-going political process of European labour market flexibility reforms.  
 
Second, reviewing key political economy determinants of labour market liberalization, 
the distinctiveness of the EU15 countries’ directional trend in labour market flexibility 
was tested. Using a standard Kaplan-Meier non-parametric estimator for downward EPL 
events (more flexibility), the results showed that EU15 countries started their, much 
deeper, reforms earlier than the Rest of the OECD comparator group of countries. The 
statistical significance of this difference was confirmed using a log-rank test, by 
definition a test that is longitudinally representative of a distinctive change in labour 
market flexibility.  
 
Further, given the theoretical importance of social models, a Kaplan-Meier set of 
survivor functions were used to differentiate EU15 countries according to their social 
model, as defined by Sapir, either: Continental, Nordic, Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon 
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(Sapir, 2006). Except for the Anglo-Saxon model countries (UK and Ireland) the 
estimator confirmed the directional trend in labour market flexibility reforms. The key 
difference between social models was the timing rather than the intensity with which 
countries within a social model reformed, except for the Anglo-Saxon model, which 
already had very flexible labour markets. Again, the survivor functions were 
significantly different using a log-rank test. Overall therefore, the estimators used 
support the descriptive identification of a European trend in labour market flexibility 
reforms “towards the rest of the world”, principally taking hold just before the 
introduction of the European Single Market.       
 
Finally, a multiple event history analysis was used to model the probability or likelihood 
of labour market flexibility reforms using explanatory variables at three levels; and 
where feasible a combination of economic and political explanatory variables: domestic, 
European and global. The observed trend for EU countries was towards increased labour 
market flexibility and hence the multiple-event history analysis identified factors to help 
explain those observed labour market flexibility reforms. A carefully specified Cox 
proportional hazard event history gap model was developed to analyse reforms as a 
continuous political process, the processes being expressed in line with the multiple 
number of reform-events having been experienced by many EU15 Member States.  
 
Once specified, the identified hazard rates became straightforward to interpret as they 
express an increase or decrease in the risk or likelihood of reforms: three multiple-event 
history models were specified, showing that for at least one of the models the following 
explanatory variables were statistically significant: political constraints or sticky 
institutions (where reforms have many veto points in the political system of a country), 
GDP growth, a country’s belonging to a specific social model, and the unemployment 
rate of a country.  
 
Somewhat surprising, globalization and openness to trade were not significant and so it 
was also not possible to make a clear assertion around any potential Europeanization 
impact of European labour market flexibility reforms. Equally, the ideological leaning 
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left-centre-right of governments was not found to be significant – indicating that both 
left and right leaning governments were able and willing to implement reforms, even if 
mainly towards reforms at the margin.  
 
Further, the importance of understanding the potentially marginal nature of reforms 
became clear from the conducted quantitative analysis. Theoretically, that implies a 
caveat to the hypothesis of no reforms derived from the inter-temporal challenge of 
establishing reforming coalitions for politicians who would like to be re-elected, as 
discussed in Chapter 1. In the sense that, politically, reforms of overall EPL changes 
were driven mainly by reforms “at the margin” or through temporary rather than regular 
EPL that may not have had the same impact politically on reforming coalitions as 
reforms of regular employment protection reforms would have had.  
 
As such, perhaps the most important contribution of the Chapter towards answering the 
research question of the thesis – what determines labour market reforms, is that 
distinguishing between economic and political explanatory variables matters. That is 
because this Chapter has shown that for the European reform trajectory, political 
economy arguments that err on the side of economics cannot stand on their own as 
determinants of reforms. Instead, the combination of economic challenges to 
governments and political-electoral or political system variables that could be tested here 
– like political system veto points, also proved to be statistically important. Hence, the 
political system variable of sticky institutions or veto points, but also lack of ideological 
importance of reforming coalitions indicated that the hypothesis of political-electoral 
challenges for reforms as a determinant of reforms cannot be ignored. 
 
Similarly, the significance of unemployment and lacking economic growth appeared 
important as support for the hypothesis that pressures on government from political 
economy problems of government are important. Most importantly, perhaps, this 
Chapter has helped make explicit the need to gain a better understanding of the 
trajectory and interactions between the combination of economic and explicitly political 
variables in producing coalitional support for European labour market flexibility 
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reforms. Therefore, the following four Chapters analyse the trajectories of reforms for 
Germany, the UK and Denmark that as evident from this Chapter’s analysis experienced 
EPL reforms at the margin, and France – which did not. 
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3. Achieving labour market reforms in Germany 
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the purpose of the thesis case studies is to provide a 
qualitative perspective to the trajectory of reforms with the aim of uncovering what 
politically explains European labour market reforms up to 2008. Whereas the previous 
Chapter used event history analysis as quantitative approach to answer the research 
question, this Chapter as the first of four case studies covering Germany, the UK, 
Denmark and France uses a qualitative analysis format.  
 
Specifically, this and the following case studies put the quantitative event history 
analysis into a broader political context by reviewing each event in respect of the 
foundations of each country’s labour markets, the trajectory of reforms events for both 
EPL and functionally related reforms, and discusses their economic and political 
rationales. As such, by combining the qualitative and quantitative reform event analysis 
this and subsequent case study Chapters open up new avenues for explaining the 
political decisions made to liberalize European labour markets over time – the topic of 
this thesis. 
 
With respect to its labour market foundations, the 1927 Job Placement and 
Unemployment Insurance Act are usually considered to be the bedrock of the German 
labour market. As the primary legal underpinning of the highly formal German labour 
market, the act established an insurance-based system under the Bismarckian welfare 
motto of “rights and duties” (cf. Thelen, 2004). While the 1927 act was replaced in 1969 
with the Employment Promotion Act, the 1969 reform did not significantly alter the 
regular employment-oriented, insurance-focused features of the German labour market. 
Rather, the 1969 act continued to rely on compulsory employment insurance and high 
replacement rates i.e. the proportion of in-work income maintained when a person 
becomes unemployed. The 1969 Employment Promotion Act also initiated support for 
training initiatives, later furthered by legalisation in 1976 that introduced Temporary 
Work agencies (Wunsch, 2005:9). 
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For the purposes of this thesis, the 1927-1969 period was almost exclusively focused on 
a political economy balancing of demand and supply, i.e. on continuing the historical 
coordination, training, and skills formation capabilities of the German political economy 
(Thelen, 2004; Hall and Soskice, 2001). As originally argued by Hall and Soskice, the 
crux of the German archetypical case of a coordinated market economy variety of 
capitalism, is the ‘production strategies that depend on workers with specific skills and 
high levels of corporate commitment that are secured by offering them long employment 
tenures’ – or, in the language of EPL, employment based on high regular EPL (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001:27). With respect to Germany as a continental social model country in 
Sapir’s labour market focused typology referenced in Chapter 1, the model ‘provides 
generous unemployment benefits, but its EPL is stricter’ (Sapir, 2006:377).  
 
The implication of both the CME and continental approach is that political coalitions 
forming to complete labour market reforms potentially represents an important and 
therefore politically challenging departure from the traditional German labour market 
set-up. As such, with respect to the German labour market reform trajectory, and of 
interest to understand labour market institutional continuity as well as this thesis’ interest 
in determinants of the political decision to reform, Germany entered the late 1970s 
European-wide period of high unemployment with its traditional insurance-based 
benefits system intact, albeit with a new layer of employment promotion geared towards 
balancing supply and demand through training.  
 
One reason for continuity was that, at a political level, both the centrist liberal FDP and 
the two main catch-all parties (Kirchheimer, 1966) –the social democratic SPD and the 
centre-right Christian Democratic CDU/CSU –agreed, at least until the mid-1970s, on a 
broad consensus with respect to the German welfare state and labour market model. For 
example, according to Arndt, before Helmut Kohl became Chancellor for CSU/CDU in 
1982, the prevailing ‘social-liberal coalition (1969-82), consisting of the SPD and the 
liberal party (FDP), expanded the welfare state in a faster and broader manner than any 
previous government’ (Arndt, 2013:101).  
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For example, the mentioned 1969 reform events were part of that expansion and a 
starting point for what this Chapter argues was a trajectory of German labour market 
reform events that, with due consideration to a longitudinal understanding of reform 
events, broadly succeeding in liberalizing the German labour market, albeit at the 
margin. In other words, Germany is a case of achieved labour market reforms; reforms 
that were mainly, but not only, for temporary EPL leading to a level of liberalization 
congruent with a dualized German labour market (Palier and Thelen, 2010).  
 
Further, the Chapter argues that the determinants of the political decisions to reform 
changed over time, with an acceleration of reforms in the late 1990s and early 2000s due 
to a combination of political economy challenges, including from German re-unification, 
and a changing party political landscape, especially impactful for SPD intra-party 
dynamics. The following Section 3.1. covers the trajectory of German labour market 
reform events, followed by a discussion of how labour market reforms were achieved in 
Germany as Section 3.2. Section 3.3 then concludes the Chapter. 
 
3.1 Trajectory of German labour market reform events  
Arguably, following the 1969 and 1976 reforms referenced above, the next following, 
critical reform event was more profound even if it was arguably also EPL neutral at first, 
namely German re-unification in 1989. The reform event of expanding the West German 
labour market with East Germany was part and parcel of the political re-unification deal. 
For this reason, re-unification could be considered as supportive of the resilience of the 
highly coordinated German labour market, mainly because labour unions in West 
Germany were politically able to force through a complete transfer of the existing West 
German labour market model to the former East Germany (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011).  
 
Likewise, the re-unification event can be viewed as a trigger for a longer term, more 
fundamental alteration of the underlying dynamics of the German labour market, setting 
in motion future economic pressures for EPL-type reforms due to the employment and 
economic growth challenges presented by extending equal terms to East German 
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workers. This because, with re-unification, a new East German labour force was added 
and paid at, but could not compete on, West-German labour market terms (Eichhorst and 
Marx, 2011). Hence, while re-unification was strictly speaking a non-EPL reform, 
according to Eichhorst and Marx, it did create a starting point for later labour market 
reforms where the ‘[p]ressure for change increased further as a result of the initial 
response to the structural problems of the East German economy’ (Eichhorst and Marx, 
2011:77).  
 
In addition to re-unification, another important factor in Germany’s labour market 
reform trajectory, from at least the 1980s onwards, was the political-institutional 
constraints or veto points on reforms within the German political system. In Chapter 2, 
the equivalent quantitative Henisz (2000) POLCON index was used to statistically show 
the significance of political-institutional veto points for labour market reforms. 
Qualitatively, for Germany, the seminal argument by Scharpf concerning the German 
‘joint-decision making trap’ –an expression of the challenge for German politicians to 
pass reforms due to multiple levels of government with veto powers or overlapping 
jurisdictions –by extension applies to German labour market reforms (Scharpf, 1996).  
 
A point in case with respect to the institutional and political challenge of enacting 
German labour market reforms was Helmut Kohl’s long period as Chancellor from 1982 
to 1998. As argued by Wood, Kohl was first elected on a platform of promising ‘less 
state, more freedom’ as part of his 1982 electoral campaign, which ‘deliberately pitched 
towards neo-liberal themes’ –including labour market liberalization (Wood, 2001a:266). 
Yet the early Kohl governments were only able to manage minor welfare state reforms 
aimed at improved budget management (Schmidt, 2003:241). In fact, Kohl’s situation 
became widely seen as an expression of the joint-decision making trap using the German 
moniker reform-stau or reform traffic jam, meaning a political gridlock where lacking 
reforms were perceived as the German political systems ‘failure to adjust the German 
welfare state to changed socio-economic circumstances’ (Arndt, 2013:104). 
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With the financial cost of re-unification and the negative European economic situation of 
the 1980s also impacting Germany, the reform challenge from socio-economic 
circumstances can be seen longitudinally through a simple descriptive statistic of GDP 
growth and unemployment for Germany, in Figure 3, together with Germany’s overall 
OECD EPL reform events up to the Great Recession.  
 
Figure 3: German GDP Growth, Unemployment Rate and Overall EPL 1985-2009 
 
Data sources: Estimates of the employment protection indicators (EPL) from 1985-2008 available from the OECD’s employment 
protection website (www.oecd.org/employment/protection) and GDP Growth and Unemployment Rate Data from the World Bank 
(www.worldbankgrouporg). All tabulations and calculations completed as part of research for this thesis. EPL range is 0-6 (six is 
most inflexible).  
 
Figure 3 shows the development of German GDP growth, unemployment and changes to 
overall EPL. EPL data is shown until 2008, but GDP growth and unemployment figures 
have been brought forward to 2009. Note that the change in EPL appears muted as the 
range is from 0-6; in percentage terms the change over the period analysed is equivalent 
  68 
to a 33 per cent increase in flexibility as German Overall EPL fell from 3.17 in 1985 to 
2.12 in 2008 (vs. a 25% change for the EU15 countries, overall – see Chapter 2). 
  
Figure 3 analytically illustrates a deteriorating and divergent trend between 
unemployment and GDP growth, consistent with calls from economists for EPL labour 
market reforms (Siebert, 1997). With pressures for reform evident from an economic 
perspective, and then factoring in the political reform-stau context of the German polity, 
actual EPL labour market reform events are shown for overall, regular and temporary 
EPL in Germany up to 2008, in Figure 4. Illustrating in detail the enacted German labour 
market flexibility reforms, Figure 4 covers EPL reform events using the OECD data 
series on overall, temporary and regular employment protection (EPL) from 1985, the 
first year of available data, until 2008. It expands on the reforms to overall EPL shown 
in Table 2 of Chapter 2, allowing a discussion of the specific policy discontinuities in the 
index, below, in terms of German politician’s ability to enact or achieve EPL reforms. 
 
Figure 4: German Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) Trends 1985-2008 
Data Source: Estimates of the employment protection indicators from 1985-2008 available from the OECD’s employment protection 
website (www.oecd.org/employment/protection). All tabulations and calculations completed as part of research for this thesis. 
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At first Figure 4 shows continuity rather than change prevailing during Kohl’s reform-
stau period up to 1993, yet with reform events ensuing in 1997 and an expansive reform 
event-set during the early 2000s; the latter giving rise to a bifurcation of regular (less 
flexible) and temporary (more flexible) EPL reforms. Specifically, the reform events 
traceable from Figure 4 –carried over from Chapter 2’s quantitative analysis of labour 
market reforms and having conducted a cross check of the OECDs EPL data shown in 
Figure 4 with that of the Fondazione Rodolfo de Benedetti’s (FRDB) qualitative 
database for EPL reforms –are: (1) the introduction of the Labour Placement Act (1994) 
and (2) Social Code III in 1998 (Kohl, CDU/CSU led government), followed by (3) the 
2002 Job-Aqtiv reform (first Schroeder, SDP led red-green government) and then the 
2003-2005 so-called Hartz reforms (second Schroeder, SPD led red-green government). 
Each of the three reform event-groupings will be briefly discussed below, followed by a 
review of the political factors underpinning the observed reform decisions.    
 
The first set of EPL reform events took place when the last Kohl government (1994-
1998) attempted or initiated several welfare state reforms in the areas of labour markets, 
social insurance and fiscal policy (Harlen, 2002). While the intent or political economy 
pressures to reform were there (shown in the secular decline in employment and GDP 
growth in Figure 3), Kohl had limited reforming success with only the Labor Placement 
Act (1994) enacted. Specifically, the Act raised the contract period for temporary work 
agencies and ‘loosened the workings of temporary work agencies’ and private 
employment services (FRDB, 2015).  
 
The second EPL reform event, under Kohl and admittedly the more significant one, is 
the Social Code III reform that set in place a policy discontinuity by enforcing a move 
from coordinated market economy supporting training, and balancing of supply and 
demand as the key role of existing labour market institutions (as set up in 1969), to a 
more liberal job seeker focused benefit system (Wunsch, 2005). In practical terms, the 
change was achieved by the Federal Employment Service having to go beyond balancing 
supply and demand via training, to a combined emphasis of training and job seeking 
incentives, overall more akin to modern principles of active labour market policies. 
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Reforms-wise and as indicated in Figure 4, however, the impact was marginal and Kohl 
arguably lost the 1998 election on ‘social issues and high unemployment’ (Arndt, 
2013:105). 
 
The third EPL reform event was enacted by the red-green government led by Gerhard 
Schroeder (1
st
 government 1998-2002) and did not reverse the piecemeal approach 
initiated by Kohl per se, but did introduce the Job-Aqtiv (2002) initiative. The Aqtiv 
initiative was certaibly more forceful than the Social Code reform and led to 
enforcement of stricter job-search activities for unemployed receiving benefits and eased 
access to wage subsidies and training programs. Further, the Aqtiv reform was an active 
labour market policy reform that did not necessarily break with the traditional German 
labour market approach, but it did provide additional flexibility within a general trend of 
labour market liberalization for temporary EPL – entrenching Germany’s reform 
trajectory as one of reforms at the margin as well as, potentially, labour market 
dualization given the simultaneous weakening of temporary EPL and strengthening of 
regular EPL (see Figure 4).   
 
In his second term (2002-2005), Schroder then initiated the four so-called “Hartz 
reforms” from 2003 to 2005. Politically, the Hartz I-IV reforms were advertised and 
implemented by the SPD-led government under the guise of giving a new lease of life to 
the German welfare state idea and key labour market tenet of “rights and duties”. In 
following with this mantra, from 2003 to 2004 Hartz I, II, and III addressed the 
efficiency of the workings of the Federal Employment Agency and introduced further 
active labour market policies following on the 2002 Job-Aqtiv reforms. Then, in 2005, 
Hartz IV came into force introducing significant changes to employment benefits and 
social assistance as well as EPL.  
 
Specifically, Hartz IV introduced ‘hard’ liberalizing reforms, referred to in the literature 
as ‘real reforms of the German labour market’ with a move from pure insurance 
contributions sustaining social status to the use of stricter measurements of the 
unemployed’s ‘ability to work’ (Neugart, 2005:11). Further, the reform increased from 5 
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to 10 the number of employees a firm needed to have before it had to offer its employees 
dismissal protection. Overall, therefore, Hartz IV affected German EPL by further de-
regulating temporary work and lowering dismissal protection with the regularization of 
fixed-term contracts, the ability to not offer dismissal protection in firms with less than 
10 employees being important in an economy driven by many small and medium sized 
companies. 
 
Importantly, the Hartz reforms formed part of a broader Agenda 2010 reform 
programme. A programme that was the Schroder government’s response to losing two 
elections at the state level shortly after coming to power, continued economic problems, 
and a high media profile scandal involving improper administrative actions taken by the 
Federal Employment Office (Hassel and Schiller, 2009). Presented by Schroeder to the 
German Parliament, the Bundestag, in 2003, ‘Agenda 2010 represented a clear policy 
change’ that immediately fed into public debates as a set of reforms that would have a 
‘negative social impact…producing bitter hardships for the persons concerned’ (Arndt, 
2013:106; Fleckenstein, 2008).  
 
The Hartz reforms also targeted the German unemployment benefits system, hence not 
EPL, by converting the unemployment benefits of long-term unemployed workers away 
from the Bismarckian insurance-replacement rate system to a more (neo)liberal 
economic approach of means-tested flat rate benefits. An approach more akin to an 
Anglo-Saxon social model country labour market. Hence, the increase in regular EPL 
(less flexibility) might potentially have left unions and insiders more open to politically 
supporting the Hartz reforms. Certainly, Schroder very likely lost the subsequent 
election in 2005 over the Hartz reforms (cf. Padgett, 2005). Further, if the election was 
lost primarily because of changes to unemployment benefits, then that could question the 
use of EPL as a proxy for labour market flexibility reforms? 
 
However, most likely, it was a combination of the impact of EPL and unemployment 
benefit reforms and the Hartz reforms were clearly picked up by the OECD EPL 
indicator used to gauge the overall trajectory of reforms achieved in Figure 4. Further, it 
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is not clear that Schroder’s subsequent electoral loss in 2005 was due only or primarily 
to the insurance-system change to a means-tested approach for the receipt of 
unemployment benefits. This, because it was only during the following Grand Coalition 
of SDP-CDU/CSU, which followed the 2005 electoral loss for Schroeder, that ‘a 
sizeable number of unemployed […] experienced a loss of income, since their benefits 
had been decoupled from former earnings [through the Hartz reforms]’ (Arndt, 
2013:107).  
 
Importantly, the Hartz reforms sit at the end of a reform trajectory leading up to the 
Great Recession. As shown in this Chapter, the German reform challenge had in fact 
remained for most of the 1980s. Further, as argued by Hassel ‘pressures for reform’ in 
Germany most often arose from ‘mounting public deficits and labour market and social 
policy inefficiencies that burdened governments’ yet only Schroeder had been able to 
move to more impactful reforms like those encompassed in Hartz I-IV (Hassel, 
2007:254). Or, put slightly differently, reforms where ‘selective liberalization of various 
forms of atypical employment – agency work, fixed terms contracts, and…so called 
mini-jobs’ had started to create an impression with the German electorate of a changing 
German labour market (Thelen, 2014:131).  
 
In practice that meant that the political response to pressures for reform appears to have 
been there more or less throughout or across both Kohl and Schroder-led governments, 
slowly opening up avenues for reforms, i.e. non-traditional temporary work contracts; in 
effect slowly moving Germany towards a dualization of its labour market. Yet do the 
political economy pressures on government tell the full story of how reforms came 
about? And if so, what then explains the significant difference between the impactful 
reforms that Schroder – as a social democrat, was able to achieve against those of a 
purportedly liberalization minded Kohl, most of who’s reforms never left the German 
reform “traffic jam” – so to speak? To review those questions in light of the thesis 
hypotheses, the next section analyses the achieved reforms with the aim of better 
understanding what determined the political ability to enact reforms in Germany.   
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3.2 Achieving labour market reforms in Germany  
In the preceding review of the trajectory of German labour market flexibility reforms, 
the most politically salient liberalization events were the Hartz reforms in the second 
red-green government of Gerhard Schroder and the general paucity, but not entirely 
reform-event free period, of the long reign of Helmut Kohl as German Chancellor. 
Jointly, these also represent a third type of “event”, namely a longitudinal trajectory of 
German reforms that conform to a general notion of labour market liberalization.  
 
The Kohl period’s dearth of reforms, especially early on, is somewhat puzzling given 
that Kohl was elected on a liberal reform-friendly platform. Certainly, as noted by 
Wood, the reforms that were enacted paled in comparison with the far-reaching neo-
liberal reforms implemented by Margaret Thatcher in the UK after her election on a 
liberalization platform in 1979 (see Chapter 5) (Wood, 2001a). In an effort to explain the 
lack of reforms under Kohl, Wood argues that the neo-liberal reforms that the Kohl 
governments did propose failed by and large because they were, counter-intuitively, 
opposed by business interests – not unions. To the extent, that ‘the rights and standing of 
unions and workers were never seriously threatened in the 1980s’ (Wood, 2001a:266). 
 
In addition, Wood argues that the resistance of business interests to neo-liberal reforms 
targeting unions was a product of employer organizations not wanting such regulation to 
decrease union’s influence, because it would reduce those same business organizations 
ability to negotiate directly with labour unions: business interests as well as unions 
wanted to keep ‘collective bargaining free from state interference’ (Wood, 2001:268). 
Yet, while reforms of EPL did not materialize during the early Kohl years, Wood’s 
argument follows one of business interests supporting a continuation of coordinated 
market economy traditions through resistance to re-regulation. That is an important 
distinction in the sense that, for the purposes of this thesis, re-regulation is somewhat 
different to the standard definition of liberalization, which tends to focus on liberalizing 
reforms as institutional de-regulation (Baccaro and Howell, 2011). 
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Strictly speaking, therefore, Kohl’s proposed yet failed neo-liberal reform program to 
cull the influence and powers of unions would not have been EPL type-liberalization, 
but instead legal adjustments that would have potentially further regulated rather than 
necessarily liberalized the German labour market. That said, Wood’s argument is 
generalizable in that, as also argued by Hassel, what does appear to have continuously 
stifled German labour market liberalization across the Kohl and early Schroeder periods 
were the continued institutional strength of the German coordinated market economy’s 
‘producer coalitions…driving and shaping [labour markets] and institutional change’ as 
well as the joint-decision veto traps built into the German political system discussed in 
this Chapter (Hassel, 2011:10).  
 
The result was marginal reforms that, as argued by the dualization literature, would 
promote labour market liberalization to the extent that, from a longitudinal perspective, 
they inserted enough flexibility into the German labour market to stabilize the core of 
the coordinated market economy (Palier and Thelen, 2010). Simultaneously however, 
the reforms also impacted the electorate’s perception of the German labour market, 
especially with Hartz IV representing much tougher liberalization measures than had 
previously been the case (Neugart, 2005). This matters with respect to understanding the 
political determinants of those reforms, regardless of Gerhard Schroeder’s self-effacing 
comments that ‘[political] courage means putting reform of your country before staying 
in power’ (John, 2012).  
 
To illustrate in terms of the thesis hypotheses: when reviewing the trajectory of reforms 
in light of the quantitative analysis in the Chapter 2, for Germany the determinants of the 
trajectory leading to the Hartz reforms appears to follow the socio-economic variables 
shown to be significant explanatory variables, namely unemployment and stagnating 
GDP growth. Or, what Clasen and Clegg have termed the then ‘gloom surrounding the 
economic situation in Germany [that] has rendered radical reform proposals possible’ 
(Clasen and Clegg, 2004:105). By extension, Hassel and Schiller argue that financial 
constraints put on local governments after re-unification, where municipalities pay out 
unemployment insurance, worked to precipitate the Hartz reforms (Hassel and Schiller, 
  75 
2009). Or, specifically that ‘both public opinion and party position are driven by 
economic “danger signals” like escalating state debt or rising unemployment’ (Padgett, 
2005:271; original emphasis).  
 
However, the idea that the political economy challenges faced by German governments 
were conducive to reforms can only be part of the reform story. After all, those 
challenges were also evident during the Kohl period, e.g. unemployment and lacking 
growth, and have been for most if not all of the period analysed in this thesis up to the 
Great Recession. Therefore, the argument put forward here is that more attention is 
warranted for the role of politics in the German trajectory of reforms; for example, to the 
political impact of intra-part changes in Schroeder’s SPD, which arguably helped give 
the SPD the ability to complete the range of reforms reviewed in this Chapter.  
 
One explanation in terms of a politically driven ability to reform follows Saint-Paul’s 
well known theoretical construct for structural reforms in modern mixed economies. 
Saint-Paul’s argument is that within a political economy reform context, the median 
voter theorem can be used to illustrate how politically significant labour market reforms 
are most likely to occur in two distinct stages. First, politicians buy the ‘support of 
incumbent employees by granting that the new arrangements’ –say in the case of 
Germany to lower Temporary EPL – ‘will only apply to new contracts’ and therefore 
will not affect the status quo for voters under regular employment arrangements, who are 
also the median majority winning voters (Saint-Paul, 2000:227). 
 
Second, with marginal increases in flexibility in place, over time further and more 
systemic change to regular labour market institutions could potentially emerge. Using 
Saint-Paul’s logic, it appears that the first step was a long drawn out step or trajectory of 
reforms leading to an ultimately dualized German labour market – broadly as described 
above. The Hartz reforms could then be seen as the first round of Saint-Paul’s second 
step, yet that would not fit well with the subsequent loss of political power by the 
reforming government nor was regular EPL reformed. 
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Rather, it seams more important to connect the achievement of reforms with possible 
politically focused arguments for reforms, which leads to a slightly different explanation 
than that arrived at using Saint-Paul’s approach. Namely, that to explain the marginal 
reforms trend observed in Germany, the intra-party and electoral preferences of Kohl’s 
CDU/CSU and Schroeder’s SPD constituencies may matter more with respect to their 
party leaders’ ability to enact reforms. To illustrate, the German ‘party politics of 
economic reform’ have historically converged for both the CDU/CSU and SPD on the 
‘weakness of partisan cleavages on socio-economic issues’ (Padgett, 2005:248).  
 
What that means is that for liberal reform attempts, ‘[i]nstead of dividing the parties, the 
fault lines between welfare supporters and advocates of the market economy cut across 
party electorates’ providing very limited political incentives for either Kohl or Schroder 
governments to large liberalization reform programs (Padgett, 2005:270). In other 
words, on top of the existing challenge with powerful producer-coalitions mentioned 
above, there were no discernible electoral upsides or intra-party advantages for party 
leaders in Germany to promote liberalizing reforms. Rather, doing so would likely 
alienate important constituencies within each of the main catch-all parties that have 
formed governments in Germany since World War II (Padgett, 2005).  
 
Hence, with respect to this thesis’ interest in understanding the determinants of the 
political decision to reform labour markets, for Germany, it appears broadly correct to 
assume that between CDU/CSU and SPD governments, the ideology of the parties in 
government (and their constituents) did not vary significantly in terms of the political-
electoral support that party leaders could gain from enacting reforms. As such, in the 
example of Kohl, a right-leaning leader in principle in favour of liberalizing reforms, 
there were plenty of economic but precious few party-political incentives to implement 
reforms.  
 
Further, like Kohl before him, Schroeder initially had few intra-party incentives to 
implement reforms. Yet changing political dynamics arguably helped influence the 
political ability to enact reforms – especially for the Hartz reforms, as follows. First, the 
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party political composition of the German polity had by Schroder’s second government 
changed to include a resurgent Left/PDS party. Secondly, Schroeder championed the 
more liberalization friendly Third Way as the ideological underpinning of the SPD, 
effectively going up against the non-liberalization friendly constituency of his own party 
(Arndt, 2013; Giddens, 1999).  
 
To illustrate the rift, Giddens as author of ‘The Third Way’ (1998) argued that 
Schroder’s electoral setback after the Hartz reforms reflected the way in which the 
German social model had negatively refracted the ability of German politicians to 
successfully enact liberalizing reforms (Giddens, 1999). However, it was more likely the 
direct alienation of core constituencies that cost the vote, with the then President of the 
DGB confederation of trade unions going as far as stating that the rationale for the 
Agenda 2010 reforms ‘had not fully met the union’s standards in terms of their effect on 
labour and social justice’ (DW, 2002). 
 
Specifically, on electoral platform Schroder moved from his first red-green governments 
election in 1998, which used an anti-liberal platform against the CDU/CSU, to a more 
centrist Third Way inspired platform in 2002 that did not rule out reforms. Labelled neue 
mitte or new middle, for the 2002 election Schroeder promoted and then subsequently 
for the Hartz reforms used a refined version of the German labour market’s classic 
“rights and duties” motto (Arndt, 2013:103). Namely, that more liberal, active labour 
market policies would modernize “rights and duties” to towards the ‘idea that labour 
market policy must “promote and oblige” (                   )’ (Clasen and Clegg, 
2004:102). 
 
Returning to German party system changes, there was an encroachment on the 
ideological space occupied by the SPD, in part self-inflicted with the Third Way move, 
in part as a result of the longitudinal liberalization trend exemplified by the resurgent 
Left/PDS party. An offshoot of the former East German communist party, the Left/PDS 
party became a serious party political competitor to the SPD, which from 1998 onwards 
was fully capable of repeatedly meeting and exceeding the 5% electoral threshold for 
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representation in the federal Bundestag (8.7% in 2005; 11.9% of the vote in 2009) 
(Arndt, 2013:103). 
  
Therefore, the longitudinal reform trajectory had inserted enough flexibility into the 
German labour market to stabilize the core of the coordinated market economy (Palier 
and Thelen, 2010). Politically, however, that had also meant a further ability to enact 
reforms given that Schroeder, as party leader, turned to the centre. A move which was 
logical after the Left/PDS gained a stable foothold in German parliamentary politics and 
Schroder’s party own leadership platform within the SPD came to depend on the Third 
Way approach, rather than more traditional left-wing ideology.  
 
Schroder’s leadership hinged on his ability to ‘mobilise swing and middle-class votes’ 
through a Third Way platform, with the addition of his running mate Oscar Lafontaine’s 
left-wing ideological credibility that jointly provided the SPD with the ‘ability to 
mobilize the social democratic core constituency’ in 1997 (Arndt, 2013:103). However, 
with that came the realization that Schroder could never be the SPD party’s left wing 
electoral flag carrier – from an intra-party perspective that space was space occupied by 
Oscar Lafontaine, whom Schroder made his first Finance Minister. Schroder was 
personally only able to rally the SPD around the Third Way reform approach, which then 
started to vote with their feet, going to the Left/PDS as the longitudinal trajectory of 
liberalizing labour market reforms crystalized (Arndt, 2013).   
 
At that point, in contrast to Kohl, Schroder was not just attempting to deliver on labour 
market reforms as part of a response to pressures on the German government from 
political economy factors like lacking growth and persistent unemployment. He was also 
engaged in a set of intra-party political dynamics that made him personally aligned with 
and reliant on the SPDs Third Way constituency – internally and externally of the SPD. 
An alignment that was further cemented when Oscar Lafontaine left the SPD in protest 
at the liberalizing Hartz reforms, very publicly advertising his defence of more left-
leaning social democratic values in his aptly titled book ‘The Heart Beats on the Left’ 
(Lafontaine, 2000).  
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In sum, the intra-party challenges faced by Schroder within the SPD and the rise, 
effectively, of the Left/PDS party outside of the SPD, showed the SPD shifting to the 
centre under Schroeder. A move that at least in part helps explain his ability – and 
willingness, to enact reforms, even if it ultimately had the political cost of losing 
Schroeder the subsequent 2005 elections.  
 
3.3  Conclusion 
This Chapter has shown that Labour market flexibility reforms were achieved in the case 
of Germany, in part, as a response to classic political economy challenges like 
unemployment and lacking growth. Further, the continental social model refracted 
reforms, as did the built-in reform breakers of the German political system especially 
evident through the reform stau period of the Kohl chancellorship. As such, GDP growth 
and unemployment put economic pressure on successive governments for reforms, yet 
producer coalitions were generally able to ensure that EPL stayed the course, at least 
during the Kohl years of the 1980s and 1990s (Wood, 2001).   
 
However, the Chapter has also shown how the German reform trajectory was guided by 
a combination of economic liberalization pressures, including re-unification, and 
political challenges that when refracted by existing institutional constraints produced the 
1998 Social Code III, 2002 Job-Aqtiv, and critically, the 2003-2005 Hartz reforms. 
Specifically, for EPL, temporary EPL deceased and became much more flexible relative 
to regular EPL: temporary EPL went from almost 4 in the EPL range of 0-6 in 1985, to 
just above 1 in 2008. Regular EPL increased from 2.5 to 3 during the same period from 
1985 to 2008, whereby overall, the Chapter lends support to the notion that Germany has 
moved towards a dualized labour market through ‘selective liberalization of various 
types of atypical employment’ (Thelen, 2014:131; Palier and Thelen, 2010).  
 
Further, the Hartz reforms were part of a longitudinal trajectory of liberalizing reforms, 
that over time had started to alert German voters to a sense of continuous labour market 
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liberalization, most likely the reason Schroder lost the 2005 election (Padgett, 2005). 
However, what matters more for answering the research question of this thesis is how 
Schroeder in contrast to Kohl – facing more or less the same political economy 
challenges throughout their respective Chancellorships, was able to achieve reforms. The 
answer given in this Chapter is that, politically, the Hartz reforms coincided with then 
SPD leader Gerhard Schroder’s move towards an electoral platform based around the so-
called Third Way. Further, in combination with the emergence of a new electorally 
viable party on the left-ideological spectrum, the Left/PDS, enhanced the ability of 
reforms as a matter of intra-party competition.  
 
To re-phrase, economic pressures for reforms had been present more or less throughout 
or across both Kohl and Schroder-led governments. Hence, economic pressures on 
government alone are unlikely to tell the full story of how reforms came about in 
Germany, as it was only under Schroeder that reforms were finally achieved, most 
clearly in the example of the Hartz reforms. Hence, with respect to what explains the 
political enactment of flexibility enhancing reforms in European countries, the German 
case does not provide evidence to reject the existing assumption in the literature that ‘the 
persistence of differences in the organization of national political economies’ remained 
valid for German reforms (Wood, 2001:247).  
 
However, the case also does not provide evidence to reject the hypothesis that labour 
market flexibility reforms, or lack thereof, are best explained by a political focus on 
solving economic problems, e.g. high levels of unemployment, or maintaining 
institutional continuity. It does, however, not confirm that hypothesis either as the 
trajectory showed a persistence of similar-type political economy pressures on 
government across the trajectory of reforms. Instead, political-electoral and party 
leadership considerations in combination with economic pressures on governments are 
the likely determinants of Germany’s reform achievements.  
 
The Chapter illustrated that line of argument by showing how Schroeder’s leadership 
platform within the SPD became closely related with the more liberalization friendly 
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Third Way approach, which had the intra-party and electoral effect of pitting Schroeder 
against the more left leaning, traditional parts of the SPD. A complication that lost 
Schroder the support of Oscar Lafontaine and ultimately affected his ‘ability to mobilize 
the social democratic core constituency’ (Arndt, 2013:103).  
 
The practical impact was that Schroeder moved towards the ideological centre, which in 
principle also should have brought support from centre-right voters and ensured an 
electoral win for Schroeder following the enactment of the Hartz reforms. Except, as 
shown by Padgett, there was always insufficient electoral support in the German 
electorate across both parties for reforms that would impact the German labour market 
towards a neo-liberal approach to labour market regulation, which the Hartz reforms 
were perceived as having done –perhaps more so when presented as part of a Third Way, 
rather than more traditional SPD electoral platforms (Padgett, 2005).  
 
In sum, the case of Germany supports the thesis argument that the reform challenge 
remains first and foremost a political challenge of enacting reforms even if reforms led 
to a loss of voter support for the SPD in 2005. First, in the example of the Hartz 
program, the self-sacrifice espoused by Schroeder belies the success and failure of his 
Third Way electoral approach. However, it does lend support to answering the thesis 
question answer by drawing on a combination of economic challenges to governments 
and political-electoral advantages to reforming political parties and their leaders when 
seeking an explain for the political ability to enact reforms. 
 
Second, the German case provides support for the idea that a better understanding of the 
trajectory of reforms, via a longitudinal analysis of reforms enacted, helped to clarify the 
political challenge of enacting reforms – as witnesses between the similarities and 
differences between the Kohl era and Gerhard Schroder’s changing approach to reforms 
across his two governments. A difference which is revealing politically given that the 
problems of government remained more or less the same from a political economy 
perspective.  
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However, the German case does not contemplate a situation where an elected leader 
confronts political economy pressures for reforms, enacts reforms, and gets re-elected. 
As such, the case of Germany conformed to Juncker’s dictum discussed in Chapter 1. 
Yet the case of the UK represents a case of a reforming politicians going on to get re-
elected, a case to which the thesis now turns with the UK being the second case study of 
the thesis.  
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4. Sustaining labour market reforms in the UK 
As seen in the previous Chapters, both quantitative and qualitative, understanding 
determinants of the political decisions to reform is is challenging but furthered through 
gaining knowledge of the trajectory of reforms and the interactions between economic or 
wider political economy and political explanatory variables that drive reform enactment. 
While the German case study showed that across the reform trajectory the political 
approach and political results for reforming politicians may vary significantly, e.g. 
between the Kohl and Schroder years, this Chapter turns its attention to the United 
Kingdom (UK); a country that, longitudinally, represents a case of a liberal market 
economy where labour market flexibility reforms took place both before and after the 
OECD EPL measure for labour market flexibility reforms became available in 1985. 
 
Further, the UK represents a case where politicians across the political spectrum, again 
in difference to Germany, appeared to be able to enact and gain from EPL reforms and 
their sustainment over time. For example, after coming to power in 1979, Margaret 
Thatcher’s Conservative government enacted labour market deregulation through the 
abolition of UK Wages Councils, lowering of employment protection, with state 
enterprise privatization and unions being prevented from taking disruptive industrial 
action from the early 1980s onwards (Wood, 2001:396). As such, the key area of non-
EPL, but functionally linked, reforms that the UK has experienced is in the field of 
collective bargaining and the position and role of unions. 
 
The result was arguably a ‘revolution…best seen as a restoration of employer dominance 
in British labour markets…[with] the collectivist period from the late 1950s to the late 
1970s [being] an aberration in recent British economic history’ (Wood, 2001:396). A 
result, which politically turned out to be beneficial with Thatcher then going on to 
become one of the longest serving Prime Ministers of British history. However, more 
than Thatcher’s enactment of reforms, as will be argued in this Chapter, what is 
significant in the UK case, particularly as it pertains to this thesis’ research question, is 
  84 
the continuous political commitment to a highly liberalized labour market, despite 
changes in governments (from Conservative to New Labour).  
 
An often stated reason for this sustained commitment across the political spectrum and 
over time is the argument, that the “welfare regime inherited by Margaret Thatcher, in 
1979, was...fundamentally inconsistent with the interests of employers and the 
institutional characteristics of the British [political economy]’ (Wood, 2001:395). An 
argument which appears plausible and supports institutional continuity, to wit, the 
sustainment over time of high levels of labour market flexibility has (including low 
levels of EPL) been borne out by the actions of both ideologically right-leaning 
Conservative and left-leaning New Labour governments – giving weight to the 
quantitative results presented in Chapter 2, which showed that the ideology of 
governments was not a statistically significant explanatory variable for flexibility 
enhancing reforms.    
 
To further illustrate, over and beyond the mentioned reforms by Margaret Thatcher’s 
governments to be reviewed in detail in this Chapter, when in 1997 Tony Blair’s New 
Labour returned Labour to power for the first time since 1979, he did so on the basis of 
an election prospectus that stated that ‘New Labour believes in a flexible labour market 
that serves employers and employees alike. But flexibility alone is not enough. We need 
“flexibility plus”’ (New Labour, 1997, original emphasis). In practice, the plus part of 
the prospectus did not materialize in intent to significantly reduce flexibility, as might 
have been expected from a left-of-centre political party government with a clear 
parliamentary majority due to the majoritarian political system of the UK. 
 
Instead, from 1997 when Tony Blair became Prime Ministers until the Great Recession, 
reforms were implemented that covered ‘minimum standards of fair treatment, including 
a national minimum wage’ and ‘an imaginative welfare-to-work programme to put the 
long-term unemployed back to work and to cut social security costs’ (New Labour, 
1997). As such, and beyond rhetoric to actual practice, the New Labour reforms aligned 
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themselves with the general European trend at the time of adding active labour market 
policies (ALMPs) to ensure a welfare-to-work work flexibility driven approach.  
 
With New Labour there was no reversal wholesale of the Thatcherite legislation for 
employment protection or trade unions. Rather, focus was on ALMPs. Hence, the UK is 
a case of overall labour market liberalization – both through EPL liberalisation and 
especially so through its sustainment at a low level. Overall then, New Labour sustained 
the high levels of labour market flexibility introduced by Margaret Thatcher’s 
Conservative party decades earlier through keeping EPL low, maintaining collective 
bargaining under wraps, and the introduction of additional welfare-to-work ALMPs. 
 
Of course, Thatcher’s neo-liberal economic reforms, including labour market 
liberalization, have received a large amount of political science attention (cf. Jessop, 
2003; Wood, 2001; Marsh, 1995; Hall, 1993), in particular with respect to understanding 
the political motivations for reforms. Similarly, the period of flexibility sustaining 
reforms under the New Labour governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown has 
received its fair share of attention (cf. Hopkin and Wijnbergen, 2011; Davies and 
Friedland, 2007; Clasen and Clegg, 2003; Deakin and Reed, 2000).  
 
However, the linkages between political economy determinants of labour market 
flexibility reforms and their sustainment over time as part of the UKs liberalizing reform 
trajectory have not always featured prominently in the political science literature. Or to 
qualify somewhat, not usually in the sense of longitudinally linking up the trajectory of 
labour market reforms with an approach that hypothesises a general set of political-
electoral and party leadership considerations as determinants of labour market reforms 
for both the Thatcher and Blairite government, with historical or legal accounts more 
common (cf. Addison and Siebert, 2000).  
  
Therefore, in an effort to understand the case of liberalization and sustainment of labour 
market de-regulation in the UK, this Chapter will trace key reform events across EPL 
and areas of reform functionally linked to labour market flexibility, providing relevant 
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information about the politics of each stage and of the most important reform events. It 
will then analyse the determinants of reforms that have enabled the UK to enact and 
sustain labour market flexibility reforms. The main argument of the Chapter, as it relates 
to the research question of the thesis, is that the UK represents a country-case that has 
sustained labour market reform liberalization because of the economic and political 
benefits of reforms for the UK and for the Conservative and New Labour leaderships 
during the period covering in this thesis.   
 
4.1 Trajectory of UK labour market reform events 
In perspective, the UK’s labour market foundations have traditionally relied on a 
voluntaristic approach where employees and employers used common law 
underpinnings for, often, factory-by-factory labour market arrangements (Marsh, 
1995:602). In other words, ‘both individual and collective labour law was kept to a 
minimum’ leading to a labour market where the ‘shape and outcomes of collective 
bargaining, depended not on the law but on the informal institutions and processes 
within the factory’ (Marsh, 1995:603). Hence, UK labour market foundations are 
somewhat unique when compared to, say, the legalistic Job Placement and 
Unemployment Insurance Act considered the bedrock of the German labour market, as 
seen in Chapter 3. 
 
Yet, to think of Thatcher’s later liberalizing reforms from a purely voluntaristic starting 
point for reforms would be misleading. This in large part due to the fact that the UK 
labour market had been modified quite substantially towards a lower level of flexibility 
through labour market regulation during the 1960s and 1970s (Auerbach, 1993). As 
shown by Marsh, from ‘1963 to 1979 there was an almost continuous expansion of the 
individual rights of the employee’ with respect to employment protection, and 
simultaneously, ‘efforts to regulate collective action’ (Marsh, 1995:603). Hence, the 
baseline for liberalizing reforms like those that were implemented by Thatcher was less 
against a pure voluntaristic labour market and more directed at a collectivist one where 
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unions and the employment protection rights of employees had been substantially 
regulated for, but not in a liberalizing or flexibility enhancing manner. 
 
In tandem with the voluntarist foundations erosion, the political economy challenges of 
the UK’s post-war labour market were not so much unemployment as a comparatively 
poor record of productivity and output growth (Crafts, 1995:246). Yet despite 
recognizing these challenges, both Labour and Conservative parties accepted the 
continued proliferation of crafts-originated unions after the Second World War – 
impeding a coordinated labour market approach as in the German case, and therefore 
collective bargaining was not always a straight forward or easy to coordinate process 
(Marsh, 1995). This, in part due to favourable UK unemployment levels ascribed to 
successful political and economic policies around post-war nationalisation of key 
industries making the case for reforms initially somewhat limited (Craft, 1995).  
 
Therefore, since both the Conservative and Labour parties accepted a post-war 
consensus on producer coalitions built around voluntarism and state ownership of large 
industries – or rather the Conservative government of 1951 did not reverse the policies 
of Clement Atlee’s first Labour led post-war government, the political parties turned to 
competing on Keynesian inspired economic polices focused on demand management 
rather than supply side adjustments to labour market policy. In the area of strengthening 
collective bargaining, according to the 1969 Donovan Report such initiatives often failed 
because the UK trade union movement continued to be highly fractured, often down to 
the level of the shop steward (Turner, 1969). For example, in 1960 out of 600 trade 
unions only 183 belonged to the Trade Union Congress (TUC) peak organization 
(Wood, 2001:261). 
 
While Keynesianism kept focus on demand-management side-by-side with a 
voluntaristic labour market run through the ‘conduct of peaceful industrial action, 
previously almost unfettered’, as mentioned, the trajectory was eventually changed to 
strengthening employment protection via individual rights using unfair dismissal 
procedures and cost policy levers in the 1960s and 70s; this, coupled with deteriorating 
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industrial relations that then, eventually, gave way to a supply-side or neo-liberal set of 
post-1979 labour market reforms (Auerbach, 1993:37).  
 
Critical to the trajectory of UK labour market leading up to the post-1979 reforms was 
the Conservative Edward Heath led government’s 1971 Industrial Relations Act. The 
Act aimed at reducing the scope for industrial action, that had by then become 
challenging with an increased number of strikes, to ‘defuse the perceived triggers of 
industrial conflict by offering a raft of new workers' rights, but at the same time sought 
to contain the activities of trade unions within a highly restrictive legal framework’ 
(Auerbach, 1993:39).  
 
Importantly, in terms of its political ramifications for the framing of labour market 
reforms within the Conservative party, the Act largely failed because of a ‘powerful and 
highly effective campaign of opposition from the labour movement, abetted by a 
steadfast scepticism and indifference among employers’ (Auerbach, 1993:39). To the 
extent that, arguably, the 1971 Act experience, coupled with the electoral loss of Heath 
in 1974 to Labour, proved galvanizing for the Conservative party; not for further labour 
market reforms during the remainder of the 1970s, but for a cautious electoral-benefits 
rather than political economy focused approach to flexibility enhancing labour market 
reforms in the period between 1974 and 1979. In other words, Thatcher who became 
party leader in 1975, did not initially focus on labour market reforms – instead being 
cautious on account of the perceived electoral fallout from the 1971 Industrial Relations 
Act (Auerbach, 1993).    
  
Meanwhile, it was not just the Conservative Heath led government that looked to 
increase regulation of the voluntarist system, the Labour governments of 1964-70 and 
1974-79 also worked to ‘develop a framework of both individual and collective labour 
law’ (Marsh, 1995:603). Stagnant growth and international competition pre-meditated an 
increase in ‘individual rights at work’ and, building out from the voluntarist base, a 
system of collective bargaining that led to industry or firm level ‘institutionalization of 
collective regulation…beyond pay, hours and dispute procedures, to the whole range of 
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issues related to labour productivity’ (Howell, 2005:88). A macro-economic challenge 
remained given the historic challenges with productivity, but the increase in labour 
market regulation was achieved through a bi-partisan, cross-class consensus spanning 
the two major Conservative and Labour parties whereby ‘the public value of both strong 
trade unionism and collective bargaining was not questioned in this period’ (Howell, 
2005:89). 
 
Yet the consensus based labour market of the post war period eventually failed 
politically for both Labour and Conservative parties. For Heath, it meant that he 
unexpectedly lost the Conservative party leadership contest in 1974 to Margaret 
Thatcher, his former Environment Secretary, who had not been considered a serious 
contender by the party leadership (Jaung, 2001:67). Politically, in hindsight, Heath’s fate 
was likely sealed with the second 1974 general election result for the Conservatives. In 
that election, the party saw its share of the national vote drop below 40 per cent – a first 
since 1945. Arguably the loss was directly linked to the success of the labour movement 
in discrediting the 1971 Industrial Relations Act and failed wage constraint policies that 
had led to a ‘rise of prices rather than the increase in profits and investment required for 
an intended investment boom’ (Jaung, 2001:69). 
 
In relation to the UK’s labour market reform trajectory and the question at the heart of 
this thesis, the key issue is therefore when, how and why Margaret Thatcher decided to 
raise the spectre of reforms to the electorate and how she eventually became successful 
in reforming the UK labour market towards more flexibility. For one, wider political 
economy reasons are often quoted, e.g. following Garrett’s general argument that over 
time the lack of productivity and severe economic conditions of the 1960s and 70s were 
ultimately responsible for the abandonment of the post-war consensus around Keynesian 
demand management (Garrett, 1998).  
 
Certainly those are variables, e.g. economic growth, that were also seen as significant for 
labour market flexibility in the quantitative analysis of Chapter 2. Yet, the intra-party 
circumstances and policies promoted between Thatcher’s 1975 ascension to party leader 
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and Prime Minister in 1979 and beyond warrants further review for their changing nature 
with respect to official labour market reform policy. A review that focuses on a general 
set of political-electoral and party leadership considerations as the determinants of 
flexibility enhancing labour market reforms. 
 
Critically, the main influence for Thatcher’s pre-1979 leadership period with respect to 
labour market reforms was how keenly aware she and the party leadership were of the 
mentioned 1971 Industrial Relations Act’s failure; to the extent that Thatcher did not 
publicly support labour market flexibility enhancing reforms in her time as Conservative 
leader in opposition from 1975 to 1979. In other words, as shown by Jaung, Thatcher did 
not publicly and hence from an election focused vantage point support labour market 
reforms of the neo-liberal type seen after 1979, i.e. before becoming Prime Minister. In 
particular, she continued to support then Shadow Employment Secretary, Jim Prior’s line 
on making sure that the ‘experiment from 1971 could not possibly be repeated’ (Jaung, 
2001:39). Similarly, the Conservative manifesto of 1979 was in the area of ‘industrial 
relations law confined to a limited number of proposals said to address specific current 
problems, rather than any more fundamental [reform] agenda’ (Auerbach, 1993:38). 
 
Therefore, while in the opposition, Thatcher continued to publicly support an 
employment policy that did not involve major employment protection legislation or neo-
liberal flexibility enhancing reforms, and labour market reforms were, as shown above, 
almost invisible in the successful 1979 Conservative election prospectus. That said, at 
the ideological level, the so-called New Right of the Conservative party had already in 
1974 started advocating for a break with the Heathite official policies of the 
Conservative party towards monetarist, neo-liberal reforms of the economy overall 
(Jaung, 2001). For example, at the Conservative party’s Preston conference in 1974, 
Thatcher’s Conservative party mentor, Keith Joseph, made an impassioned speech for a 
neo-liberal and monetarist approach to setting economic policy that ran counter to the 
prevailing Heathite official policy that relied on Keynesian demand-management. Again, 
however, with respect to the early Thatcherite agenda there was no specific mention in 
the speech of labour markets or labour market reforms (Joseph, 1974).  
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Suffice to say that, while the Preston Conference in 1974 opened up the initial 
ideological attack on the status quo towards liberalization, the notion that labour market 
reforms should or could be at the centre of a Conservative party led neo-liberal reform 
agenda was not a foregone conclusion. To the extent that, arguably, with respect to 
labour market reforms ‘even in late 1978 it was impossible to predict the Conservatives' 
likely future policy because they were faced by such contradictory views and pressures’ 
(Marsh, 1995:604).  
 
At this point, to gain some perspective before reviewing how Thatcher politically arrived 
at the post-1979 reform trajectory, it is worth taking an overall of look at the UK labour 
market trajectory, which can be easily gleaned from the EPL indicator used throughout 
the thesis as a proxy for labour market flexibility. Starting only in 1985, Figure 5 shows 
the UK to have one of the lowest EPL measures’ overall in the EU (and the OECD for 
that matter) up to the Great Recession in 2008. There is a slight increase in EPL (less 
flexibility) after 1999, i.e. under New Labour leadership, and then there are increases in 
2000 and 2002, leading to a total of 0.75 by 2008 (OECD, 2010). 
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Figure 5: UK Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) Trends 1985-2008 
 
Data Source: Estimates of the employment protection indicators from 1985-2008 available from the OECD’s employment protection 
website (www.oecd.org/employment/protection). All tabulations and calculations completed as part of research for this thesis. 
 
Figure 5 also shows that relative to the overall EU15 average the UK has had a very low 
level of Overall EPL, even if both Regular and Temporary EPL have increased to move 
the overall EPL for the UK marginally closer to the decreasing (more flexible) trend of 
the EU15 average. However, for example, no EPL reforms in the UK case would lead to 
dualization except a significant retrenchment or increase in regular EPL. However, the 
reforms discussed above are from before 1985 and not captured in Figure 5 because EPL 
data from the OECD only became available in 1985.  
 
Thankfully, for the time period before 1985 the qualitative FRDB database discussed in 
Chapter 1 provides a useful primary data foundation (FRDB, 2015). Also, secondary 
sources provide context to the early Thatcherite ‘flexibilization and deregulation of 
labour markets’ (Jessop, 2003:142). Therefore, to complete the analysis of the trajectory 
of UK labour market reform events before 1985, those sources help gain an overview 
with respect to employment protection reforms with the main liberalizing reforms 
enacted being the Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982. Further, both acts were supported 
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by multiple minor revisions to legal codes in 1979, 1981, 1985 and 1989 (FRDB, 2015). 
Then, the non-EPL 1984 Trade Union Act, 1988 and 1990 Employment Acts, and 1993 
Trade Union Reform and Employment Act focused on unions, mainly adjustments to 
strike rules (Addison and Siebert, 2000).  
 
Overall, apart from the initial 1980 and 1982 Acts, subsequent revisions represented a 
piecemeal follow-up approach, as compared to the German Hartz reforms announced as 
a premeditated part of the larger Agenda 2010 reform package discussed in Chapter 3. 
Further, the Acts were often supplemented by code level revisions, e.g. covering the 
introduction of regulation to comply with the EU Directive on Transfers (1981) and the 
Unfair Dismissal Order (1985), which changed the qualifying period for unfair 
dismissal. The general reform direction was, however, usually towards further 
liberalization. For example, according to the FRDB, the 1985 Unfair Dismissal Order 
changed the ‘qualifying period of employment before employees may bring a claim for 
unfair dismissal [that was] raised to two years (before it was 1 year)’ (FRBD, 2015).  
 
Specifically, the post 1979 reforms to EPL under Thatcher governments increased the 
qualifying period for ‘unfair dismissal claims from 26 to 52 weeks in 1979, and to 104 
weeks in 1985’ (OECD, 1999:59). Further, as shown by Deakin and Reed, the ‘1980 
legislation removed a provision placing the burden of proving fairness in dismissal on 
the employer’, so that part-time workers (those working less than eight hours per week) 
could not ‘qualify for basic protection at all’ – a disruption of the then existing 
employment protections system and a change that de facto made employment protection 
legislation somewhat ‘procedural rather than substantive’ (Deakin and Reed, 2000:122).  
 
Principally, the 1980 and 1982 Acts were the critical reforms events as the 1980 Act 
limited ‘employee’s right against unfair dismissal, narrows the immunity for lawful 
picketing, and considerably reduces the immunity for secondary industrial action’ 
(FRDB, 2015). Further, the FRDB’s qualitative reform description indicates that the 
1980 reform ‘was the first major enactment in the Conservative Party’s “step by step” 
programme to reform law and promote deregulation’ of labour markets (FRDB, 2015). 
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Step-by-step, or as mentioned above, piecemeal implementation appears correct, but 
may not have been as pre-meditated as is sometimes assumed, not least given that, as 
discussed above, the Thatcherite labour market flexibility-enhancing platform was not 
defined nor acknowledged as late as 1978. 
 
Alternatively, therefore, an argument could be made that what is more likely is that 
Thatcher proceeded step-by-step, not as part of a grand design, but rather as part of a 
politically expedient approach to slowly build and test intra-party reform coalitions, 
appetite and through that also cement her own party leadership. Going step-by-step 
allowed for testing of the reactions of party leaders, the electorate and peak 
organizations for both employees and employers starting with the 1980 Act – ensuring or 
waiting and seeing if the resulting impact would be similar to the one suffered by 
Heath’s 1971 Industrial Relations Act (Auerbach, 1993). 
 
A further key differentiator leading to the political calculation that the 1980, and 
subsequent Acts, were politically possible and expedient was likely the impact of the so-
called Winter of Discontent in 1978-9 – a very different political economy backdrop to 
reforms than that which Heath had confronted in 1971. Arguably, an event which 
‘strengthened the resolve of the Conservatives to reform’ away from the earlier 
calculation of Thatcher from 1974 onwards, that supposed a wait and see approach given 
the fallout from the 1971 Industrial Relations Act (Marsh, 1995:605). As such, the 
strikes and ensuing perception of the Labour party as economically incompetent 
following the Winter of Discontent was important in lowering the level of Conservative 
party political concern with respect to any electoral fallout from labour market flexibility 
enhancing reforms (Hall, 1993). 
 
That said, over and beyond neo-liberal ideology being implemented through a monetarist 
control of the money supply – as argued by Keith Joseph in his 1974 Preston speech 
(Joseph, 1974), the argument can also be made that labour market reforms also provided 
a critical building bloc for an economic reform program that was by then politically not 
just expedient, but perhaps also necessary regardless of the underlying economic 
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wisdom of flexibility enhancing reforms. Necessary in the sense that, with the 1979 
election win following the Winter of Discontent, Thatcher’s internal party political 
leadership platform became inexorably linked to the need for liberalizing reforms, 
including labour market flexibility enhancing reforms that, as shown, were or had not 
been clearly formulated as late as 1978.  
 
In other words, Thatcher had won the 1979 general election without much of a practical 
economic program except for the need to change the economic policy led by both 
Labour and Conservatives for most of the post-war period. A position corresponding to a 
new leader in power, suddenly and first and foremost politically in need of a specific 
economic reform program; a program that from a political perspective had to be 
radically different than that of all previous UK post-war governments. Arguably 
therefore, in practice, apart from neoliberal monetary and fiscal policies, for the 
trajectory of labour market reforms the policy response was first the 1980 Employment 
Act as a reform teaser, ostensibly chosen for ‘the most dramatic political impact’ 
emphasising its role as a political consideration rather than an economics or ideology 
based reform, then the 1982 reform and so forth (Auerbach, 1993:41).  
 
The reform trajectory hence developed politically with the 1980 Act completed, and not 
having caused the upheaval experienced in 1971, supporting and even improving 
improving Thatcher's direct ‘authority in her Cabinet’, further putting her in a position 
within the Conservative party to replace Jim Prior as Employment Secretary, appointing 
instead the neo-liberal reform oriented Norman Tebbit in 1981 (Marsh, 1995:606). 
Tebbit’s ensuing 1982 Employment Act was then allowed to be much bolder, targeting 
unions head-on by outlawing ‘union labour only contracts’ thereby ‘effectively 
abolishing closed-shops, and narrowing the definition of trade disputes to tightly limit 
the scope for strikes’ (FRDB, 2015). Significant with respect to EPL, the 1982 Act 
‘made it easier for employers to fire striking workers and not face unfair dismissal 
claims’ (FRDB, 2015). Continuing with the step-by-step approach, Thatcher and 
Tebbit’s flexibility enhancing legislation covered many smaller initiatives, making the 
electorates and the unions ‘resistance at each point more difficult’ (Howell, 2007:147).  
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Overall, the 1982 Act was focused on dismantling trade union legal protections that had 
been in place since 1906 and that were reinforced in 1974, setting-up the current day 
liberalized UK labour market clearly observable in terms of EPL in Figure 5. After the 
1982 Act, until New Labour came to power in 1997, while numerous, Conservative 
governments subsequent ‘legislation tended to shift from encouraging a certain kind of 
industrial relations behaviour to enforcing it’ – again, especially with respect to closely 
managing the internal workings of trade unions, which explains the limited variation in 
overall EPL after 1985 (Howell, 2007:149).   
 
In sum, for the Conservative-led liberalization of the UK labour market, the Thatcherite 
labour market reforms had as much a political as a political economy directional shift 
built in to the adopted policies. Yet the political motives or imperative for reforms 
becomes even clearer when considering the economic costs. To illustrate, UK 
unemployment was around 2 per cent until 1973 after which it increased to 4 per cent by 
1979 – this would have appeared as a significant spike and a serious political challenge 
in the sense of being recognised as a problem of government similar to that of Germany 
discussed in Chapter 3 and using the variable of unemployment shown as significant in 
Chapter 2.  
 
Yet the 1979 level of unemployment was low compared to the post-labour market 
flexibility reforms decade under Thatcher in the 1980s, when unemployment increased 
to a peak of over 10 per cent in the period between 1987 and 1989. After that period, it 
did decline to about 6 per cent, which was still well above the 1970s levels (Anderton 
and Mayhew, 1994:16). Hence, UK unemployment was comparatively high when 
Thatcher took power, but it is not clear that supply side policies like stricter monetary 
policies also necessitated radical labour market reforms – especially as the enacted 
reforms led to very high levels of unemployment that themselves, according to 
conventional wisdom of political economy pressures for reforms, should have then led to 
a reform reversal towards less liberalization of labour markets. Hence, the reasoning for 
implementing reforms, the continuation of those reforms after the high economic costs 
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became clear point to the relative importance of the political arguments for those reforms 
outlined in this Chapter.  
 
Now for New Labour’s reform trajectory, returning to the progression of EPL reform 
events in Figure 5, as data is available for the New Labour governments period until 
2008, at first glance the period after 1997 when Tony Blair’s New Labour came to 
power showed a slight increase in EPL (less flexibility). Specifically, the OECD 
measure for EPL for the UK in Figure 5 shows an increase from 0.68 to 0.75 in 2002 (on 
a scale from 0-6), attributable to the 2002 Employment Act. Further, EPL for regular 
employment increased (less flexibility) in 2000 from 0.95 to 1.12 on the OECD scale, 
and for temporary work from 0.25 to 0.38, attributable to the 1999 Employment 
Relations Act (OECD, 2010).   
 
According to Shackleton there was a ‘substantial increase in employment regulation’ 
from Blair’s EPL reforms (Shackleton, 2007:454). Yet as shown in Figure 5, overall, 
EPL for the UK is still considerably lower than those of most continental European 
countries. In this sense, New Labour more accurately represents a period of continuity of 
the Thatcher years as far as flexible labour markets are concerned, with clear ‘echoes’ of 
the 1980s (Davies and Friedland, 2007:7). That said, the 1999 Act was ‘the most 
important and wide-ranging piece of employment legislation in the UK for many years’, 
principally raising the cost for employers who unfairly dismisses employees as well as 
introducing ‘legal protections against discrimination against employees on the grounds 
of trade union membership or activities’ (FRDB, 2015). 
 
Then, the 2002 Employment Act further set out a specific three-step procedure for 
dismissal, raising the cost of unfair dismissal to employers. Yet, overall, the liberal 
approach to flexible labour markets – including employment protection, was not 
challenged by New Labour’s policies (Davies and Friedland, 2007). Further, while New 
Labour passed legislation to improve conditions for trade unions, union density and 
membership continued to decline (Shackleton, 2007). More significantly, there was no 
return to the pre-Thatcher era in that from a legal perspective, New Labour was still 
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officially committed to remaining ‘the most restrictive on trade unions in the western 
world’ (Taylor, 2005:193).  
 
That said New Labour did put in place several active labour market policies. Policies 
that were, in part at least, the practical expression of the second tenet of labour market 
reforms promised in the New Labour 1997 Prospectus, the idea of ‘an imaginative 
welfare-to-work programme to put the long-term unemployed back to work and to cut 
social security costs’ (New Labour, 1997) (the first tenet was flexibility, which as per the 
analysis in this Chapter was not reduced significantly). Another area where New Labour 
distinguished itself from the Thatcher era was in the use of EU originated legislation.  
 
Specifically, Blair included in the New Labour prospectus the need for the UK to change 
John Major’s decision to stay outside the so-called Social Chapter of the Maastricht 
treaty. A promise that Blair kept once New Labour came to power. Even so, most 
employment protection in the UK remained directed towards regular rather than 
temporary employment, making the UK labour market appear intrinsically flexible 
compared to other EU15 member states. In a comparative European perspective, this 
means that the UK already had or, to a large extent, was receptive to the ideas of flexible 
labour markets expounded at the European level, e.g. through the Lisbon Agenda and 
European Employment Strategy (EES).  
 
Further, the UK ‘with its flexible labour market, dispersed wage structure and minimalist 
wage structure’ was better at this point placed to adopt EU labour market reform 
initiatives than other EU15 political economies (Hopkin and Wijnbergen, 2011:271). 
That said, according to Hopkin and Wijnbergen, the UK’s adoption and sustainment of a 
low EPL labour market was most likely the ‘result of British policy makers being 
influenced by the same thinking that also influenced the ESS, drawn from the 
experiences of non-EU countries such as the United States and Sweden’ (Hopkin and 
Wijnbergen, 2011:271). In sum, the UK does not present itself as a case of Europeanized 
labour markets and the labour market flexibility reforms trajectory documented above do 
not appear directly linked to EU initiatives. A result that is substantiated by the statistical 
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findings of Chapter 2, where European integration and globalization were not found to 
be significant for labour market flexibility reforms over time. 
 
In sum, having considered the trajectory of reforms for the UK under the Conservatives 
and New Labour alike, in line with the case study methodology of the thesis, the 
following section looks at the likely determinants of the UK’s ability to enact and sustain 
labour market flexibility enhancing reforms.    
 
4.2 Sustaining UK labour market flexibility reforms 
Thatcher’s liberalizing reforms were a clear break with the prevailing approach whereby 
both the main political parties had until 1979 accommodated themselves to the post-war 
Keynesian inspired economic policy consensus. A consensus, which proscribed a 
positive attitude to Keynesianism that had tended to ‘defuse conflicts among groups and 
classes by expanding the economy to everyone's benefit’; where ‘[p]owerful business 
interests need not necessarily oppose Keynesian programs that embody high levels of 
public spending’ (Weir and Skocpol, 1983:6). Given the stark contrast, according to 
Hall, the reform process under the first Thatcher government was nothing less than a 
‘revolution’ (Hall, 1992:90). Yet, as to the question of institutional continuity, the 
Thatcherite project also promoted ‘enterprise, innovation and competitiveness’ in a way 
that would ‘subordinate a broad range of social policies to the demands of greater 
labour-market flexibility’ (Jessop, 2003:140). 
 
Similarly, Marsh and, separately, Auerbach have argued that while abandoning 
Keynesianism for a monetarist and liberal political economic agenda was perhaps 
inevitable after the Winter of Discontent, it principally serves to highlight how the 
enactment of labour market liberalization reforms was more likely than not ‘affected by 
political considerations’ rather than economic (neo-liberal) ideology (Marsh, 1995:603; 
Auerbach, 1993). Yet for the purposes of this thesis’ research question, that still leaves 
out the question of exactly how Thatcher would benefit from labour market reforms 
overall? First, the enacted labour market flexibility reforms were both a productivity 
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enhancing political economic measure and a party political manoeuvre advantageous to 
Thatcher’s ability to build and sustain her leadership of the Conservative party. Not only 
did Thatcher exploit and use the UKs majoritarian political system that made ‘radical 
departures…possible’, she was arguably willing to do so because it helped her 
consolidate internal power in the Conservative party (Wood, 2001: 260).  
 
Second, while the majoritarian electoral system of the UK may have played a role in the 
sense that both Conservative and New Labour governments, with clear Parliamentary 
majorities could have completed fundamental labour market reforms without the 
institutional veto points that, say, German Chancellors had to worry about (Wood, 
2001a:253). Yet only Margaret Thatcher’s governments chose to de-regulate labour 
markets and subsequent New Labour governments did not reverse that overall approach. 
This matters because, as shown in the German case, government party leaders’ ability to 
reform is often constrained by institutional veto-points, party system changes and, 
changes to intra-party dynamics with respect to the political platform of party leaders.  
 
Third, unpacking those variables in this Chapter has pointed more towards ‘a struggle 
for power within the Conservative party’ as the reason for reforms to be put forward in 
1980’s Employment Act and then, after the Act did not suffer the fate of Heath’s 1971 
Act, to move forward with the fully liberalizing agenda of the 1982 Act (Howell, 2007). 
Hence, the argument that has driven the politics of reforms is that, while the group 
around Margaret Thatcher ‘were genuinely seeking new solutions to Britain's economic 
problems’ they also ‘embraced the monetarist solution in large measure because it also 
had substantial political appeal’ that would help drive electoral success following the 
Winter of Discontent. For example, as presented in the Guardian, and underscoring a 
typical view of the growing political necessity of moving swiftly forward with 
implementing neo-liberal reforms, for mainly political reasons, ‘by success we mean 
regenerating the British Economy and winning the next election for the Conservative 
party’ (Guardian editorial in Kwarteng, 2015:113).  
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Hence, the appeal of reforms was not only to attack Labour for economic incompetence, 
it was also a political raid against Thatcher’s detractors within the Conservative party 
who had no problem with the then prevailing Keynesian orthodoxy – the so-called wets, 
including Jim Pryor who was Thatcher’s first Employment Secretary and against radical 
liberalization reforms. In other words, there was a clear political leadership interest in 
reforms being successful for the Conservative party and for Thatcher to remain as its 
leader. Arguable, reforms became one of the (new) main selling points of Thatcher’s 
government and was part of a liberal reforms platform on internal party leadership.  
 
Not a small feat to be achieved when already in late 1981 ‘it seemed that Thatcher’s rule, 
as well as that of her henchmen, would be short lived’ (Kwarteng, 2015:112). So to 
speak, the implementation of labour market reforms were part and parcel of an electoral 
and intra-party strategy that would benefit Thatcher as party leader, not withstanding that 
it was, admittedly, a ‘high risk enterprise both for the Prime Minister [Thatcher] and for 
her nervous party’ as well as a political economy reform component in the larger scheme 
of moving towards a supply rather than demand-side driven approach to national 
economic policy (Kwarteng, 2015:114).  
 
Comparing the Thatcher and Blair years, the inter-temporal parallels in the completed 
reforms become apparent. First, Thatcher liberalized the UK labour market by tackling 
trade unions head-on and lowering or effectively eliminating EPL for both regular and 
temporary employment. Secondly, New Labour did not reverse Thatcher’s reforms, but 
instead put in place ameliorating features so that (declining) union membership was not 
penalised without re-empowering unions to pre-1979 levels (Taylor, 2005). It also raised 
the cost to employers for unfair dismissals without changing the right to hire and fire. 
The result was that, according to the OECD, the UK, with Canada and the USA, with 
respect to dismissal costs, now ‘occupy a middle position, since they have legislated 
considerable waiting periods and notification requirements’ (OECD, 1999:64). Yet, 
overall the UK remains a political economy with a highly flexible labour market as 
indicated by Figure 5 – confirming its position as a liberal or Anglo-Saxon social model 
country.  
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Having analysed the politics around Thatcher’s reforms in this Chapter and then briefly 
reviewed the very limited EPL reforms under Tony Blair, the parallel is striking in how 
both Thatcher’s and Blair’s reforms created intra-party capital for both of them as party 
leaders. To illustrate in the case of Blair, New Labour’s labour market reforms ‘created 
political capital for himself with the power bloc and the wider electorate through his 
sustained attacks on the economic and political power of trade unions’ (Jessop, 
2003:143). Adding ameliorating features to temper labour market flexibility without 
compromising the liberal nature of the overall UK labour market made sense for Blair 
from an electoral perspective, by not upsetting the ‘middle class groups, which had 
supported the Conservatives in the 1980s’, that liked the more liberal Third Way 
approach of New Labour, and that had made it possible for New Labour to return to 
power in the first place (Gualmini and Hopkin, 2012:11; Giddens, 1998).  
 
Hence, Blair had no political reason to strengthen unions nor increase EPL because his 
own influence in New Labour had, at least in part, been enhanced by reducing New 
Labour’s ‘financial dependence on the trade unions and bolstering the control of the 
leadership over party governance and policy development’ (Coulter, 2014:44). Further, 
continuing to limit unions’ New Labour Party Conference bloc votes, Blair was able to 
convert New Labour from a mainly Conference decision-based to a parliamentary party-
based decision making party, much more in line with the parliamentary party governance 
model traditionally used by the Conservative party (Arndt, 2013).  
 
Therefore, in view of the thesis argument that intra-party political considerations are 
critical to reform enacting coalitions, including in the case of New Labour for re-
regulating reforms that did not happen, Blair had no reason to decrease flexibility by 
reversing the reforms completed by Thatcher. This because, from an intra-party and 
political-electoral perspective, doing so would only weaken his own power base and 
diverge from the Third Way ideology to which New Labour aspired and that he had 
shown was electorally successful from 1997 onwards (Arndt, 2013; Giddens, 1998). 
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4.3 Conclusion  
Labour market flexibility reforms were achieved and sustained in the case of the UK, in 
part, because of longer term developments in the post-War political economy 
culminating in the Winter of Discontent, Thatcher’s rise to Prime Minister in 1979 and 
the liberalization of labour markets that followed. Reforms, that in their flexibility of 
labour market intent were then sustained by New Labour from 1997 until at least the 
2008 Great Recession, albeit with minor EPL modifications and an expansion of 
ALMPs.  
 
Implied in that trajectory were, as would be expected from the quantitative analysis in 
Chapter 2, challenges of GDP growth and unemployment that certainly put pressure on 
successive governments for various EPL and functionally-related labour market reforms. 
However, contrary to the German case in the previous Chapter, Margaret Thatcher was 
able to over-ride the dominant producer coalitions of the late 1970s, all but removing the 
influence of unions in the process of liberalizing the UK labour market. Similarly, Blair 
was able to stay the course of flexible labour markets after coming to power under New 
Labour guise in 1997.  
 
Part of the existing literature argues that those liberalizing reforms were not much more 
than a re-alignment to the historical flexibility of the Anglo-Saxon social model (Wood, 
2001). Or, that the inflexibility that had been created through an ‘almost continuous 
expansion of the individual rights of the employee’ through the 1960s and 70s (Marsh, 
1995:603) would always or eventually have led to a ‘restoration of employer dominance 
in British labour markets’ (Wood, 2001:396). Similarly, from a political economy 
perspective, that over time the lacking UK productivity and severe economic conditions 
of the 1960s and 70s was what had led to the eventual abandonment of the post-war 
consensus around Keynesian demand management (Garrett, 1998).  
 
Yet, while not invalid, those arguments belie the also significant political challenges for 
politicians enacting reforms that have been discussed in this Chapter. For example, how 
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politically the Conservatives prior to 1979 took an electoral rather than political 
economy driven view on the direction that labour market policies should take. An 
approach where making sure the ‘experiment from [the] 1971 [Industrial Relations Act] 
could not possibly be repeated’ was the main political-electoral consideration (Jaung, 
2001:39). As such, the Conservatives political reasoning for not putting forward labour 
market reform proposals in opposition was the failed 1971 Industrial Relations Act.  
 
Further, the Chapter’s analysis of the longitudinal trajectory of reforms supports 
Auerbach’s contention that rather than purely economic problems of government or 
political economic restitution there was not initially a ‘more fundamental [reform] 
agenda’ at the time of Thatcher’s election (Auerbach, 1993:38). That of course changed 
once Thatcher came into power, and the politics of reforms pivoted to moving those 
reforms forward in a form that would have the ‘most dramatic political impact’ in terms 
of reform achievements and the related consolidation of cabinet power for Thatcher 
within the Conservative party, which would follow, in part, from those reforms’ 
enactment (Auerbach, 1993:41).  
 
To re-cap, the UK entered the late 1970s European-wide economically challenging 
period having completed re-regulation of its historically voluntaristic labour market – 
with a failed attempt to reverse that trend at a high political cost to Edward Heath via the 
aborted 1971 Industrial Relations Act (Auerbach, 1993). Then followed the step-by-step 
Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982, in tandem with the ‘wet’ Jim Pryor being replaced 
by the ‘dry’ Norman Tebbit as Employment Secretary and the liberalizing intent of the 
reforms becoming fully apparent (Juang, 2001). Further, while Thatcher overwhelmingly 
de-regulated the UK labour market, New Labour from 1997 onwards preferred to use 
soft regulation, for example active labour market policies, as an instrument for 
sustaining a highly flexible UK labour market. Therefore, in terms of change and 
continuity across the trajectory of reforms, both the Conservatives (Margaret Thatcher 
and her successor, John Major) and New Labour (Tony Blair and his successor, Gordon 
Brown) governments followed political strategies that ultimately led to and sustained the 
UK labour market as an example of an Anglo-Saxon social model labour market. 
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Overall, therefore, the UK case does not provide evidence to reject the hypothesis that 
labour market flexibility reforms, or lack thereof, are best explained by a political focus 
on solving political-economic problems, e.g. severe economic problems, as was the case 
at the time of the Winter of Discontent. It does, however, not confirm it either as the 
trajectory showed that the enactment of reforms under the Conservatives, and the lack of 
reforms under New Labour, were politically motivated in support of the respective party 
leaders intra-party positions and electoral success, respectively. Hence, the determinants 
of reforms and explaining the ability of politicians to enact reforms in the case of the UK 
likely go beyond classic government “pressures for reform”. Instead, they point to at 
least a combined economic or wider political economy and political-electoral 
explanation for enacted reforms.  
 
As a result, empirically the Chapter has provided a longitudinal, qualitative assessment 
of the most important EPL and functionally-related labour market reforms. A trajectory 
analysis showing that political economy arguments rarely on their own stood up as 
determinants of reforms. Instead, the Chapter showed how the combination of economic 
challenges to governments and political-electoral advantages of reforming political 
parties and party leaders appears to be a more fruitful avenue for understanding the 
determinants of the ability of UK politicians to enact and sustain labour market reforms 
from the early 1980s to the Great Recession. 
 
 
 
  106 
5. Marginal reforms and flexicurity in Denmark  
This Chapter follows a structure similar to that of the preceding two case studies. First, 
the Chapter looks at the Danish reform trajectory, then the politics of enacting and 
sustaining the Danish so-called “flexicurity” labour market model through marginal EPL 
and functionally-linked active labour market policy reforms. Flexicurity is defined as the 
combination of low levels of employment protection or EPL, generous unemployment 
welfare, and a high level of investment in active labour market policies (ALMPs) 
(Sorensen, 2010:18; Madsen, 2003). As such, flexicurity is one of the reasons the Nordic 
social model has been able to create economic growth and a level of social protection in 
downturns, which then limits unnecessary levels of inequality (Sapir, 2006). 
 
In comparison with the preceding cases covering Germany and the UK, as a case of a 
Nordic social model country and through flexicurity, Denmark offers a particular insight 
into the politics and institutional modalities of flexibility enhancing reforms. Not only 
have Danish EPL reforms been at the margin. Reforms have also focused on 
enhancements to flexicurity and the institutions which support both the relatively 
flexible Danish labour market and the flexicurity model overall (Torfing, 1999).  
 
Importantly, both EPL and ALMP reforms help illustrate how political coalitions formed 
to enact reforms, emanating not just from political economy pressures for reform but 
also as the result of intra-party developments within the Danish Social Democratic Party 
and the advent of a brief and unusual Social Democratic led majority government rather 
than the parliamentary-minority governments that have been the usual norm in Denmark. 
A political change from the traditional minority governments, which meant that 
significant labour market reforms, including for temporary EPL and ALMPS, could be 
enacted (Green-Pedersen, 2001).  
 
Defining ALMPs, Katz argues that they are best seen as ‘measures targeted at the 
unemployed and disadvantaged (low-wage) workers with the intent of improving the 
functioning of the labour market’ (Katz, 1994:259). For the case of Denmark that 
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definition applies, but the timing and context of ALMPs matter even more in the Danish 
case. That is because ALMPs were the last of the flexicurity variables added to the mix 
in the mid-1990s. The other two components were low regular EPL (high flexibility) and 
high levels of social security added at the end of the 19
th
 century and from the 1960s 
onwards, respectively. However, the modern foundation of the Danish labour market is 
agreements entered into by labour market peak organizations, with a limited role for 
direct state involvement.  
 
To illustrate, the voluntary agreements underpinning of the Danish labour market 
matters because it has meant that shifting parliamentary coalitions did not drive nor 
overall meddle with labour market flexibility through, say, the civil service or dirigiste 
corps managing firms, nationalized or otherwise, as was the case for France and the UK 
following World War II. Rather, the politics of labour market flexibility in Denmark 
historically remained contingent on labour market flexibility not being captured by either 
left or right leaning governments. A capture that, so far, has not happened to any 
significant extent, although labour market reform events may slowly be disrupting the 
agreements based traditions of limited state involvement in labour market affairs (Goul 
Andersen, 2011). Yet, the absence of direct ideological interference by left or right 
leaning governments remains consistent with the statistical analysis in Chapter 2, which 
indicated that left or right leaning governments were not a significant explanatory 
variable for labour market flexibility enhancing reforms.  
 
The same agreements based system makes reforms both difficult and to some extent 
unnecessary because the Danish labour market was always very flexible with respect to 
regular EPL (Thelen, 2014:141). Also, as mentioned, the political system in Denmark 
has more often than not produced minority governments, which means that small parties 
at the ideological centre have had an outsize influence on Danish public policy (Bille, 
1989). For example, Danish governments have typically been coalitions across the 
middle of the ideological spectrum.  
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Typically, centrist parties would be ‘emphasising the need to reach ‘agreements across 
the centre’’ and had enough votes to do so (Bille, 1989:53). To the extent that it became 
almost ‘an ideology and a  ais    ’ t   to compromise and mediate’ in Parliament for 
those parties; a target that could furthermore be easily achieved because the ‘distribution 
of seats in the Folketing [Danish Parliament] required their participation in the formation 
of any feasible majority’ for both legal acts and government formations since the second 
World War (Bille, 1989:53). In other words, Danish party leaders in government have 
for the most part always been constrained in their ability to move forward with any 
(radically) liberalizing reforms because of the political system and it support for the 
agreements basis of the labour market, regardless of the economic problems of the day.  
 
More recently the traditional across-the-centre coalitions of Danish politics have 
somewhat changed, with the right-leaning government of Anders-Fogh Rasmussen right 
before the Great Recession becoming dependent for its parliamentary majority on the 
increasingly successful Danish Peoples party. Further, as a far-right competitor for 
influence on reforms the Peoples Party did not always align itself with the agreements 
basis of the existing labour markets system and instead being more open to direct 
conflicts with, among others, trade unions unions (Goul Andersen, 1999). 
 
That said, in terms if this thesis research question, the up front empirical puzzle of the 
Danish case is why marginal EPL reforms were completed as with an already flexible 
regular EPL labour market, there was potentially little political gain from doing so. 
Further, why and how ALMPs were preferred to other functionally related areas of 
possible labour market reforms, e.g. unemployment benefits. The Chapter posits that 
Danish politicians were able to implement reforms because of the alignment of 
reforming coalitions across the ideological middle of Danish parliamentary politics with 
the key liberalizing reforms being enacted in 1993-1994. Reforms that were driven by 
the politically unusual situation of having a majority social democratic government and, 
simultaneously, the Social Democratic Party moving towards a Third Way approach due 
to an intra-party leadership contest in the early 1990s. Wit those political changes in 
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mind, the next section on the trajectory of Danish labour market reforms addresses those 
questions. 
     
5.1 Trajectory of Danish labour market reform events  
As already mentioned, an important historical underpinning of the Danish labour market 
and contributor to its overall flexibility, is the concept of voluntary agreements between 
unions and employer Organizations. Through the so-called “Main Agreement” or 
Hovedaftale, unions and employer organizations traditionally make arrangements for 
and negotiate wages, including arbitration, without state led involvement or 
interventions. Therefore, Danish collective bargaining results are agreements and not 
law based, as in the case of Germany nor law or state driven as in the case of France. 
Simply put, the key founding principle of the Danish labour market is a system of 
agreements between involved parties rather than state regulation (Sorensen, 2010:20).  
 
Interestingly, the Main Agreement remains more or less intact from its first 1899 version 
and is still in force – practically, as well as in spirit, more or less as it was when 
originally signed. At its core stands a division of labour arrived at through the resolution 
of various strike actions at the end of the 19
th
 and beginning of the 20
th
 century as 
Denmark journeyed from an agricultural to an industrially advanced, and then post-
industrial nation (Sorensen, 2010:20). 
 
The ability of the Main Agreement to function as intended is its support for and the 
continued prevalence of very strong unions and employer organisations. Further, while 
the Main Agreement is not a law, a legal support framework dating from 1910 is in place 
to enhance the workings of the agreements-based labour market system. Principally, that 
framework includes the Danish labour dispute arbitration courts and Forligsinstitutionen 
or “Compromise Institution”, a formal state run office or forum for collective labour 
market negotiations that require mediation (Due and Madsen, 2010).  
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Hence, a supportive legal framework exists, yet its main purpose is to aid the functioning 
of the labour market independently from the state. Politically, according to Sorensen, the 
incentives for labour market organisations have so far been strong enough for the system 
to function effectively. Overall, unions and employers have preferred the agreements-
based model, forming a classic coordinated producer coalition (Due and Madsen, 2010). 
In practical terms, the Main Agreement and its institutional corollaries keep the Danish 
state out of detailed regulations- and wage setting, instead leaving that space open for 
collective bargaining between unions and employers. Bargaining that, if needed, could 
be assisted with mediation through the non-political Compromise Institution (Sorensen, 
2010:21). 
 
With respect to labour market flexibility, the Main Agreement further ensures that 
employers recognise the right of labour to organize and to ascent to binding agreements 
on wages and working conditions. The same provision gives employees the right to form 
a union, which then has a negotiation prerogative vis-a-vis employer organisations. In 
that context, it is important to note that union membership has been correspondingly 
high in Denmark, giving a high level of negotiating credibility to labour unions, and 
implicitly, the maintenance of existing levels of flexibility. Unionisation has actually 
been on an increasing path over time: while peaking at 79 per cent in 1980, that was still 
considerably higher than the 56 per cent it was in 1950. As such, even though much is 
made from time to time in the Danish media about union decline, the rate of unionisation 
has remained in the low seventies as of the late 2000s (Sorensen, 2010:101). 
 
Further, high unionisation rates also traditionally precluded Danish unions from being 
captured by a more militant minority view of the far left (or right) and enabled unions to 
play a role as credible and responsible day-to-day participants in the functioning and 
running of the economy at both the micro- and macro levels – an example of Danish 
corporatism (Jorgensen and Schulze, 2015). Put differently, Danish unions have rarely 
been considered as politically contentious per se, as in the UK, or explicitly left-wing 
militant as in France.  
 
  111 
At the same time, Danish unions have not been co-opted with quasi business 
management rights as in the German system of co-decision making (although they are 
represented on company boards, co-decision is not within the scope of the Main 
Agreement). An approach, which meant the ‘inclusion of unions in the political process 
was a key element of the Danish model’ with respect to labour market flexibility and any 
contemplated reforms (Jorgensen and Schulze, 2015:637). Inversely, employers had, and 
continue to have, the right to lead and distribute work according to the most efficient and 
effective ways as dictated by the global market place. A right that, so the popular 
argument goes, would be somewhat meaningless without the overall ability, within 
reasonable contractual parameters, to hire and fire at will – hence the low level of 
regular EPL in Denmark. At least that is the core tenet of the employer’s side of the 
Main Agreement bargain (Due and Madsen, 2010).  
 
The Main Agreement has therefore been fundamental for the ability of Denmark to 
sustain flexible labour markets for an extended period of time, and illustrates why the 
social model – and especially the strong producer coalitions of employers and unions, 
have continued to play a role or to refract reforms in the Danish case. However, that is 
not to say that the key tenets of the Main Agreement, including the derived relative ease 
with which to hire and fire, are not party political. They certainly are, in the sense of 
often having been the subject of political contestation or elections in Denmark 
(Jorgensen and Schulze, 2015). Yet the political salience of the hiring and firing abilities 
of employers (high flexibility, low regular EPL) has traditionally not been a driving 
force of political parties’ approach to labour market flexibility nor to proposed reforms 
of the same on either the political right or left.  
 
Instead, given the provisions and longevity of the Main Agreement, the flexibility of the 
Danish labour market has politically been contested by unions and flexibility kept high 
by adding generous welfare provisions for unemployed workers, through relatively high 
replacement rates (though in no way the highest in the EU) rather than EPL. Only later 
were ALMPs added and overall, a slow reduction in the corporatist influence of unions 
became more evident. A development that has accelerated and created a space for 
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reforms, where ‘union influence has declined, to the extent that unions are currently 
better defined as lobbyists rather than as part of a corporatist system’ (Jorgensen and 
Schulze, 2015:637).  
 
With declining influence, unions have become less of a hindrance for political coalitions 
wishing to implement labour market flexibility reforms, especially so for the Social 
Democratic party. To analyse Danish labour market reforms, understanding the Main 
Agreement helps explain the historical acceptance and somewhat non-political nature of 
high levels of labour market flexibility. A characteristic that continues to characterise the 
Danish political economy and one reason why it overall remained stable, with only a 
limited number of reforms enacted until the early 1990s. The general flexible labour 
market is illustrated in Figure 6, showing how low regular EPL has been in place for the 
entire period for which OECD data is available, i.e. from 1985.  
 
Figure 6: Danish Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) Trends 1985-2008 
 
Data Source: Estimates of the employment protection indicators from 1985-2008 available from the OECD’s employment protection 
website (www.oecd.org/employment/protection). All tabulations and calculations completed as part of research for this thesis. 
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That said, from Figure 6, Denmark did in the covered period from 1985 to 2008 enact 
labour market flexibility enhancing reforms for temporary EPL in 1993-1994, satisfying 
the case selection criteria of variation on the dependent variable outlined in Chapter 1. 
For overall, temporary and regular EPL, the trend of reforms for temporary EPL stands 
out as yet another European example of marginal reforms: between 1985 and 2008 
Denmark went from a temporary EPL just above 3 to just shy of 1.5. Specifically, the 
primary reform events were enacted under the social democratic centre-left government 
of Paul Nyrup Rasmussen. They combined the lowering of temporary EPL seen in 
Figure 6 with the enactment of new ALPMs leading to a ‘significant shift towards 
liberalization through activation’ for the Danish labour market (Thelen, 2014:151). 
 
The 1993-1994 EPL and ALMP reforms were somewhat unique in that during the 1980s 
and early 1990s Denmark had already been ‘plagued by high unemployment and 
growing public debt’ (Thelen, 2014:141). As such, a classic case of a political economy 
challenges had existed for a long time, putting pressure on Danish governments to 
reform the labour market prior to 1993. However, also evident in Figure 6, for the 
governments led by the Conservative Prime Minister Paul Schluter from 1982 to 1993, 
labour markets were not fundamentally changed through liberalizing reforms. Instead, 
they continued to focus on maintaining the ‘standard of living for the unemployed as 
well as possible’ (Torfing, 1999:13). Further, flexicurity had not yet emerged (ALMPs 
had not yet been added to the mix), with the result that at the ‘beginning of the 1980s, 
Denmark's welfare state was still largely passive’ (Schulze-Cleven, 2009:185). 
 
Schluter was, in essence, not politically in a position of strength with respect to reforms. 
The reason being that while he led a long series of ‘non-socialist minority governments’, 
they were usually composed of up to four coalition parties. In practice that meant that 
reaching consensus on labour market reforms proved difficult, albeit not for lack of 
intent (Green-Pedersen, 2001:59)13. Corresponding to ‘conventional wisdom about 
minority governments as weak in terms of governing capacity’, instead of fighting the 
                                                 
13 The Poul Schluter led governments of the 1980s and early 1993 were all parliamentary minority ‘right-
wing centre’ governments with frequent elections and reconstitutions (Green-Pedersen, 2001:55).   
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social democrats and centre-leaning parties – some of the latter within his own 
government(s), Schluter focused on cost containment to reduce the national debt and 
administrative reforms under the hue of New Public Management (Green-Pedersen, 
2001:53). However, within that gambit, in the area of labour markets he did achieve one 
labour market reform success, namely the ‘elimination of cost-of-living indexation for 
wages’ (Thelen, 2014:145). Yet, symptomatic of the Danish labour market reform 
challenge, other areas ripe for reforms like unemployment insurance were left untouched 
(Green-Pedersen, 2001:60).  
 
Having put the eventual 1993-1994 Danish reforms in context, the political shift that 
eventually made temporary EPL and ALMP reforms possible were political through the 
entry of a majority, Social Democratic Party led government from 1993 to 1994 (Green-
Pedersen, 2001). Described as a ‘highly energetic reform policy’ government, what had 
not changed were the political economy conditions that met Paul Nyrup Rasmussen’s 
government in 1993. Meaning that the pressures for reforms were still extant, with more 
than 12 per cent unemployment in 1993 (Torfing, 1999:381). Then, arguably through 
EPL and ALMP reforms, near full employment was eventually reached with 
unemployment dropping to 5 per cent by 2002 (Andersen, 2010:6).  
 
Hence with respect to unemployment as a significant variable for explaining labour 
market reforms in Chapter 2, the Danish unemployment story went from very high levels 
to low levels and helped put a damper on any political arguments towards increasing 
unemployment protection. It certainly also put pressure on the Nyrup Rasmussen 
government for reforms. As such, an initial preference for wage depression policies was 
dropped in favour of increasing labour market flexibility through new and strictly active, 
rather than passive labour market policies that were enacted in 1993-1994 (Kristensen, 
2011:93). 
 
Looking at the specifics of the 1993-1994 reform events, they were mostly developed 
from a series of white papers arguing for reforms within the Main Agreement model 
(Thelen, 2014). The most important of those papers was the so-called Zeuthen Report, 
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which underlay the active component of the ALMPs that were eventually introduced by 
setting out the ‘discursive conditions for a transition from welfare to workfare’ (Torfing, 
1999:386). The 1993-1994 reforms were in fact two acts – one on Active Labour-market 
Policy (1993) and another subsequent law in 1994 named Changes to the Law on Active 
Labour-market policy (Torfing, 1999:386). In practice, both Acts ‘lowered the generous 
unemployment benefits of the welfare model’ and invested aggressively in active, often 
mandatory ‘job – and education schemes’ (Torfing, 19993:387). 
 
Further, the Zeuthen Report sheds some light on how the Danish approach to flexicurity 
actually works, remembering that the consensual fundamentals of the Main Agreement 
were still in place. As Madsen convincingly argues, the definition applicable to Danish 
flexicurity within the Main Agreement framework was always the interaction effect 
between three distinct parts of the Danish labour market: first, ‘a high level of labour 
market flexibility’ and second, ‘a generous system of economic support to the 
unemployed’ (Madsen, 2006:327). Thirdly, the Danish flexicurity model critically 
depends on the additional component of aggressively pursued ALMPs essentially 
impacting the second component by making unemployment support conditional on pro-
active participation in those ALMPs.  
 
That is why, as shown in this Chapter, the trajectory of reforms matters for the Danish 
case. With ALMP policies only introduced after 1993, as a marginal reform ALMPs did 
not fundamentally alter the other two components of flexicurity or the foundations of the 
Main Agreement itself. As such, the success of the flexicurity model was not an inherent 
or a longitudinal feature of the Danish labour market – as was low regular EPL and 
generous welfare and unemployment benefit provisions. In other words, low EPL and 
generous welfare were complemented by investments in AMLPs and the full 
liberalization of EPL though the lowering temporary EPL. Overall, no one was left out 
of reach of ALMPs, which in turn helped to sustain and increase Danish labour market 
flexibility through marginal reforms. 
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To illustrate the flexicurity components interaction effect at a practical level, the 
universal tax funded rather than means tested, generous access to unemployment support 
provides Danish employees with additional freedoms to seek new jobs. For example, in 
2000 when unemployment was relatively low, approximately 260,000 Danes left their 
jobs for a new one, but out of that number only 40,000 were fired under the low overall 
EPL regime (Kristensen et. al., 2011:91). Therefore, as Kristensen argues, ‘a major flaw 
in the discussion on Danish flexicurity is that employers are attributed the active role’ in 
hiring and firing (Kristensen et. al., 2011:88). Rather, ALMPs provide incentives and 
training to make employees more competitive in their changing jobs-careers. Then, with 
welfare provisions built in, they also help labour markets clear when paired with low 
levels of EPL.  
 
Generalizing the argument that employees and not just employers benefit from a flexible 
labour market, the basic political argument for marginal reforms in Denmark was not 
impeded by fear of poaching between firms. Instead, the Danish labour market had 
‘succeeded in institutionalizing poaching, without creating the consequence that 
employers would under-invest in vocational training and education’ (Kristensen et. al., 
2011:90). An argument that the varieties of capitalism theory predicts cannot be done 
with LME type flexible labour markets (Hall and Soskice, 2001). As such, the Nordic 
social model, to which Denmark belongs, becomes non-typical of both Liberal and 
Coordinated Market Economy typologies with features more akin a CME with LME-
type labour market flexibility. Of course that is more or less the same result that Sapir 
reached in terms of the Nordic model being able to create equity with efficiency in terms 
of economic growth (Sapir, 2006).  
 
However, in the context of the trajectory of reforms, what had gone wrong and was then 
corrected with the 1993 reforms was the passiveness of the social support offered, which 
had left large numbers of unemployed unable to re-enter the labour market or had given 
them scant incentive to do so (Torfing, 1999). Further, it is fair to say that the 
combination of generous welfare and ALMPs is what made the underlying hiring and 
firing flexibility politically sustainable, with the caveat that the latter has become 
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expensive to the Danish government. To the extent that it has in itself occasionally 
become a political economy issue (Madsen, 2006; Goul Andersen, 2011).  
 
Again, to summarize the trajectory of reforms, it is worth remembering that the 
enactment of reforms supporting each of the three components of flexicurity aligned 
longitudinally: the early foundations of the Danish labour market had built-in, very low 
levels of regular EPL. Then, substantial welfare provisions were added as the Danish the 
welfare state developed in the 1960s and 70s, which were only changed with respect to 
access conditionality as the third and last flexicurity component of ALMPs fully 
emerged. To understand the politics of Danish labour market reforms, the next section 
looks at what explains the described marginal yet flexicurity enhancing labour market 
reforms in Denmark.   
 
5.2 Marginal reforms and flexicurity in Denmark 
ALMP investments, combined with the relaxation of temporary EPL, took Denmark 
from a 12 to a 5 per cent unemployment rate; a macro-economic result that became the 
lead reason for why the EU began to tout the Danish flexicurity model as highly 
desirable, even if the other flexicurity components of low regular EPL, welfare payments 
and the Main Agreement framework were not always well understood at the EU level 
(Madsen, 2006:323). Further, looking objectively at the success of flexicurity, at least 
part of what drove the fall in unemployment was derived from a very aggressive fiscal 
stimulus – including fiscal funding of ALMPs.  
 
To the extent, that Denmark at its peak in 1995 was spending almost 7 percent of GDP 
on ALMPs, compared to the UK’s peak of 2 percent and similarly Germany (4 percent) 
and France (3 percent) (Thelen, 2014:114). Put bluntly by Madsen, ‘the decline in 
unemployment can be directly attributed to the changes in labour market policy…[and] 
be explained perfectly well within the framework of standard macro-economic analysis’ 
based on the level of fiscal stimulus provided (Madsen, 2006:329). Such a high level of 
expenditure of course puts pressure on governments to reduce spending, but while 
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flexicurity was a relatively recent phenomenon it had surprisingly quickly become 
institutionalised within the existing Danish labour market model (Madsen, 2006).  
 
Clearly it is also not far fetched to assume that unions and employers would not resist 
reforms that, while more onerous on the unemployed came with a substantial additional 
investment in fine-tuning and enhancing the overall supply of labour. Specifically, 
flexibility enhancing EPL and ALMP reforms were the way in which previously passive 
labour market policies were converted into strictly active labour market policies 
(ALMPs). That was possible, in large part, because beyond leading a unique majority 
government, Nyrup Rasmussen’s own leadership had come about as a conscious move 
towards the more centrist, even economically liberal Third Way approach to updating 
welfare states for the global economy (Giddens, 2008).  
 
In a power struggle similar to that between Oscar Lafontaine for the traditional left and 
Gerhard Schroder’s move of the German social democratic SPD party towards the Third 
Way in Germany (see Chapter 3), Nyrup Rasmussen had managed to ‘overthrow’ the 
more left-leaning Social Democratic Party ‘party leader Svend Auken in 1992’ 
(Pedersen, 2010:744). A historically unparalleled event for the Danish Social 
Democratic Party, from which Nyrup Rasmussen went forward to become Prime 
Minister in 1993 on what was effectively a Third Way electoral platform. A platform 
supported by a majority within the Social Democratic Party by virtue of the direct 
membership poll that ousted his predecessor Auken, and by winning the popular vote on 
a Third Way reforms electoral platform in 1993 (Arndt, 2013).  
 
Hence, intra-party leadership and ideological platform changes, and being uniquely the 
Prime Minister of a majority government allowed Nyrup Rasmussen to go forward with 
‘path-breaking labour market reforms under the Third Way agenda’ (Arndt, 2013:127). 
As such, Danish reform developments, as part of a political intra-party transition, aligns 
with the Hartz reforms of Gerhard Schroder’s social democrats in Germany, but also 
Tony Blair’s New Labour agenda that put emphasis on ALMPs (see Chapter 4). A 
political achievement in a Social Democratic historical context, because using ALMPS 
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as the political response to high levels of unemployment in the early 1990s was atypical 
within a Nordic social model context. First, by being re-commodifying in the reform’s 
zealous approach to imposing benefit conditionality and activation requirements for the 
unemployed, an approach whereby the Danish labour market became more liberalized 
than it was previously, going from ‘social security’ without conditions to ‘more 
conditional’ (Arndt, 2013:127). 
 
For example, employment-substituting activities and checks on participation in training 
programmes tailored to address actual market driven skills shortages were put in place 
(Torfing, 1999). Further, assessments of individual’s ability to work rather than time or 
rule-based guarantees of (still relatively generous welfare) benefits were introduced. 
Likewise, unemployment benefit recipients were obliged to actively participate in 
ALMPs that were now to a larger extent run by local municipalities rather than union 
affiliated unemployment agencies, as had previously been the case (Madsen, 2006; 
Socialministeriet, 2001; Torfing, 1999).  
 
Secondly, to achieve unemployment results via ALMPs meant obliging the unemployed 
to participate in ALMP programs in accordance with their assessed ability to work; what 
Goul Andersen stresses was a move to a ‘work first’ emphasis in both rules and spirit, 
and what ultimately became the underlying principle of the developing Danish 
flexicurity model (Goul Andersen, 2011:204). Politically and in the trajectory of 
reforms, that had an impact. For example, in a careful analysis of reforms from 1990 to 
2010, Goul Andersen highlighted the political challenges of fiscally maintaining the very 
costly ALMPs and, critically, the political impact of the earlier achieved flexibility – or 
flexicurity – enhancing reforms (Goul Andersen, 2011).  
 
For one, when in 2001 the liberal Anders Fogh-Rasmussen took over as Prime Minister 
after Nyrup Rasmussen (1993-2001), he further tightened ALMP conditions already in 
place. Then, as a second step, Fogh-Rasmussen favoured an ALMP implementation 
approach that disregarded the agreements-based foundations of the Danish labour market 
by limiting unions involvement in managing ALMP programs – one of the key reasons 
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they had had for being in favour of ALMP reforms in the first place (Gould Andersen, 
2011; Jorgensen and Schulze, 2010). What that meant was that there was a political 
impact of the marginal reforms enacted, affecting Main Agreement signatories directly, 
i.e. unions were now prevented from having a ‘formal position in the implementation of 
ALMPs’ (Gould Andersen, 2011:202).  
 
Overall, ALMP management discontinuity by unions can, to some extent, be explained 
party politically by looking at the Fogh-Rasmussen government’s reliance on the far 
right Danish Peoples Party for his (minority) coalition governments after 2001. First, the 
Peoples Party took over the pivotal role of providing the parliamentary majority support 
role previously held - for decades, by the centre and centre left Radical Party and Centre 
Democrats Party. In fact, the Centre Democrats did not meet the threshold for the Danish 
parliament when Fogh-Rasmussen took over as Prime Minister in 2001. It was an 
important change in the sense that the consensus politics of labour market flexibility 
enhancing reforms, like most of Danish economic policy, had for more than a century 
been decided across the middle of the aisle, with cross-party support so to speak. 
 
Secondly, while the Fogh-Rasmussen changes to ALMPs may appear somewhat muted 
to the casual eye, the implications of even marginal reform tweaks have become 
potentially important for the forward stability of flexicurity. For example, unions have 
started to request increases to EPL – reforms that would lower flexibility, as part of 
collective bargaining talks between unions and employer organizations (Goul Andersen, 
2011:204). If fruitful, then such discussions about non-trivial increases in protection 
against dismissals or regular EPL would fit within a trend that would potentially feed 
already emerged doubts among the Main Agreement’s union-side signatories about the 
wisdom of maintaining across-the-board, low levels of employment protection 
simultaneously with strict ALMPs.   
 
In sum, the division of labour management enshrined in the Main Agreement was based 
on and has over time been able to support an entente cordiale between employers and 
employees as well as between producer coalitions and the Danish state. The result was, 
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as seen in the trajectory of EPL reform events in Figure 6, a historically low level of 
regular EPL. To that was added, through unique intra-party developments of the Danish 
Social Democratic Party and the advent of a somewhat unique majority government, 
reforms to temporary EPL reforms and ALMPs within the political context and 
ascendance in Danish politics of Third Way thinking. Certainly, a sharp reversal from 
passive to active labour market policies took off and helped create a Danish labour 
market model exhibiting the defining features of flexicurity. Therefore, as a case of a 
country with variation on the dependent variable of reforms, the subsequent Section 
concludes on the trajectory of Danish labour market reforms with respect to the thesis 
research question and hypothesis.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
Denmark’s journey to flexicurity provides a picture of marginal labour market reforms 
increasing overall flexibility. The pattern is strikingly similar to reforms observed for 
Germany in terms of the reasons given and the intra-party challenges and opportunities 
for reforming politicians to enactment reforms. As expected from the quantitative 
analysis in Chapter 2, labour market flexibility reforms were achieved in the case of 
Denmark, in part, as a response to economic challenges of high unemployment in the 
early 1990s. Further, the Nordic social model –especially the underpinnings of the Main 
Agreement, refracted reforms. The result was a political reform ability or focus on a 
move from passive to active labour market policies, and full liberalization of EPL – 
lowering temporary EPL to match the already low levels for regular EPL (see Figure 6).  
 
The reforms enacted by social democrat led governments of the early 1990s, and 
subsequently enhanced by liberal government sin the early 2000s, stand out in contrast 
to the challenge of reforms during the 1980s. A a period of liberal but also minority 
coalition governments led by Poul Schluter with high national debt and unemployment 
levels, which put political pressure on his successive governments for reforms. However, 
as shown in this Chapter, parliamentary majority challenges and producer coalition 
residual strength meant that the existing low regular EPL and generous but passive 
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welfare remained in place. Ideologically in favour of reforms and having had them as 
paert of his electoral platform, the only reforms that Schluter was able to achieve was 
lowering the cost of welfare payment by de-indexation of unemployment benefits 
(Thelen, 2014:145). As such, other areas ripe for reforms like unemployment insurance 
remained largely unreformed (Green-Pedersen, 2001:60).  
 
The trajectory of the Main Agreement, low regular EPL and then temporary EPL and 
ALMP reforms took place in 1993-1994 with a continued backdrop of high 
unemployment, around 12 per cent (Thelen, 2014). However, with the political ability to 
move from passive to active labour market policies, and fully liberalizing temporary 
EPL, Denmark achieved liberalizing labour market reforms that when described as 
flexicurity became widely seen as a potential model for Europe (Madsen, 2006). Overall, 
a conclusion which draws attention to the politics of reforms with respect this Chapter’s 
contribution to answering the research question of what explains the political enactment 
of flexibility enhancing reforms in European countries (or lack thereof) in the period 
from the early 1980s to the Great Recession in 2008.  
 
Critically, the ALMP reforms re-commodified workers by insisting on assessments of 
the ability to work, mandatory participation on ALMP programs, and a change of those 
programs to promote job-taking at almost any cost. As such, if anything, the notion of 
flexibility enhancements to the Danish labour market at the cost of lower de-
commodification under a Social Democratic Party government underscores the 
importance of understanding the politics of reforms when analysing European labour 
countries labour market reform enacting coalitions. 
 
Specifically, the social democratic led government was able to enact reforms with a rare 
parliamentary majority, but also because the intra-party dynamics had changed. A drastic 
change in that the party unceremoniously discarded its party leader, Svend Auken, while 
in office and after he had won a historically high overall share of votes in the preceding 
general election, for Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. Nyrup Rasmussen being a new party 
leader, fully signed up to the modernisation of the Danish welfare state and labour 
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market through adherence to the Third Way approach (Jorgensen and Schulze, 2010; 
Arndt, 2013).  
 
The result was that between 1985 and 2008 Denmark kept regular EPL comparatively 
low at just below 2 on the 0-6 OECD scale, but then went from just above 3 to just shy 
of 1.5 for temporary EPL. Simultaneously, the social democratic centre-left government 
of Poul Nyrup Rasmussen gave up on improving the labour market through wage 
compression and instead significantly increased investments in ALPMs resulting in what 
for Denmark was a ‘significant shift towards liberalization through activation’ (Thelen, 
2014:151). In other words, reforms that lent support to ALMP type reforms that Tony 
Blair and Gerhard Schroder also worked towards under the Third Way banner.  
 
In sum, with respect to what explained the political enactment of flexibility enhancing 
reforms in European countries, the Danish case does not provide evidence to reject 
hypothesis that labour market flexibility reforms, or lack thereof, are best explained by a 
political focus on solving political-economy problems, e.g. high levels of 
unemployment, or maintaining institutional continuity. It does, however, not confirm it 
either as the trajectory showed a persistence of similar-type economic ‘pressures on 
government’ across the trajectory of reforms under Poul Schluter in the 1980s and early 
1990s, and the early governments of Nyrup Rasmussen.  
 
Rather, the political ability to reform labour markets in combination with economic 
pressures on the reforming government of Poul Nyrup Rasmussen appear to be the key 
explanatory factor for the ability to enact reforms. Although the trajectory of reforms 
does not have a large number of reform events, which somewhat limits the 
generalizability of the argument, the trajectory of Danish labour market reforms leading 
up to the Great Recession did coincide with intra-party, party political, and 
parliamentary majority alignment changes rather than continuity. Changes that, as 
documented in this case study, provided sufficient political impetus for the described 
reforms to go ahead. All while economic pressures for reforms continued to exert 
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unrelenting pressure on governments, with Denmark exhibiting double digit 
unemployment rates at the time.  
 
Hence, the determinants of reforms in the case of Denmark likely go beyond classic 
government pressures for reform like growth and unemployment and instead point to at 
least a combined political-economy and political-electoral explanation of the enacted 
reforms. As such, in line with the theoretical background discussed in the Chapter 1, this 
Chapter provides evidence for the contention that labour market flexibility reforms are 
best explained by understanding the short-term electoral prospects for reforming 
politicians.  
 
The Danish case also provides support for the idea that a better understanding of the 
trajectory of reforms, via a longitudinal analysis of reforms enacted, helps to clarify the 
political challenge of enacting reforms – as witnesses between the similarity and 
difference between the governments of Schluter, Nyrup Rasmussen and Fogh-
Rasmussen across the ideological spectrum. Interestingly, and different from the German 
case Denmark does present a situation where an elected leader confronted economic 
pressures to reform, enacted reforms, and then got re-elected. In that respect, the Nyrup 
Rasmussen government and its re-election was more akin to that of the UK, even if the 
reforms enacted were not as drastic as those of Margaret Thatcher.  
 
In a broader context, this Chapter has illustrated the case of a Nordic social model 
country, Denmark, successfully implementing reforms to temporary EPL and flexicurity 
enhancing ALMP measures. However, the implementation modalities chosen for the 
ALMP measures may be putting unintended political pressure on the continuity of 
existing high levels of labour market flexibility. As such, it is no longer anathema in 
collective bargaining negotiations for Danish unions to bring up the possibility of 
increasing employment protection or EPL. Therefore, in terms of the thesis research 
question, Denmark represents both a country where reforms have been at the margin – as 
expected, and where Junker’s dictum may at some point be reversed in the sense that 
Danish politicians may consider lowering the overall level of labour market flexibility.  
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At the same time, the observable Danish reforms – say of its temporary EPL, are broadly 
in line with the reform pattern of most of Europe. Namely, liberalising reforms that have 
mainly been at the margin. The next Chapter looks at France as a case that has had 
similar if not more persistent economic pressures for reforms, but where the politics of 
reforms have not aligned to produce consistent flexibility enhancing reforms, marginal 
or otherwise.  
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6. Challenging labour market reforms in France  
In previous Chapters, we have seen that labour market reforms were enacted and 
sustained in the UK, achieved in Germany against a backdrop of limited electoral 
support for reforms, and in Denmark how a combination of economic and political 
circumstances led to marginal reforms that established flexicurity in Denmark.  
 
The thesis now turns its attention to the case of France, a country that, while having a 
generally recognised baseline of an inflexible labour market, has in practice moved 
forward with what is perhaps more accurately described as a ‘contradictory reform 
pattern’ (Marx, 2012:714). Contradictory in the sense that EPL-driven marginal reforms, 
and labour market reforms more broadly, have oscillated between increased and 
decreased flexibility across the in-scope time period from the early 1980s.  
 
Because of its sheer number of attempts at reforms, which largely failed, France 
represents an opportunity to better ascertain the determinants of reform – what explains 
their success, their failure and their often contradictory results—in a context   where 
economic pressures for reforms (such as high unemployment) were unremitting for most 
of the period covered by this thesis. The French reform trajectory, therefore, helps to 
provide a unique understanding of the economic and political conditions for reforms 
covering both successful and unsuccessful EPL reforms.  
 
The generally recognised baseline of an inflexible labour market – making France a case 
of a priori no reforms, can be seen by considering the comparative average difference in 
EPL reforms completed by EU15 countries from 1985 to 2008, in Table 4. Similar to the 
descriptive statistics used in Chapter 2, Table 4 shows that from 1985 to 2008 France’s 
EPL remained almost flat around 3.0 (remembering that the EPL indicator goes from 0 
to 6 with figures closer to zero denoting higher flexibility). Hence, France at 3.0 in 2008 
was at the mid-point between high and low EPL flexibility. However, that level over 
time became a comparatively inflexible level of overall EPL compared with the EU15 
average of 2.08 in 2008.  
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Table 4: Overall EU15 Employment Protection Change and Continuity 1985-2008 
EU15 Member State 1985 2008 EPL Change* 
Portugal 4.19 3.15 -1.04 
Spain 3.82 2.98 -0.84 
Italy 3.57 1.89 -1.68 
Greece 3.56 2.73 -0.83 
Sweden 3.49 1.87 -1.62 
Germany 3.17 2.12 -1.05 
Belgium 3.15 2.18 -0.97 
France** 2.79 3.05 0.26 
Netherlands 2.73 1.95 -0.78 
Denmark 2.40 1.50 -0.90 
Finland 2.33 1.96 -0.37 
Austria 2.21 1.93 -0.28 
Ireland** 0.93 1.11 0.18 
United Kingdom** 0.60 0.75 0.15 
EU Average  2.78 2.08 -0.70 
Overall EPL Totals 38.94 29.17 -9.77 
Data Source: Estimates of the employment protection indicators from 1985-2008 available from the OECD’s employment protection 
website (www.oecd.org/employment/protection) for employment protection legislation (EPL). All tabulations and calculations 
completed as part of research for this thesis. **Indicated in bold: positive indicates less flexibility in 2008 than in 1985. 
 
The implication is that, by remaining static and in fact raising its overall level of EPL 
slightly, France at 3.05 in 2008 was approximately one full EPL point above the 2008 
EU15 average of 2.08. So not only is France a possible case of no-reform, in relative 
terms to the other EU15 countries, the decline in French labour market flexibility 
measured through the EPL indicator is quite dramatic: while the rest of EU15 member 
states made their labour markets more flexible through the liberalization of hiring and 
firing practices, mainly at the margin, France through its overall stability became 
relatively less flexible.  
 
Yet this does not mean that lessons on what explains reform cannot be gleaned from the 
reform events that did take place and for France, also those that did not. Further, France 
is the only EU15 member state apart from the liberal market economies of Ireland and 
the UK – both of whom had EPL levels close to one in both 1985 and 2008, to have 
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increased its overall EPL from 1985 to 2008. In practical terms, France’s trajectory 
shows increases (less flexibility) in both Temporary and Regular EPL, which is unusual 
given the overall labour market liberalization trend witnessed across Europe (Boeri, 
2011). A trend that was also captured, and to which the thesis has added robustness, 
through showing a picture of marginal reforms quantitatively in Chapter 2 and then in 
the preceding qualitative case studies of Germany, the UK and Denmark.  
 
Comparatively, in brief, France completed flexibility enhancing reforms in the early 
1980s before the EPL indicator became available, in 1986-87 for regular EPL, and then 
attempted several reforms between 1990 and 2006 for both regular and temporary EPL 
that eventually failed. Finally, a flexibility enhancing reform to EPL was successful in 
2007-08, just before the Great Recession. This briefly outlined, contradictory trajectory 
of reforms is discussed below with a reconstruction of reform events that succeeded and 
the most important, politically, also of those that failed. 
 
6.1 Trajectory of French labour market reform events 
France has as its labour market foundation a ‘tradition of strict employment protection 
and social protection systems’ (Clasen and Clegg, 2012:254). As such, French 
employment protection typically divides into permanent and fixed term contracts, 
roughly equivalent to the categories of regular and temporary EPL categories used 
throughout the thesis. In addition to employment protection, the French labour market 
has an overlay of insurance based unemployment and social protection (Amable, 
2012:1173). The insurance-based social welfare system was set-up to maintain the social 
status of the main “male breadwinner” and therefore labour market reforms have often 
focused on so-called “insertion” policies: policies that target young people and women 
with respect to granting work on special contract types that are more flexible than 
regular contracts, and hence can further access to the labour market (Levy, 2005). An 
approach that became increasingly used ‘to provide social benefits as a cushion against 
the unemployment generated when French firms rationalized’ as EU integration and 
global competition ramped up during the 1989s and 2000s (Hall, 2007:72). 
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Paired with dirigisme or the French tradition of an elite from the Grande Ecoles running 
the French state through comprehensive, highly technical-administrative planning, the 
insurance based labour market arrangements would after the Second World War be 
managed through ‘an activist industrial policy that modernized the economy’ (Hall, 
2006:5). However, the French state delegated the administration of insurance 
contributions to recognized trade unions and employer federations (the so-called social 
partners). By doing so, the French state could co-opt unions to help manage key 
elements of social welfare and the labour market, but avoid strengthening too much ‘a 
labour movement dominated by a communist union’ (Hall, 2007:49). 
 
As such, involvement of social partners became a pre-requisite for labour market 
reforms. For example, the Grenelle Accords agreed in the aftermath of the 1968 student 
riots led to the establishment of a framework for the maintenance of labour market 
policy through the ‘inclusion of unions and employers in the deliberation of labour 
market policy reform’ (Davidsson and Emmenegger, 2012:214). However, the social 
partners in general remained a weak labour market reform partner – in part by design, as 
mentioned above, to avoid too leftist a capture of collective bargaining (Hall, 2007). In 
part, that weakness was driven by the trajectory of unionization going from below 25 per 
cent in the 1970s to below 10 per cent in the 1980s – the lowest in any OECD country 
(Levy, 2000:310; Palier, 2010a:77).  
 
Overall, dirigisme with the post World War II nationalization and creation of large 
companies became the main, sustainable, avenue for setting labour market standards in 
France and reducing the need for strong partners for reforms. To wit, the 100 largest 
companies in France increased their share of the industrial production output from 20 per 
cent in 1950 to more than 50 per cent in the 1970s, many of them state owned (Levy, 
2000:317). The implication was that the French state took on a large share of the 
economy to run with or via the state, and French society became ‘accustomed to looking 
to the state to resolve its problems’ including the labour market (Hall, 2006:5).   
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The upshot with respect to the trajectory of labour market reform events is that the 
producer coalitions of the French economy were at least at the end of the 1970s and 
beginning of the 1980s aligned with and often mainly driven from within the French 
state itself, continuously testing its ability to directly manage the economy, and by 
extension the labour market – preferably in concert with, but often against the desire of 
its social partners (Hall, 2007). For example, under ‘President Valery Giscard d’ Estaing 
increased state aid to industry and expanded social programmes for those without 
employment’ became the stock ‘response of France to the socio-economic challenges’ at 
the time (Hall, 2007:54). 
 
Hence, the existing literature on French labour market reforms draws focus towards 
initiatives led by the French government, indirectly illustrating the ‘relevance of socio-
economic pressure for the [labour market] reform process’ (Marx, 2012:312). Yet while 
driven by economic or wider political economy concerns, politically, French reform 
initiatives more often than not were directed at propping up ‘traditional values and a 
“social treatment of unemployment”’ rather than being dictated by market forces or 
economic problems of the government of the day (Clasen and Clegg, 2003:361).  
 
Challenges like unemployment were therefore tackled by state interventions, which was 
very different from the liberalizing reforms studied in the other cases covered 
previously. For example, while France started privatizing industry in the early 1980s – 
comparable to Thatcher’s UK labour market reforms, the UK went further by also de-
regulating unions and adopting a monetary policy leading to an overall reduction in the 
state’s role. In Denmark, the focus was on maintaining political support for high levels 
of flexibility by compensating through flexicurity; and in the case of Germany, the direct 
involvement of producer coalitions and unions set up a trajectory of successful 
collaboration between governments and social partners for overall coordination of labour 
market reforms – at least until the Hartz reforms came into place.  
 
A further differentiator of the French case, over and beyond political economy 
considerations, was the political consideration that ‘since 1981 no government has ever 
  131 
been re-elected’ (Amable, 2012:1169). With no repeat governments, from a political 
science perspective, the electoral calculation behind reforms and reform attempts 
changes significantly – contrary to its peers, French governments do not appear to be 
focused on re-election. This is important because, as discussed in Chapter 1, a general 
political-electoral dilemma exists where, even if well-designed, liberalizing reforms that 
are structural in nature and may have long term (economic) benefits are not implemented 
because politicians are too well aware that the ‘pains of reform usually precede the 
gains, making it even harder to push through the needed reforms’ (Bean, 1998:355). 
That would scantly be expected to count for Prime Ministers of France as they could not 
expect their governments to be re-elected, with electoral focus and incentives therefore 
shifting to the Presidential level – examples of which will be illustrated below.  
 
Further at the political level, France ‘is not generally considered to be a case where 
labour market flexibility or rigidities have played a substantial role in the debate on 
unemployment…[and therefore] French governments have not attempted to induce 
significant changes in terms of [labour market] flexibility’ (Malo et.al., 2000:245). 
However, this thesis argues somewhat differently that French politicians have, in fact, 
been focused on labour market reforms, especially when the combination of economic 
and political gain has been jointly evident or where taking the initiative to implement 
reforms has been connected to a (Prime) Minister’s ambitions to run for subsequent 
Presidential elections (cf. Petit, 2006). As such, the following paragraphs will review the 
specific events of the French reform trajectory, noting the reactive nature of reforms to 
economic problems of governments, as well as the implicit fear of union led riots and the 
political leadership implications that has often had for reform enacting politicians.  
 
For the overall trajectory of French labour market reforms, neither permanent (regular 
EPL equivalent) nor fixed term (temporary EPL equivalent) contract types were 
‘governed by a special provision’ meaning that a ‘fixed-term contract could provide 
more employment stability than a permanent one, which could be practically terminated 
at any time unilaterally’ (Marx, 2012:710). In short, historically a relatively flexible 
labour market existed, which then changed after the Second World War to the dirigiste 
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heyday, when between ‘1950 and 1980 termination of permanent contracts became more 
and more restricted by law and collective agreements’ (Marx, 2012: 711).  
 
Hence, the baseline of labour market flexibility was quite high (flexible), certainly it was 
higher that what can be read for the EPL indicator level of 2.8 in 1985 from Figure 7, 
below. France then reduced its flexibility in the post-war political economy; and, went 
from a relatively flexible labour market in comparisons with other EU15 countries 
between 1985 and 2008, as shown in Table 4. Flexibility, which was mainly derived 
from widespread (some times illicit) use of fixed-term contracts, which towards the end 
of the 1970s, as unemployment increased, had surged both in terms of the overall 
number of companies using them and the share of the overall workforce being employed 
on fixed term contracts (remembering that fixed term corresponds to temporary EPL-
based contracts). This led to the enactment of a labour market reform in 1979 by the 
centre-right government of Giscard d’Estaing, which at the time was argued for on the 
basis that ‘jurisdiction could not sufficiently constrain opportunistic hiring’ on fixed 
term contracts (Marx, 2012:711). 
 
The solution arrived at was putting in place a binding framework for fixed-term 
contracts (FTCs) that had previously not existed, principally creating a more ‘predictable 
and stable legal basis for the use of such contracts’ (Marx, 2012:711). Yet while 
tightening on paper, the reform was contradictory in that the ‘regulatory approach was 
rather liberal’ because the ‘law did not specify conditions under which FTCs could be 
concluded’ (which had been the case before 1979) (Marx, 2012:711). Therefore, in terms 
of France’s reform trajectory, flexibility was increased through allowing the use of 
FTCs, both technically with respect to the contract form and overall in its usage vis-à-vis 
regular contracts. A trend, which continues to this day, and in large part has been used as 
evidence for a dualization of the French labour market (Palier and Thelen, 2010). 
 
By the time socialist Francois Mitterrand became president in 1981, the political 
‘position towards FTCs changed’, leading to a ‘re-regulatory reform in 1982’ (Marx, 
2012:712). Specifically, the 1982 reform set-up a list of areas under which FTCs could 
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be used, imposed a maximum duration, and only allowed one extension instead of the 
previous two (Davidsson and Emmenegger, 2012:215). However, as unemployment did 
not abate, ‘the economic needs of firms overwhelmed the legislative stopgaps of the 
Socialists’ under Mitterrand’s leadership and FTCs continued to be used extensively 
(Howell, 1992:79). Further, social tension rose due to a near permanent 10 per cent level 
of unemployment, which became ‘a structural problem linked to fundamental defects in 
the economy or its regulatory regimes’ (Hall, 2006:3).  
 
In response, the continued high levels of unemployment meant that the socialist party 
that led the first government under Mitterrand’s presidency began to ‘accept the need for 
deregulation’; yet it was also aware of the ‘low popularity of such measures’ (Marx, 
2012:713). Involving unions and employer associations in negotiations or reforms 
proved difficult, as there was no agreement on pursuing either temporary or regular 
contract reforms. Ultimately, the government in 1985 passed a reform that would soften 
or increase the flexibility of temporary contracts such that ‘more grounds were 
admissible for the use of fixed-term contracts and the maximum duration was extended 
to 24 months’ (Davidsson and Emmenegger, 2012:216). As such, politically, the unions 
accepted a lowering in protection of regular contracts given the ‘socio-economic 
pressure’ for reforms (Marx, 2012:713).  
 
So far then, both under centre-right and then socialist government leadership, a 
contradictory reform trajectory had characterised the French labour market. A reform 
trajectory that had been implemented in agreement with or at least not blocked by any of 
the social partners, and that aligned with the political economy pressures for reforms 
variables analysed in Chapter 2, e.g. unemployment. Noticeably, these reforms were 
implemented and affected labour market flexibility before 1985, when EPL data became 
available. Now, to link the period before and after 1985, the trajectory of EPL from 1985 
is shown in Figure 7 and a discussion follows for each depicted reform event and key 
attempted reform events that failed, below. 
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Figure 7: French Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) Trends 1985-2008  
 
Data Source: Estimates of the employment protection indicators from 1985-2009 available from the OECD’s employment protection 
website (www.oecd.org/employment/protection). All tabulations and calculations completed as part of research for this thesis. 
 
In 1986, while Mitterrand remained as socialist President, a centre-right government 
replaced the socialist led one that had agreed to increase flexibility for FTCs – a classic 
case of so-called “co-habitation” between a president and government with a different 
party political and ideological background (Sartori, 1997). Then, with unemployment 
rising rapidly to double digits, ‘the growth of FTCs was presented as evidence for 
desperately needed flexibility and was used to legitimise de-regulation (Marx, 
2012:713). Further, the new government had momentum behind it in the sense that 
public opinion – somewhat counter intuitively given the general story of France 
maintaining inflexible labour markets, turned in favour of liberalization (Balme, 2006). 
For example, in 1978, only 49 percent of the French electorate ‘favoured State regulation 
over freedom for firms’, including support for the liberalization of EPL (Balme, 
2006:254).  
 
That shifted in the 1980s to 60 percent of French voters being in favour of giving firms 
more freedom and ‘public opinion became clearly economically liberal’ (Balme, 
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2006:254). So the 1986 decrease in regular EPL, shown in Figure 7, happened with a 
centre-right government in power and electoral or public support for more liberal 
policies overall. The result was the 1986 reform that ‘included a significant relaxation of 
regular dismissal protection’ (Marx, 2012:714). However, as is also clear from the 
trajectory of EPL reforms in Figure 7 that the trend of liberalization did not continue.  
 
One reason was that reforms of EPL for French governments were a challenging 
approach to liberalization given that, based on survey data, the French electorate was 
contradictory in wanting ‘both economic freedom and social regulation of the economy’ 
(Balme, 2006:256). That said, the following reform of temporary EPL in 1989 seen in 
Figure 7 – after Mitterrand was re-elected President in 1988, was ‘re-regulation of job 
security for temporary workers’ or an increase in temporary EPL (less flexibility) 
(Davidsson and Emmenegger, 2012:218). Clearly visible in Figure 7 is also the 
increasing span between regular and temporary EPL from 1989 onwards.   
 
Politically, voters ambivalent approach to economic freedom and regulation of EPL in 
support of social stability became, potentially, evident in the long period of no EPL 
reforms from the early 1990s to the early 2000s. In that period, however, there was an 
increase in related areas of reforms, principally the previously mentioned special 
employment programs – including the so-called ‘re-insertion’ policies or programs, as 
well as macro- economic liberalization efforts to better insert France into the global 
economy (Hall, 2007).  
 
First, the special employment programs were meant to help unemployed outside formal 
regular employment conditions enter or re-enter the labour market (Palier and Thelen, 
2010:83; Hall, 2007; Culpepper, 2006:38; Malo et.al., 2000:247). More formally, Clegg 
argues that the programs of the late 1980s were a ‘dualistic regulation of the 
unemployment risk and the use of non-standard employment arrangements’ to 
complement the already discussed extensive use of FTCs (Clegg, 2011:49). Yet, as is 
evident from Figure 7, the programs did not change the overall EPL status for France.  
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For example, the 1988 R v    mi im m  ’i s  tation (RMI) provided for a minimum 
income to be received by a person who had never before worked. At its creation, about 
400,000 workers registered for the RMI. In 2009, about 1.13 million or 3 per cent of the 
active population were dependent on it (Palier and Thelen, 2010:134); 8 additional per 
cent became dependent on other minimum schemes while 25 per cent in 2007 are in 
atypical work relations – up from 3 per cent in 1970. With those use-numbers, about one 
third of the entire working population in France came to be outside of the “normal” 
labour market, the underlying reason for France’s status as a dualizing labour market 
(Palier and Thelen, 2010)14.  
 
However, most of the (re)insertion schemes had mixed reviews and several failed 
outright, thus representing failed reforms. An example was the CIP or contrat 
 ‘i s  ti   p    ssi   ll , introduced by the conservative Balladur government in 1994. 
Created as a new form of employment contract ‘with a lower minimum wage for the 
young’, government decrees were issued but the CIP was never actually implemented 
due to weeks of violent street protests (Tompson, 2009:203). Importantly, as an example 
of a failed reform in France’s trajectory, the CIP was different in its conception and 
political enactment compared to earlier successful reforms in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. The differentiator was how successive governments, including Balladur’s, would 
try and “go it alone” without the traditional incorporation of social partners’ views that 
had provided support for reforms in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
 
To illustrate, in the case of the CIP, organized interests were largely ‘excluded from 
policy making and social tensions were marked’ as a result (Tompson, 2009:203). 
Similarly, another important case of non-reform or reform failure influenced by street 
protests instigated by unions was the critical attempt to lower EPL in 2006 by then Prime 
                                                 
14 In the French political debate, a working time reduction is understood as a means to increase internal 
(within companies) and decrease external flexibility that relates to indicators measured by EPL (Malo 
et.al, 2000). Working time reductions began in 1993 with the Robien Law and reached its most significant 
shift with the Aubry II Law in 1998, with the latter famously reducing working hours from 39 to 35 hours 
per week. In return, employers that agreed to the new limits were given higher exemptions on social 
contributions. In effect, substantive financial incentives made these reforms at least somewhat attractive to 
employers (Vail, 2008:342). 
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Minister de Villepin. Called CNE for contrat de nouvelle embauche, the reform was 
intended to ‘facilitate the hiring of young people by small firms understood to be 
reluctant to hire because of the existing high levels of EPL (Petit, 2006:111). In practical 
terms, the CNE ‘allowed small firms to fire new employees at any time during the first 
two years of employment’, ironically a duration equivalent to the typical time of a 
normal FTC (Petit, 2006:111).  
 
Petit argues that de Villepin moved ahead with the CNE because of ambitions for the 
2007 Presidential election, yet did not approach the topic logically given that ’70 per 
cent of young people under twenty-five [years of age] entering the labor market were 
already on temporary [FTC] contracts’ – hence the mentioned irony (Petit, 2006:112). 
Politically, it was moved through parliament without debate, using an exception clause. 
Yet again, perhaps most important with respect to the challenge of labour market 
reforms in France, it did not conform to the successful political process of including 
social partners in the development and implementation of the new reform measure. 
 
Further and important for the politics of labour market reforms in France, the measure 
was an example of a reform that was not intended to impact electoral considerations for 
de Villepin as Prime Minister, but rather focused on his position towards the up-coming 
2007 Presidential election campaign to replace then French President, Chaque Chirac. 
Specifically, de Villepin was contesting the role of Presidential campaign candidate for 
the UMP centre-right party with one of his ministers, Nicolas Sarkozy. Hence, the CNE 
was likely targeted as an electoral play with de Villepin aiming to show his ‘statecraft 
and his ability to reform a social model in crisis’ rather than a political economy solution 
to high unemployment or a leadership calculation for re-election at the level of Prime 
Minister (Petit, 2006:114).   
 
In sum, the somewhat or often completely failed insertion policy(ies) and EPL reforms 
from 1989 to 2007 were symptomatic of Prime Ministers aiming to promote their own 
stature with respect to reforms and Presidential elections. As such, the one reform that 
did succeed in the same period was a regular EPL reform observable in Figure 7 from 
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2000-2001, lowering flexibility. The reform was enacted under socialist Prime Minister 
Lionel Jospin (1997-2002) within the framework of the so-called Social Modernisation 
Bill. The Bill was intended as an ameliorating feature to the previously passed, widely 
unpopular "new economic regulations" law (nouvelles régulations économiques, or 
NRE), which was intended to prepare France for participation in global capital markets 
(Tiberghien, 2007). Specifically, for the area of EPL, the Social Modernisation Bill 
enacted measures to ‘tackle precarious employment through restrictions on fixed-term 
contracts’ (FRDB, 2015). Publicised politically as an ‘anti-layoff law’ it was arguable a 
side-payment to the coalition partners of Jospin’s government, a ‘concession to the 
communist party’ (Tiberghien, 2007:100). 
 
In essence, the Social Modernisation reform continued the trajectory of French labour 
market reforms by tinkering with FTCs or marginal and at times contradictory reforms. 
The reform thereby helped ensure that the ‘period which must elapse between the uses of 
fixed-term contracts for the same position is made longer’ (FRDB, 2015). The point of 
making the time between using an FTC for the same position longer being a marginal 
reform, yet an important one because of the increasingly irregular use of FTCs. For 
example, by using several FTCs after each other for the same position or inventing new 
FTC positions to hire existing employees into, Jospin’s reform looked to ‘contain the 
uncontrolled use of flexible employment’ contracts that had spun out of control with 
potentially ‘systematic violation of [FTC] regulation’ (Marx, 2012:718).    
 
Another supporting political factor for Jospin’s reform was the French electorate’s 
resistance to liberalization, which had grown through the period in which the NRE was 
discussed and implemented. For all intents and purposes, the previous calculation of 
voter’s dual expression of support for both social regulation (including EPL) and firms 
following liberal market principles (see Balme, 2006) had changed: by 2001, opinion 
polls showed that ‘65 percent of the [French] people expressed their resistance to 
globalisation’ into which they also read attempts at EPL reforms – visible if nothing else 
through the abuse of FTC contracts (Tiberghien, 2007:101). In that sense, the French 
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electorate had potentially, like the German one, come to see a trajectory of reforms that 
was unforgivingly targeted at liberalization – which they rejected.  
 
The political result of the NRE, related privatizations in the context of preparing France 
for a globalising economy, and a labour market with FTC usage spiralling out of control 
was Jospin getting the ‘lowest percentage of the vote for a socialist leader [as 
Presidential candidate] since the 1970s’ in the 2002 Presidential election (Tiberghien, 
2007:103). And that was even though Jospin was politically able to claim credit for 
introducing the famous French 35 hour working week and had, uniquely in the political 
economy trajectory of France, presided over a reduction in unemployment from 12 to 8 
per cent (Tiberghien, 2007:103).   
 
That leads to the last of the reform events covered in this thesis for France shown in 
Figure 7. A reform that in 2007-8 lowered EPL with incoming President Nicolas 
Sarkozy having won the election on a ‘campaign that emphasized his desire to break 
with the traditional ways of policy making in order to enact structural reform’ (Milner, 
2012:290). In practical terms, temporary EPL was decreased to try and move the overall 
level of EPL towards the ‘liberal ideal’ of a ‘single labour contract abolishing the 
distinction between regular and unconventional work contract’ (Amable, 1212:1179). 
 
In political terms, Sarkozy’s reforms had as an enabling feature the promise of a move 
towards flexicurity to go with the intended, liberalizing reforms. Yet with the onset of 
the Great Recession, the political economy implications ‘made the flexicurity approach 
to labour market deregulation unsustainable’ due to the potentially high fiscal costs of 
active labour market policies needed for flexicurity (Amable, 2012:1185; see Chapter 5 
on active labour market policies and flexicurity definitions). In other words, the 
coalitional support for reforms may have been in place at the outset of Sarkozy’s 
Presidential period, but political economy considerations cut short the reform attempts – 
ironically illustrating both the continuing economic pressures on the government of the 
day.  
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To further explore the contradictory French trajectory of reforms, the following section 
reviews the challenge of labour market reforms for France and what can explain how 
France remained at the side lines of the Europe-wide trend of labour market 
liberalization.  
 
6.2 Challenging labour market reforms in France 
For France, the result of the reform events analysed in the previous section from a 
longitudinal perspective was the continuation of, on the one hand, a labour market based 
on social insurance within the traditional legal-protections focused labour market 
system. On the other hand, an increasingly large part of the working population became 
dependent on tax-based, means-tested assistance and non-regular labour market 
employment modalities, including irregular use of FTCs. The opening shot at the French 
trajectory was most likely politically set off by the end to the so-called single country 
experiment from 1981-1983, under President Mitterrand (Malo, et. al., 2000:248). At 
that point, when Mitterrand had to back down or “turnaround” from his electoral 
promise of socialism in a single country, not only did the turnaround mean a change 
from dirigiste intervention at the micro or firm level of the economy. It also meant 
privatization of firms and an overall farewell to Keynesian demand management. 
 
However, unlike in the UK, the farewell to Keynes was softer and did not politically 
include an element of increased labour market flexibility via EPL reforms; even if, as 
evidenced above, adjustments were certainly made along the way. Arguably, in the 
context of this thesis research hypotheses, one reason for this was that there was no party 
political or intra-part gains to be made from reforms. Neither for Mitterrand nor any 
subsequent Presidents – possibly bar Nicolas Sarkozy (Milner, 2012), as there had been 
for Margaret Thatcher in terms of establishing her credentials as leader of the then 
largely Keynesian Conservative party in 1979; albeit at the government or Prime 
Ministerial attempts at limited reforms were made and some succeeded –in either 
direction, as described above.  
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Rather, at the political level, and certainly different from Thatcher’s approach, discussed 
in Chapter 4, Mitterrand, for example, argued for political economy reforms as a vote for 
France in terms of deepening its European leadership role, and as a measure 
commensurate with France’s intentions of full European market integration participation 
(Hall, 2007). Hence, European integration and later globalization pressures were used 
politically for electoral cover, but not to the extent that Europeanization or globalization 
occurred so that European integration became an explanatory factor for labour market 
reforms, that as shown in this Chapter really never happened. The one exception 
potentially being Jospin’s politically disastrous macro-economic liberalization platform 
that included a small change in labour market flexibility, as discussed in this Chapter (cf. 
Tiberghien, 2007). 
 
Instead, the trajectory of reforms suggests that political calculations at the Prime 
Ministerial rather than the Presidential political level may in a few cases have been 
conducive to reform attempts. Not in the classic sense of government re-election 
calculations by party-leaders, but though the Presidential ambitions of sitting Prime 
Ministers or Ministers. For example, in a case of a failed reform, the challenge of labour 
market flexibility reforms in France was evident in the de Villepin government’s attempt 
to introduce a flexible entry-level employment contract for individuals under the age of 
26 labelled contrat premiere embauche (CPE), in 2006. That effort remains perhaps the 
most serious political investment in employment protection reforms that then did not 
happen: while the reform passed politically through Parliament and was signed into law 
by then President Chirac, public protests in the end led to a government climb down – 
even ‘humiliation’, in the spring of 2006 (Howell, 2008:219). Nicholas Sarkozy then 
went on to win the Presidential election.  
 
Hence, in terms of the research question of this thesis it would appear that the 
contradictory reforms that were implemented support the hypothesis that economic and 
broader socio-economic or political economy pressures for reforms do matter. Yet for 
the overall trajectory of reforms to become one of liberalization, the political conditions 
need to be in place – in France they were not, at least not in the period covered by this 
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thesis. So for the hypothesis that economic pressures are what mainly drives reforms, for 
France the consistent political answer has been to create a web of exceptions to general 
rules, a formal second tier of non-regular employment through insertion policies, and 
limited ALMPs that do not reach flexicurity levels. In other words, variables like 
economic growth and unemployment were important, but not important enough to help 
implement significant reforms to EPL and override the aversion to liberalization held by 
the French electorate (with a few limited exceptions as explained above).  
 
That makes France an important case for this thesis argument that what determines 
labour market flexibility reforms in Europe has been the combination of economic or 
wider political economy pressures for reforms and political intra-party and electoral 
advantages for politicians who then implement those reforms. That would appear to be 
affirmed in the case of France as the former has been plenty evident, yet the latter has 
blatantly not been. Yet as a corollary, one of the gains that France may have taken away 
with political implications is that, as Milner argues from a review of the Sarkozy 
presidency, that the trajectory of non-reforms mitigated the otherwise ‘international 
trend towards rising poverty and inequality, in comparison with other advanced 
economies’ (Milner, 2012:302). 
 
Hence, the strength of the French political system may be its inability to enact reforms 
because of the way in which its social model refracts the extant pressures for reforms. As 
such, therein lies perhaps a more political explanation of the reluctance of French 
Presidents let alone Prime Ministers, once in office, to carry through with reforms: the 
potential negative social and political impact of flexibility enhancing reforms, which was 
certainly felt in the UK under Thatcher and perceived as a distinct possibility by German 
workers from the Hartz reforms (see Chapters 3 and 4, respectively). Reforms may 
simply not have been worth the risk for French presidents as both they and the electorate 
were aware of what Balmer argued was a dual preference for economic efficiency and 
social rights (Balmer, 2006). Overarching, the result is that the French political economy 
has refracted calls for reforms through political coalitions rejecting anything but 
marginal reform proposals.  
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That still leaves the argument that ‘France is not generally considered to be a case where 
labour market flexibility or rigidities have played a substantial role in the debate on 
unemployment…[and therefore] French governments have not attempted to induce 
significant changes in terms of [labour market] flexibility’ appears to have changed 
(Malo et.al., 2000:245). Which would to an extent invalidate the use of France as a case 
of lacking labour market flexibility reforms – other related macro-economic areas may 
simply have been more important? However, that argument belies the change evident in 
the political debate and the actual reform attempts, albeit failed, illustrated in this 
Chapter. For one, for a government in power de Villepin risked everything for a set of 
EPL reforms, and the electorally winning platform of Sarkozy had a clear element of 
proposed labour market reforms.  
 
To illustrate, Nicolas Sarkozy’s winning Presidential election bid was based on a reform 
platform that including labour market reforms. As such, in a recent review of the 
Sarkozy Presidency, Milner sums up Sarkozy’s performance but also France’s from a 
longitudinal perspective by highlighting the inconsistency ‘between the political 
discourse of structural reforms and a practice of incrementalism’ in the enactment of 
labour market flexibility reforms (Milner, 2012:290). Evidently, Sarkozy did not manage 
to implement significant labour market flexibility reforms before the Credit Crisis hit 
France in 2008. Yet, importantly, both the examples of de Villepin and Sarkozy do 
however indicate that reforms are squarely on the agenda, but also that the political 
incentives, as argued here, did not in the studied period align for France to overcome the 
challenge of labour market flexibility enhancing reforms.  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
In the case of France, labour market flexibility reforms remained an unfulfilled 
challenge. Not that classic economic government problems like unemployment and low 
growth did not exist or that no EPL reforms where implemented, as overall the French 
reform trajectory was contradictory (Marx, 2012). Yet as shown in this Chapter, the 
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French labour market has remained inflexible and become more inflexible relative to 
other EU15 countries. That was evident from the analysis of how French reforms 
oscillated between increased and decreased flexibility across the reform trajectory of the 
in-scope time period.  
 
In addition, because of a number of attempts at reforms, which largely failed, France 
showed that without political coalitions for reforms, as a determinant of reforms, 
economic variables on their own are not likely to lead to the enactment of labour market 
flexibility reforms. As such, political choices were made in the case of France to address 
political economy challenges like high unemployment, especially youth unemployment 
without resorting to EPL reforms. Instead, insertion policies of various types were 
introduced and interacted with the use of existing FTC (temporary EPL) contracts to 
provide labour market flexibility. An approach which has meant that an increasing 
number of jobs have shifted to those programs or FTC contract modalities, which in turn 
is the root of France as a case of labour market dualization (Palier and Thelen, 2010).  
 
Politically, whether or not dualization is a desirable outcome, for the purposes of 
answering the thesis research question, the trajectory of EPL and functionally related 
reform events like the insertion programs show a contradictory reforms pattern. 
Contradictory in the sense that draws attention to the politics of reforms more than the 
political economy outcomes or pressures for reforms. For example, comparatively, while 
France started privatizing industry in the early 1980s – comparable to Thatcher’s UK 
labour market reforms, the UK went further by de-regulating unions and adopting a 
monetary policy leading to an overall reduction in the state’s role. In Denmark, the focus 
was on maintaining political support for high levels of flexibility by compensating 
through flexicurity; and in the case of Germany, the direct involvement of producer 
coalitions and unions set up a trajectory of successful collaboration between 
governments and social partners for overall coordination of labour market reforms. 
 
For France, a model of reform involving social partners was initially successful in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s but was discontinued. Instead, from the analysis in this 
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Chapter, France became a case of no-reforms because the combination of both political 
economy and political determinants were not present for France to join the European 
trajectory of liberalizing reforms seen in the other case study Chapters and across the 
EU15 group of countries in Chapter 2. Hence, in terms of the research question, the 
contradictory reforms that were implemented support the hypothesis that economic or 
wider political economy pressures for reforms do matter. Yet for the overall trajectory of 
reforms to become one of liberalization, the political conditions needed to be in place – 
in France they were not. In other words, variables like economic growth and 
unemployment were important, but not important enough to implement significant 
reforms to EPL and override the aversion to liberalization held by the French electorate.  
 
Over and beyond economic considerations, the French case of political incentives for 
politicians to enact reforms was arguable influenced by governments not being re-
elected in the period from 1981 onwards (Amable, 2012:1169). With no repeat 
governments, from a political science perspective, the electoral calculation behind 
reforms and reform attempts should or could change significantly. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, a general political-electoral dilemma exists where, even if well-designed, 
liberalizing reforms that are structural in nature and may have long term (economic) 
benefits are often not implemented because politicians are too well aware that the ‘pains 
of reform usually precede the gains, making it even harder to push through the needed 
reforms’ (Bean, 1998:355).  
 
In the case of France, an electorally negative outcome from reforms should not have 
played a major role as Prime Ministers could not have expected to be re-elected, 
potentially offering less risk and more of a possibility of a self-sacrificing approach to 
structural reforms. However, that is not the most likely result given that would-be 
reformers at the Prime Ministerial level did not fare well regardless. For example, as 
shown in the case of Prime Ministers Lionel Jospin’s EPL adjustments towards less 
flexibility in 2002 and de Villepin’s CPE 2006 CPE reform towards more EPL flexibility 
– both of which arguably cost them a clear shot at the French Presidency.  
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Instead, it is more likely that the shift in public opinion demonstrated by Balmer away 
from a popular preference for economic efficiency in the early 1980s, when limited 
reforms were possible, can provide a political reason for lack of reforms. The reason 
being that a balanced preference for both efficiency and social protection later emerged 
as the mainstay of electoral preferences of French voters and that those preferences were 
successfully channelled through the French political system (Balmer, 2006). A 
conclusion which is further supported by the lack of reforms having, uniquely in Europe, 
ensured that large increases in inequality have been largely avoided (Milner, 2012).  
 
In sum, the French case does not provide evidence to reject the hypothesis that labour 
market flexibility reforms are best explained by a political focus on solving political-
economy problems, e.g. high levels of unemployment, or maintaining institutional 
continuity. Rather, the French case shows that the political conditions were not present, 
that the electoral-political incentives and/or intra-party dynamics were not present for 
flexibility enhancing or liberalizing reforms to take place. As such, the social model or 
rather the political system of France was able to refract pressures for reforms, by 
implication confirming that it is more likely than not the combination of political 
economy and political-electoral conditions which determines labour market flexibility 
reforms – including when they are not successful, as was the case for France. 
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7.  European labour market reforms: politics of change and continuity   
This Chapter summarizes the findings of the thesis and puts them in a comparative 
setting by reviewing empirical support for the theoretical framework and the argument 
concerning the political ability to reform argument set-out in Chapter 1. To do so, the 
Chapter addresses the extent to which the observed change and continuity in the four 
case studies in Chapters 3-6 are consistent with the quantitative analysis in Chapter 2. 
Finally, the Chapter provides a brief discussion in terms of the thesis’ contribution to the 
existing literature and its possible policy implications.  
 
7.1 General expectations and summary of findings 
The main point of departure for this thesis was that while economics often takes a front 
seat, politics matters for understanding the ability of European countries to successfully 
engage in labour market flexibility reforms. Arguably under-researched and set against a 
classic political economy literature focusing on continuity rather than change of labour 
market institutions, a political approach recognises the importance of contributions to the 
study of reforms that have recently moved towards ‘analysis of the political coalitions on 
which economic institutions rest’ (Thelen, 2012:139). As such, the expectations set forth 
in Chapter 1 were about furthering our ability to chart a path towards an explanation of 
the ‘way in which shifts in the political coalitions on which institutions rest drive 
changes’, in the case of this thesis, in European labour markets (Thelen, 2009:473).  
 
However, the thesis has stopped short of analysing outcomes from the way in which 
labour markets have changed over time, for two reasons. First, the main intent of the 
thesis, recognising the complexity of the existing literature, is to understand the ability of 
politicians to enact liberalizing reforms. A limitation that leaves out the impact or 
political economy outcomes of labour market reforms, which remain an empirical 
question. Second, for parsimony of analysis and to gain the benefits of a mixed-methods, 
longitudinal research design the thesis focused on tracing reform events for EPL as a 
  148 
proxy for labour market reforms. In the main using EPL based on its political salience up 
to 2008 (cf. Boeri, 2011; Siebert, 1997).  
 
The choice of EPL was a limiting factor for the ability to draw inference from the thesis 
with respect to the determinants of European labour market reforms. However, beyond 
remaining politically salient, EPL did offer the opportunity to conduct a longitudinal 
review of reforms across European and within selected case countries. With EPL as the 
dependent variable, change or continuity were straightforward to define as de-regulatory, 
rather than systemic or institutionally transformational, with the former being the 
‘removal of legal or contractual restrictions’ (Baccaro and Howell, 2011:527). An 
approach, which through analytical parsimony would not be lost within an area of 
political science that can otherwise quickly become unwieldy, and recognising that 
‘[g]overnments influence the operation of labour markets in a wide variety of ways’ 
(Thelen, 2014:112). 
 
To ameliorate some of the limitations of EPL, other functionally related labour market 
reforms were taken into account in the four country case studies that covered Germany, 
the UK, Denmark and France. An approach, which proved useful for understanding 
labour market reforms in Denmark and Germany where changes to flexicurity and 
unemployment benefits, respectively, were politically important within the reform 
enactment trajectory of those two countries. Further, the thesis recognised and showed 
how other labour market reforms than those for EPL could complement and enrich our 
understanding of what constitutes the “perfect storm” for labour market reforms.  
 
That “perfect storm” analogy was theoretically underpinned by the assumption that the 
reform trajectories under investigation were ‘relying on strict unemployment laws at a 
time of rapid change when old jobs and practices are no longer warranted’ or where high 
EPL ‘discourages adaptation to change and preserves the status quo’ (Sapir, 2006:381). 
The need for reform then, in turn, allowed for the development and testing of two 
regulatory reform-level hypotheses derived from the thesis research question of what 
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explains the political enactment of labour market flexibility enhancing reforms in 
European countries in the 30 years to 2008?  
 
The first hypothesis had a political-electoral perspective where the political impact of 
enacting reforms would be the most likely determinant of whether or not politicians had 
the ability to enact reforms. The second hypothesis set out the idea that the prevailing 
economic or wider political economy conditions of a country, e.g. unemployment and 
economic growth levels or social model belonging, would determine the ability of 
politicians to enact reforms. Further, the difference between the two hypotheses were not 
assumed to be trivial, which perhaps is clearest from the evidence presented in the case 
study conducted for France in Chapter 6.  
 
In France, there were persistently high political economy or economic pressures for 
reforms, but in fact only limited or contradictory reforms to liberalize labour markets 
were achieved. In other words, France was a case of no or few and contradictory 
reforms, even though, like the other European countries in this thesis, which did enact 
(marginal) labour market reforms, there were significant political pressures on 
successive governments to enact reforms. As such, with a trajectory of contradictory 
reforms, France highlighted the possibility that the absence of political change, a lacking 
political ability to enact reforms could continue to hamper reforms regardless of the level 
and incessantness of economic or wider political economy problems.  
 
While a more detailed analysis of the empirical Chapters of the thesis follows below, the 
case of France highlights the conclusion that neither hypothesis was likely to be rejected, 
and indeed are not based on the evidence presented in this thesis. Instead, the 
combination of economic or wider political economy and electoral-political explanations 
is a more fruitful avenue to understand what determined politician’s ability enact labour 
market reforms. The reason being that, as a general case, the answer to the posed 
research question is that reforms appear more likely to emerge when both economic 
pressures and political-electoral, often intra-party variables, change or align for reforms 
to actually be enacted.  
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The implications are that change or continuity of variables like intra-party competition, 
political party composition, and party electoral platforms need to be taken into account 
when explaining the observable longitudinal trend of (marginal) EPL and functionally 
related reforms, i.e. ALMPs, unemployment benefit reforms, etc. For example, as shown 
across quantitative and qualitative Chapters of the thesis, economic or wider political 
economy challenges remained across European countries for the covered time period, 
yet only when beneficial to political leaders’ intra-party or electoral platforms did 
reforms typically emerge.  
 
To illustrate, the Third Way ideological platform changed the approach to reforms in 
both Germany and Denmark, in the sense of being essential to the emergence and 
continued leadership of Gerhard Schroder – vis-à-vis Oscar Lafontaine, and Poul Nyrup 
Rasmussen – vis-à-vis Svend Auken (see Chapter 3 and 5, respectively). As for Tony 
Blair in the UK, there was no need for further reforms, as they had already been 
completed – indeed, the Third Way approach was in that case simply used to maintain 
already flexible labour markets. Hence, as argued also by Arndt (2013), the Third Way 
changed the ideological-political premise for reforms in Denmark, the UK and Germany, 
including liberalizing reforms within traditional social democratic parties. Yet further, as 
underlined by the research in this thesis, the link to intra-party leadership politics also 
was non-trivial.  
 
In brief, the general transmission mechanism for successful reforms (at the margin) from 
the research of this thesis appears to run as follows: as predicted by the existing literature 
the ability to enact labour market reforms for European politicians emerges from 
economic challenges to governments, with social models and producer coalitions likely 
to refract the proposed reforms towards marginal reforms. Yet, as shown in this thesis, 
reforms are more likely to be enacted if they substantially favour party leaders’ positions 
or their responses to changing political conditions, i.e. the emergence of Third Way 
ideology, party system changes, and historical political support for specific types of 
programmes that enhance social partners’ standing or participation – for example 
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ALMPs in Denmark, so-called insertion programmes in France, or “rights-and duties” 
and voluntaristic-cum-flexibility traditions in Germany and the UK, respectively. 
 
Further it is worth noting that the suggested transmission mechanism for reforms adds a 
caveat to the contention that the evidence presented does not allow rejection of the 
hypothesis that the political-electoral impact of enacting reforms would be the most 
likely determinant of whether or not labour market reforms are enacted. That is because, 
while the hypothesis is about political ability it also acknowledges that politicians are 
inclined to avoid implementing reforms because of the likely electoral risks, i.e. the 
Juncker dictum of reforms leading to an almost “guaranteed” loss in subsequent 
elections. This dictum is, in the main, supported by the existing literature relating to the 
hypothesis, as discussed in Chapter 1 (cf. Leiner-Killinger et. al.; Bean, 1998; Saint-
Paul, 2000).   
 
However, the caveat is that subsequent elections were not lost by reform enacting 
politicians in the UK and Denmark, but were lost by Gerhard Schroder in Germany 
following the so-called Hartz reforms. Further, in the case of France, re-election was 
somewhat irrelevant as Amable showed no government was re-elected at all in the 
period covered by the thesis, suggesting a systemic polity issue for the case of France 
(Amable, 2012). Instead, for France, reforming politicians – most often unsuccessfully, 
even if they were proponents of reforms, reforms typically only put forward as part of 
politicians setting forth Presidential ambitions (cf. Petit, 2006). 
 
Hence, while the hypothesis is not rejected, the results are mixed when focusing on re-
election as the main impediment or driver of politicians’ abilities to enact reforms. 
Rather, the underlying general idea that “politics matters” comes to the fore, which is 
perhaps a somewhat novel result given the existing literature’s tendency to focus more 
narrowly on electoral results following reforms – exemplified by the Juncker dictum, as 
the reason for lacking ability to enact reforms. Certainly a result, which this thesis 
suggests warrants further research.    
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Therefore, through the cross-country quantitative and then country-by-country 
qualitative analysis presented, rather than reject both hypotheses the thesis shows the 
need to engage or “control” for political economy pressures for reforms by combining 
political and economic variables within a longitudinal understanding of country-specific 
reform trajectories. Of course, even when doing so, there continues to be a range of 
country-specific explanations for reforms. That said, the thesis has added robustness to 
the existing literature showing that most pre-2008 European reforms were indeed at the 
margin, targeting non-regular employment within European labour markets (Boeri, 
2011). That said, in some cases like Germany, it does appear as if the longitudinal 
trajectory of liberalizing reforms at the margin became cumulatively more significant –
potentially as a sign of overall rather than just marginal liberalization, and certainly as a 
driver of labour market dualization (Palier and Thelen, 2010).  
 
Overall, the thesis has contributed a political understanding of the European reform 
trajectory up to 2008. The implications for future research are that the enactment of 
flexibility enhancing reforms should be treated more explicitly as the outcomes of 
political decisions and less as reactive steps to economic predictions or pressures for 
reforms, even if the latter continues to play a role in bringing reforms on to the political 
agenda. However, before reviewing or discussing those common themes emerging from 
the thesis further, the subsequent sections review the findings of the quantitative and 
qualitative Chapters of the thesis in light of the mixed-methods guide set out in Chapter 
1.  
 
7.2 Political-economic pressures on governments for reforms 
In Chapter 1, the reasoning behind using a mixed-methods was, in part, to avoid a bias 
between arguments for continuity or divergence in respect of European structural 
reforms across and within countries (Gualmini and Hopkin, 2009). Yet just as important 
was to have a method that would allow appropriate hypothesis testing. First, a 
quantitative approach was arguably more appropriate to understand the impact of 
political economy variables on the ability of politicians to enact reforms. An argument 
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which has been borne out by the quantitative analysis in Chapter 2, which helped to start 
identifying statistically significant explanatory variables across EU15 countries. Further, 
as the descriptive statistics presented in Chapters 1 and 2 showed, reforms are the result 
of a continuous political process. Therefore, an event history analysis was selected as the 
method for quantitative analysis because it uniquely provides the ability to test political 
change processes over time (Martin and Steiner, 2013; Barriga, 2004; Box-
Steffensmeier, 2004). 
 
The results from the event history analysis in Chapter 2 showed rather unequivocally 
that economic and wider political economy variables like social model belonging play a 
role that need to be, if not necessarily statistically controlled for, then certainly 
qualitatively taken into account when reviewing in-country and cross-country political 
motivations for reform enactment. That economic or wider political economy variables 
matter is not surprising given the extensive literature on change and continuity of social 
models, which depends on variations in political economy institutional configurations 
for their socio-economic outcomes (Sapir, 2003; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Esping-
Andersen, 1996).  
 
From that perspective, the results of the event history analysis in Chapter 2 are 
straightforward to interpret in that high levels of unemployment, faltering GDP growth 
and the social model or political economy variety of a country were statistically 
significant in explaining EPL reforms across the most integrated EU Member States 
from 1985 to 2008. Further, the EU15 between 1985-2008 exhibited a reform trajectory 
showing a change towards labour market flexibility of about 25% for the overall EPL 
measure: the summary overall EPL score for EU15 countries decreased from 39 in 1985 
to 29 in 2008. However, the thesis showed that the change for temporary EPL was a 
large -16 versus that of regular EPL, which was more subdued at only -4 between 1985 
and 2008. Hence, the two-tiered nature of the reforms emerging from Chapter 2’s 
analysis adds robustness to the marginal reforms argument by economists, which 
signalled a gap ‘emerging between a reformed and an unreformed segment of the labour 
market’ (Boeri, 2011:1185).  
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In addition, most EU15 countries completed several reforms – observed as multiple 
downwards EPL events, confirming a longitudinal political process of European labour 
market flexibility reforms at the margin. To wit, from 1985 to 2008 only three EU15 
group countries decreased their labour market flexibility, namely the UK, Ireland and 
France – with the main reforms enacted by the UK not visible in Chapter 2’s analysis 
because, as shown in Chapter 4, they happened before 1985 when the OECD EPL 
indicator first became available.  
 
Further, given the theoretical importance of social models, a Kaplan-Meier set of 
survivor functions were used to differentiate EU15 countries according to their social 
model, as defined by Sapir, either: Continental, Nordic, Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon 
(Sapir, 2006). Except for the Anglo-Saxon model countries (UK and Ireland) the 
estimator confirmed the directional trend in labour market flexibility reforms. The key 
difference between social models being shown in Chapter 2 being the timing rather than 
the intensity with which countries within a social model would eventually reform their 
labour markets. Importantly, the survivor functions were significantly different using a 
log-rank test, meaning that the statistical analysis supported the descriptive identification 
of a European trend in labour market reforms towards more flexibility.  
 
A carefully specified Cox proportional hazard event history gap model was then used to 
show that the following explanatory variables were statistically significant: political 
constraints or sticky institutions (where reforms have many veto points in the political 
system of a country), GDP growth, a country’s belonging to a specific social model, and 
the unemployment rate of a country. Somewhat surprising, globalization and openness to 
trade were not significant and so it was also not possible to make a clear assertion 
around any potential Europeanization impact of European labour market flexibility 
reforms. Equally, the ideological leaning left-centre-right of governments was not found 
to be significant – indicating that both left and right leaning governments were able and 
willing to implement reforms, even if mainly towards reforms at the margin as already 
defined above.  
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Most importantly, the quantitative analysis in Chapter 2 showed that within the 
European reform trajectory, political-economic arguments cannot stand on their own as 
determinants of reforms. Instead, the combination of economic challenges to 
governments and political-electoral or political system changes in variables like political 
system veto points, also proved to be statistically significant. Hence, the political system 
variable of sticky institutions or veto points, but also lack of ideological importance of 
reforming coalitions indicated quantitatively that the thesis hypothesis of political-
electoral challenges as explanatory for reforms was at least as important as economic 
variables like growth and unemployment.  
 
The implication methodologically was two-fold, as seen in the execution of the country-
case studies, the results of which will be reviewed below. The first was that each EPL 
event of a country undergoing reforms and its politics would need to be understood for 
the coalitions that supported it. The second was to try to discern what the impact of the 
statistically significant variables in Chapter 2 looked like qualitatively, using both 
primary and secondary sources, in each country case. The results of explicitly focusing 
on reform events – and in some cases non-events, therefore provided a set of country 
specific, but also general findings with respect to what has determined labour market 
reforms in Europe up to 2008. The political-electoral variables for explaining labour 
market reforms in Europe are reviewed, below.   
 
7.3 Political-electoral variables determining reforms 
As part of the mixed-methods approach, the thesis used country-case studies for 
Germany, the UK, Denmark and France as a follow-on to the statistical investigation of 
reform events in Chapter 2. Doing so was useful to provide the opportunity for an 
examination of ‘within-case processes and/or variation’ derived from the quantitative 
analysis and theoretical background of the thesis outlined in Chapter 1 (Lieberman, 
2005:440). However, the selected cases also needed to ‘theory test’ the posed research 
hypotheses (George and Bennett, 2005:75). Two theoretical criteria were specified to 
ensure a theory test component to the research design and case selection. The criteria are 
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repeated below, then related to the results of each case study and how, if at all, the 
qualitative findings are consistent with the quantitative ones from Chapter 2.  
 
The criteria set out were that each case needed to help (1) test the specified research 
hypotheses and (2) provide a better understanding of the determinants of the observed 
variation on the dependent variable of EPL reform events. Starting with the UK and 
Germany, those two countries were ideal as tests for the two main strands of social 
models in Europe both within Sapir’s typology of continental and Anglo-Saxon 
countries, and the varieties of capitalism coordinated and liberal market economy 
typology. More importantly, in terms of the criteria both Germany and the UK showed a 
trajectory of labour market reforms in a liberalizing direction. In fact, both at least to 
some extent, were shown to have gone slightly beyond marginal reforms. In the sense 
that reforms in Germany and the UK were shown to politically chart new ground for 
both the achievement and sustainment of reforms, reforms going to the limits of each of 
their respective social models at the time.  
 
To illustrate in the case of the UK, Margaret Thatcher completed significant labour 
market flexibility enhancing reforms against the UK post-war political consensus, 
making the UK the most liberalized of the liberal social model countries in Europe 
during the period covered by the thesis (Wood, 2001). As such, the UK confirmed the 
criterion of exhibiting variation on the dependent variable. Yet most UK reforms were 
completed before the EPL variable became available from the OECD in 1985. For this 
reason, the qualitative Chapter on the UK proved useful in completing the picture on UK 
EPL and functionally linked reforms in a way that would have been difficult, if not 
impossible to achieve quantitatively. At the same time, the reforms observed 
quantitatively in Chapter 2 did show the UK to have had two small increases (less 
flexibility) in EPL from 1985 onwards, both reforms enacted under New Labour 
governments led by Tony Blair.  
 
Yet for the UK, reviewing the results of the analysis across both quantitative and 
qualitative Chapters, a trajectory of liberalization and its sustainment, even during New 
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Labour, is the most accurate representation of UK politician’s ability to enact reforms. 
With reference to the Conservatives’ reforms under Margaret Thatcher, the UK 
trajectory supports or at least does not contradict the contention that the enactment of 
reforms was evidence of a re-alignment of the UK labour market to its historic levels of 
Anglo-Saxon flexibility (Wood, 2001). Further, that the reformed inflexibility, enacted 
by Thatcher’s early governments through the 1980 and 1982 Employment Acts, had 
been done against a backdrop of an ‘almost continuous expansion of the individual rights 
of the employee’ through the 1960s and 70s (Marsh, 1995:603). 
 
However, with respect to the second criteria of understanding what determined them, 
UK reforms were achieved in the case Thatcher as part of changes in the political policy 
approach that accompanied her rise to Prime Minister in 1979 with the political economy 
problem or background of the Winter of Discontent. Further, as argued in the UK 
Chapter of this thesis, the intra-party need for Thatcher to make a U-turn on existing 
Conservative labour market policy, and to consolidate her party leadership through a 
clear demonstration of neo-liberal reforms to stand out or break off from the post-war 
consensus, were politically critical to the labour market liberalization that followed.  
 
Following through on the trajectory of UK reforms, the thesis showed that liberalizing 
reforms in their flexibility of labour market intent were then sustained by New Labour 
from 1997, until at least the 2008 Great Recession, albeit with minor EPL modifications 
and an expansion of ALMPs. Implied in that trajectory were, as would be expected, 
challenges of GDP growth and unemployment that certainly put pressure on successive 
governments for various EPL and functionally-related labour market reforms. Overall, 
therefore, in terms of the research question and hypothesis of this thesis, the UK case 
does not provide evidence to reject the hypothesis that labour market flexibility reforms, 
or lack thereof, are best explained by a political focus on solving political-economy 
problems, e.g. severe economic problems as was the case at the time of the Winter of 
Discontent. It does, however, not confirm it either as the trajectory showed that the 
enactment of reforms under the Conservatives and the lack of reforms under New 
Labour were politically motivated in support of both the Conservative and New 
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Labour’s party leaders intra-party positions. Hence, explaining reforms in the UK goes 
beyond classic economic pressures for reform and point instead to at least a combined 
economic and political-electoral explanation for the enacted reforms. 
 
Now turning to Germany, the case study confirmed that the so-called Hartz reforms 
meant Germany fell in a category of a case with variation on the dependent variable of 
EPL (Neugart, 2005). Overall, German reforms were achieved even as it was also shown 
how the continental social model refracted reforms, as did the built-in reform breakers of 
the German political system. First, as expected from the existing literature and 
demonstrated in the quantitative Chapter of the thesis, GDP growth and unemployment 
put pressure on successive governments for reforms. However, for the most part, 
producer coalitions were generally able to ensure that EPL stayed the course during the 
Kohl years (Hassel, 2005; Wood, 2001).   
 
Second, the non-EPL reform of German reunification was an important change to the 
German political economy let alone political system, which ultimately provided a 
political backdrop for later labour market reforms because of the stark difference in 
factor costs between East and West (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011). The result became a 
trajectory of EPL reforms that produced the 1998 Social Code III, 2002 Job-Aqtiv, and 
2003-2005 Hartz reforms. In other words, Germany achieved a significant level of 
reforms when viewed from a longitudinal perspective. 
 
The German case contribution to answering the research question becomes clearer if 
accepting that while Schroeder faced union and intra-SPD resistance to labour market 
reforms, he also like Kohl had had few intra-party incentives to implement reforms in his 
first government from 1998 to 2002. Yet the German party system and SPD intra-party 
politics arguably transitioned to change that. For example, Schroder’s electoral platforms 
moved between his first successful election in 1998, which used an anti liberal platform 
against the CDU/CSU, to the more centrist even liberal Third Way inspired platform of 
the 2002 election (Arndt, 2013:103).  
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Further, German parliamentary and SPD intra-party changes shifted the political space 
within which Schroder was able to or decided to propose reforms to further his 
leadership of the SPD. First, the resurrection of the PDS/Left party (an offshoot of the 
former East German communist party) rose to a point where it no longer struggled to 
exceed the 5% electoral threshold for parliamentary representation (Arndt, 2013). 
Secondly but related to the rise of the Left/PDS, Schroder was no longer, if ever, able to 
appeal to the SPD party’s left wing electoral wing. 
 
That was because that space was occupied by Oscar Lafontaine, whom Schroder made 
his first Finance Minister. Then, when Oscar Lafontaine left the SPD in protest at the 
liberalizing Hartz reforms, very publicly advertising his defence of more left-leaning 
social democratic values in his aptly titled book ‘The Heart Beats on the Left’ 
(Lafontaine, 2000), Schroder effectively lost the 2005 election. Hence, ironically, the 
intra-party change to the third Way and the rise of Left/PDS that had helped him against 
Lafontaine on his SPD party leadership, through going forward with reforms, most likely 
then cost him the 2005 election as he ultimately was not able to convince enough centrist 
voters to move to the SPD. The wider implication that confirms this is that German 
governments have since 2005 been grand coalitions between CDU/CSU and the SPD.  
  
Again, the case of Germany supports the thesis argument that the reform challenge 
remains first and foremost a political challenge. Further, as shown in the example of 
reforms represented by the Hartz program, the self-sacrifice espoused by Schroeder 
belies the success and failure of his Third Way, but lends support to the thesis hypothesis 
that it is most likely a combination of economic challenges to governments and political-
electoral advantages to reforming political parties and their leaders that offers a more 
precise understanding of the conditions for European labour market flexibility enhancing 
reforms.  
 
For Denmark, the case study showed reforms increasing overall flexibility, with a 
pattern of reforms strikingly similar to the reform pattern observed for Germany. As 
such, labour market flexibility reforms were achieved as a response to classic political 
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economy challenges of high unemployment in the early 1990s. However, the Nordic 
social model refracted reforms, resulting in a move from passive to active labour market 
policies, and full liberalization of EPL – lowering temporary EPL to the already low 
level of regular EPL that Denmark had historically exhibited.  
 
To illustrate with respect to the determinants of reforms for Denmark, under Prime 
Minister Poul Schluter in the 1980s, high national debt and unemployment put political 
economy pressures on his successive governments for reforms. However, the Danish 
political system made gaining a parliamentary majority a challenge and therefore the 
pre-existing low levels of regular EPL and generous, but passive, welfare remained in 
place. With the exception of Schluter lowering the cost of welfare by de-indexation of 
unemployment benefits, other areas ripe for reforms like unemployment insurance 
remained largely unreformed (Thelen, 2014; Green-Pedersen, 2001).  
 
That changed with the social democratic led government under Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, 
which from 1993 for a brief period gained a parliamentary majority providing the ability 
to enact a key 1994 reform. A reform that both lowered temporary EPL and changed the 
dynamics of Danish ALMPs towards enforced active rather than passive unemployment 
support. In terms of the corresponding moves in the EPL proxy for reforms, the results 
were that between 1985 and 2008 Denmark kept regular EPL comparatively low at just 
below 2 on the 0-6 OECD scale, but then went from just above 3 to just shy of 1.5 for 
temporary EPL. As a summary, Nyrup Rasmussen gave up on improving the labour 
market through wage compression and instead significantly increased investments in 
ALPMs, resulting in what for Denmark was a ‘significant shift towards liberalization 
through activation’ (Thelen, 2014:151). 
 
At the intra-party level, Nyrup Rasmussen moved forward in a similar way to that of 
Schroder in Germany. Namely, through an ideological move to the Third Way as an 
anchor of Nyrup Rasmussens’ party leadership. A change had further come about by the 
Social Democratic party unceremoniously discarding its then party leader, Svend Auken, 
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even after the latter had won a historically high overall share of votes in the preceding 
general election (Jorgensen and Schulze, 2010). 
 
The Danish case, therefore, does not provide evidence to reject hypothesis that labour 
market flexibility reforms, or lack thereof, are best explained by a political focus on 
solving government problems, e.g. high levels of unemployment, or maintaining 
institutional continuity. It does, however, not confirm it either as the trajectory showed a 
persistence of similar-type economic pressures on governments across the trajectory of 
reforms under Schluter in the 1980s and early 1990s as well as the early governments of 
Nyrup Rasmussen.  
 
Although the trajectory of reforms does not have a large number of reform events, which 
somewhat limits the generalizability of the argument, the trajectory of Danish labour 
market reforms leading up to the Great Recession coincided with intra-party, party 
political, and parliamentary majority alignment changes rather than continuity. As such, 
the Danish case provides support for the idea that a better understanding of the trajectory 
of reforms, via a longitudinal analysis of reforms enacted, helps to clarify the political 
challenge of enacting reforms.  
 
Interestingly, and different from the German case but similar to the UK, Denmark 
presents a case where an elected leader confronts political economy pressures for 
reforms, enacts reforms, and then gets re-elected. In that respect the Nyrup Rasmussen 
government and his re-election after the 1994 reforms is more akin to that of the UK, 
even if the reforms enacted were not as drastic as those of Margaret Thatcher. More 
importantly, the cases of the UK and Demark together challenge the conventional 
wisdom that labour market reforms will necessarily lose party leaders their next election.  
 
Finally, the last case study for France was a case of no-reform, at least as far as EPL 
went. In the case of France, the expectation one of limited variation on the dependent 
variable in terms of the theoretical criteria for case country selection (See Chapter 1). As 
such, the thesis confirmed that labour market flexibility reforms remained an unfulfilled 
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challenge, even if on closer inspection of EPL events the French reform trajectory was 
somewhat contradictory (Marx, 2012). That said, the French labour market remained 
overall inflexible, and increasingly so relative to other EU15 countries up to 2008.  
 
In addition, a number of reform attempts failed. A result showing that without change at 
the political level, for political coalitions to form, economic problems of government are 
unlikely to be successful. To illustrate, political choices were made in the case of France 
to address challenges like high unemployment, especially youth unemployment without 
resorting to EPL reforms. Instead, insertion policies of various types were introduced 
and interacted with the use of existing FTC (temporary EPL) contracts to provide labour 
market flexibility. An approach which meant that an increasing number of jobs shifted to 
those programs or FTC contract modalities resulting in France becoming a case of labour 
market dualization (Palier and Thelen, 2010).  
 
However, politically in terms of answering the thesis research question, whether or not 
dualization is a desirable outcome, the trajectory of EPL and functionally related reform 
events like the insertion programs draws attention to failed politics of reforms. For 
example, comparatively, while France started privatizing industry in the early 1980s – 
comparable to Thatcher’s UK labour market reforms, the UK went further by de-
regulating unions and adopting a monetary policy leading to an overall reduction in the 
state’s role. In Denmark, the focus was on maintaining political support for high levels 
of flexibility by compensating through flexicurity; and in the case of Germany, the direct 
involvement of producer coalitions and unions set up a trajectory of collaboration 
between governments and social partners for overall coordination of labour market 
reforms. 
 
For France, a model of reform involving social partners was initially successful in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, but was discontinued. Therefore, comparatively across all 
four cases, France becomes a case of no-reforms. The reason arguably being that the 
combination of both economic challenges and political changes that had led to reforms 
in the other cases were not present in France. Hence, France was unable to join the 
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European trajectory of liberalizing reforms. Overall, for France the reforms that were 
implemented support the hypothesis that economic pressures can lead to a trajectory of 
contradictory reforms, but without aligning political change, the overall trajectory 
remains flat with respect to EPL.  
 
In sum, neither the UK, German, Danish or French cases provide evidence to reject the 
hypothesis that labour market flexibility reforms are best explained by a political focus 
solely on solving economic political-economy, e.g. high levels of unemployment, or 
maintaining institutional continuity. Rather, the cases show that when the political 
conditions are present, when change rather than continuity of the electoral-political 
incentives and/or intra-party dynamics prevail, then flexibility enhancing or liberalizing 
reforms can and did take place in the period to 2008. As such, the cases lend support to 
the thesis argument that it is more likely than not the combination of economic and 
political-electoral conditions that explain the ability of politicians to enact labour market 
flexibility reforms.  
7.4 Discussion  
Change and continuity for European labour market reforms have in this thesis been 
illustrated to follow-on and add robustness to the literature arguing most pre-2008 
reforms were mainly at the margin, targeting non-regular employment parts of labour 
markets (Boeri, 2011). However, the thesis also posits that reform determining junctures 
of a political nature have guided labour market change and continuity during the same 
period. From leadership-driven ideology changes like Thatcher’s neo-liberal approach to 
reforms, the Social Democratic parties move to the Third Way, which opened new 
avenues for reforms in the 1990s, and intra-party leadership and electoral competition, 
the politics have come to the fore when determining what explains reforms.  
 
Overall, the contribution of this thesis has therefore been to provide a longitudinal 
perspective on determinants of labour market reforms from a political perspective. A 
perspective that theoretically fits within the emerging research focused on ‘analysis of 
the political coalitions on which economic institutions rest’ and through which they can 
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and have been reformed, as demonstrated both quantitatively and qualitatively in this 
thesis (Thelen, 2012:139). As such, the thesis posits that economic or problems of 
government arguments, prevalent in the existing literature as a competing explanation 
for reforms, rarely on their own stand up as determinants of politician’s ability to enact 
reforms. Instead, the argument put forward by this thesis is that, based on the evidence 
presented across the empirical Chapters, a general set of political-electoral and party 
leadership considerations need to be brought to bear when trying to determine what 
explains the ability to enact reforms.  
 
If correct, even within a somewhat ambitious mixed-methods approach where the thesis 
has addressed the research question within the limiting assumptions of using EPL as a 
proxy for reforms, then one possible implication for future research is that the enactment 
of reforms should be treated more explicitly as the outcome of political decisions. That 
is, less as a reactive step or steps to economic predictions or political economy pressures 
for reforms in the traditional sense – even if, as recognised in this thesis, European social 
models often continue to refract the form, intensity and type of reforms that politician 
have been able to enact.  
 
Therefore, the tentative answer offered for the research question of what explains the 
political ability to enact flexibility enhancing labour market reforms in European 
countries, is that it is more likely than not a combination of traditional political-economy 
pressures for reforms and political-electoral motives of party leaders in government, 
changes the latter of which influences the ability of party leaders to establish reform 
enacting coalitions. Further, those motivations are not necessarily, as conventional 
wisdom would dictate, only hinged on immediate re-election considerations. Rather, as 
shown in this thesis, successful reform coalitions may also depend on alignment of the 
ideology and intra-party dynamics underpinning party leaders and, in some cases, party 
system changes that have affected the ability of those leaders to promote a reform 
agenda.  
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To illustrate, the French case stood out as one where political incentives were absent for 
politicians to enact reforms even if the economic challenges were aplenty or clearly 
evident during the period up to 2008. Would-be reformers from both left and right-
leaning parties at the French Prime Ministerial level did not fare well, regardless, in their 
(failed) attempts at labour market reforms. Similarly, but in a broader context for the 
cases of Germany, the UK, and Denmark where reforms were enacted, and linking the 
quantitative and qualitative findings, the respective social model appears to have set an 
implicit boundary for the reforms that were successful.  
 
For example, Denmark implemented a reduction in temporary EPL and added focus was 
put on ALMPs that fitted within the Main Agreement Framework and produced the 
politically successful flexicurity model. In Germany, the Hartz reforms appealed to a 
renewal of the rights and duties underpinning of the highly legalistic traditions of the 
German labour market, yet passed appeared only as Gerhard Schroder moved to the 
Third Way with the intra-party and electoral ramifications that brought for his 
subsequent failed re-election. Whereas in the UK, the liberalization of the labour market 
by Margaret Thatcher and its subsequent sustainment by a New Labour government 
under Tony Blair played to the long term strengths of liberal market economies, yet also 
clearly had a basis in the promotion and maintenance of the respective party leaders 
against internal opposition, e.g. Wets for Thatcher and the Unions for Blair. For both the 
Danish and UK reforms, the party leaders were also re-elected. 
 
As a conclusion, the thesis has added robustness to the literature showing most pre-2008 
global recession reforms were at the margin, targeting non-regular employment parts of 
European labour markets. However, overall, the thesis has provided new knowledge on 
the pathways of European reforms, arguing that a political understanding of change and 
continuity is as critical as economic arguments for reforms, the latter of which rarely on 
their own stand up as explanatory variables of reforms. The implications for explaining 
the ability of politicians to enact reforms, is that future research needs to pair the policy 
ambition of reforms with an explicitly analysis of political change and continuity.  
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